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AQIM appeared on the Algerian landscape in 2007 after the merger between Al Qaeda and 
the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) with the objective of expanding its existing 
network in North Africa and the Sahel region. Within a relatively short period, AQIM 
adopted Al Qaeda tactics of suicide bombings targeting foreign institutions. It rapidly grew 
into one of the most dangerous terrorist groups operating in North Africa. Forging links with 
other militant Islamist groups such as Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and Ansar Dine, AQIM 
became an influential player within the terrorist network of that region. Pressure from 
security forces in Algeria propelled the group to seek refuge in Mali where the 2012 conflict 
provided a safe haven for the group. Operation Serval launched by the French military in 
2013 dealt a severe setback to AQIM since many of its fighters were killed and others 
dispersed to other parts of the region. From that period onwards, there has been a reduction in 
terror attacks and bombings. Yet, an increase in kidnapping of foreigners for ransom coupled 
with drug and contraband trafficking signalled a transformation in the modus operandi of the 
group.  
 
In trying to understand this trend, the study employed a qualitative method of data collection 
to examine the AQIM phenomenon. This involved applying the crime-terror paradigm in 
order to assess the evolution of AQIM from a terror group with political and religious 
intentions into a group engaged in criminal activities with economic motivations. Using 
desktop research and document analysis the study made concerted efforts to understand the 
causes and motivations of AQIM with the view to contribute towards formulating counter-
terrorism measures that are more effective to address the threat of terrorism in the Sahel and 
North Africa. The findings of this study revealed inter alia that AQIM is a hybrid entity that 
displays both terrorist and criminal motivations which are determined by the context within 
which the group finds itself. One of the recommendations of this study is that concerted effort 
towards effectively countering the threat of terrorism is needed in order to ensure a holistic 
approach towards engaging this terrorist threat. In this regard, any strategy should include 
inter-regional information sharing among states and the creation of a joint commitment of 
forces in the Sahel with the aim of undertaking joint transnational operations along the 
borders. By so doing, terrorism could be contained even if it is not completely annihilated.  
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 General Introduction and Background 
 
1.1 Introduction: Setting the Scene 
The emergence of Al Qaeda on the global scene is often associated with the events of 
September 11th 2001. This is partly due to the fact that it was the first time in history that a 
terrorist organisation had conducted an attack outside of its local territory. However, Al 
Qaeda terrorism can be traced back to the twin bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and 
Mombasa in 1998. The group further established its tentacles within the African region when 
on 11 April 2002 Al Qaeda launched an attack against the Ghriba synagogue situated on the 
Tunisian island of Djerba. After a hiatus of exactly five years, Al Qaeda marked its return 
with three suicide bombings in the city of Algiers. This event not only represented the 
beginning of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but it also ushered in the reign of 
terror that would engulf North Africa for the subsequent years. The danger of AQIM lies in 
its ever-evolving nature of its operations and its flexibility to adapt to current situations.  
AQIM has become one of the most dominant terrorist groups in Africa as its influence can be 
noted on militant groups such as the Boko Haram and Al Shabaab and its threats shows no 
sign of abating. Consequently, to comprehend the workings of AQIM and the dangers it 
poses, it is necessary to examine the historical context which incubated and precipitated its 
birth and growth and this can be traced back to a decade and a half prior to the renaming of 
the group.   
 
In 1992, Algeria, on the verge of becoming the first Islamic nation to transit from 
authoritarianism to democratic pluralism, was about to enter into the annals of history as the 
first elected Islamic republic (Le Sueur, 2010). A military coup abruptly halted the process 
and paved the way for a near decade-long civil war between the state and militant Islamic 
groups. In this context, one of the militant groups, Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) or the 
Armed Islamic Group in English – the antecedent to the Salafist Group for the Combat and 
Preaching (GSPC) and later Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – capitalised on the 
grievance of the population to justify its attacks on the state. Eventually, after losing the 
support of the people due to its belligerent and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, the GIA 
splintered and the GSPC was formed. In addition to adopting the GIA’s ideology of 
overthrowing the government and transforming Algeria into an Islamic state, the GSPC 
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further sought to extend its reach beyond Algeria by extending its caliphate into North Africa 
as a whole. The merger between Al Qaeda and GSPC in 2007 concretized this vision as the 
group adopted the name Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Chivvis & Liepman 2013:5).  In a 
nutshell, this marks the genesis of terrorism in the Maghreb region which is the focus of the 
present study. 
 
In a relatively short period, the reenergized AQIM began employing Al Qaeda tactics of 
suicide bombings and targeting of foreign institutions and, in a relatively short period of time, 
the group became one of the most feared terror groups in Algeria. As the indiscriminate 
attacks increased, so did the casualties who included non-combatants amongst whom were 
women and children. The group eventually abandoned this method of assault due to the 
decline in support from the populace which in turn dealt a massive blow to their recruiting 
capacity. Furthermore, pressure from security forces in Algeria propelled the group to seek 
refuge in Mali where the 2012 conflict provided a safe haven for the group until the French 
military launched operation Serval  in 2013 (Le Monde, 2013). Afterwards, AQIM retreated 
in hiding, reassessing their plans of operation. This resulted in the decrease in the number of 
terror attacks executed by this terrorist group. Inversely, in recent times there has been an 
increase in the kidnapping of foreigners for ransom and trafficking of drugs and contraband 
by members of the group. This latter trend exemplifies an evolution of the group’s modus 
operandi. 
 
Despite the fact that the group has not been in the spotlight in recent times for terrorist 
attacks, the danger that it poses has not diminished. It is imperative, therefore, to establish the 
type of group that AQIM has metamorphosed into in order to proffer recommendations to 
curb any threat that the group may pose either presently or in the near future both in north 
Africa and the entire African continent as a whole. In this context, it is crucial to examine the 
background, emergence, ideology and evolution of AQIM. Although the latter’s theatre of 
operations stretches throughout the Sahel region into northern Mali, Niger, Mauritania and 
Chad, the group still maintains a predominantly Algerian support base. Furthermore, despite 
having adopted the name Al Qaeda in its designation, the group still pertains to the ideology 
of its predecessor, namely, the GSPC. Against this backdrop, this thesis examines the history 
of the militant group AQIM not only from the time of its emergence in the post-coup era in 
Algeria but rather from the original event that inspired the birth of jihadi extremists in 
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Algeria, namely, the Algerian war of independence that transpired between 1956 -1962 
(Volpi, 2003:32).  
 
1.1.1 The origins of the Algerian civil war 
Within two years of winning the war of independence, the Algerian populace faced another 
political turmoil in the form of a military coup after which ensued almost three decades of 
single party rule (Le Sueur 2010: 19). In the economic sphere, the strong reliance on 
industrialisation at the expense of agriculture initially had a positive effect but eventually led 
to a near collapse in the economy as unemployment soared with the youth finding themselves 
as the targeted victims. Furthermore, the people were prevented from expressing their 
grievances through protests as this would only exacerbate the amount of force that the 
military and security forces would use as means to repress the crowd. Although the 
government eventually allowed other political parties to participate in the 1990 elections, it 
had no intention of ceding power to the upcoming incumbent. Thus after losing the first 
round of elections and anticipating a second round loss, the military stepped in and cancelled 
the elections. This event became a historical moment for Algeria as it marked the beginning 
of one of the longest civil wars in the history of North Africa. It also precipitated the 
emergence of one of the longest operational jihadi groups in Africa.  
 
In this milieu, it becomes clear that religious terrorism, in this instance jihadi terrorism, does 
not incubate inside a vacuum but rather there are underlying causes such as political 
grievance, poor governance and lack of economic opportunities that stimulate the perfect 
conditions for it to develop. Consequently, this has led scholars to ascribe the root causes of 
conflict into two broad paradigms, namely, the greed and grievance categories. Furthermore, 
a pivotal point to note is that once terror groups are formed, they do not remain as static 
entities. As the leadership of the group changes - in the event of the leader being replaced or 
killed - so does the group’s ideology and modus operandi. Similarly to a business enterprise, 
a terrorist group needs funds to function and thus sources of funding become a crucial 
element for their survival. However, as Makarenko (2004) notes,  it is often the case that in 
an attempt to scour for funding, the group’s ideology changes and the desire for profit 
overshadows its original political/religious goal, albeit the group still makes recourse to the 
latter if only for recruiting new members. It is with this elucidation in mind that this study 
attempts to study the evolution of AQIM from the time of its inception to its present day 
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functioning in order to determine whether the group still remains a terror group focusing on 
economic gains as a source of funding or if it has turned into an organised crime group using 
terror tactics as a means of further its economic interests. 
   
1.2 Research Problem 
The recent decline in the terror activities of AQIM in the Sahel might be perceived by many 
as a sign of victory against the Islamic militant group. After operation Serval, conducted by 
the French military in Northern Mali in January 2013, AQIM went into hiding to the relief of 
the international community who believed that the group might have finally been defeated. 
Furthermore, AQIM has not conducted any major attacks since that epoch, albeit splinter 
groups associated to it continue to launch small-scale assaults against military and foreign 
interests in the Sahel region, for instance, the Mali restaurant bombing and the Tunisian 
museum attack inter alia. Moreover, as previously mentioned, although there has been a great 
reduction in terror attacks by AQIM, kidnapping of foreigners for ransom and trafficking of 
drugs and contraband signals have increased, signalling a transformation of the modus 
operandi of the group. As a result, scholars have turned their attention towards other active 
groups in the Sahel, such as the Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and the Islamic State (ISIL) 
contributing towards a decrease in literature on AQIM. However, a caveat is that failure in 
understanding the group’s current functioning and operations due to the myopic 
misconception that it has been defeated, may result in serious social and security 
repercussions in the near future. 
 
Given this dearth of information relating to the current state of AQIM, it becomes imperative 
to undertake a comprehensive study that will provide an analysis of the group in view of 
examining the threat and danger that it poses to the Sahel and beyond. Hence, this study aims 
to provide a thorough analysis of AQIM with the view of offering suggestions to academics 
and policy makers on how to curb the threat of AQIM and other similar militant groups who 
follow similar traits. 
 
1.3 Research Hypothesis 
The thesis of this study asks whether AQIM has transformed from a terror group with 




1.4 Research Objectives  
The aim of this study is to contribute to the existing literature on AQIM in order to produce 
sufficient data that will provide the basis for understanding the group’s current activities. To 
this end, the following objectives guided the study from its conceptualisation: 
a) To examine and analyse the links between weak states, greed and grievance, the crime-
terror nexus and AQIM terrorism in the Sahel.  
b) To contribute to the literature that aims to provide an understanding of the evolution of 
AQIM in the Sahel region. 
c) To establish how AQIM has evolved over time. 
d) To suggest alternative measures and policies aimed at addressing the threat of terrorism in 
the Sahel region and the rest of Africa. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
From these objectives flow the following research questions: 
a) What are the origins, modus operandi, motivations and objectives of AQIM in the Sahel? 
b) To what extent has AQIM evolved from a religious terror group into an organised 
criminal network? 
c) Is AQIM linked with any organised crime groups? 
d) Are the current counter-terrorism measures efficient in combating the threat of militants 
groups such as AQIM in Africa? 
e) What can be learned from the phenomenon of AQIM and how can this contribute towards 
formulating more effective responses to AQIM and its affiliates?  
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
A research design, as Selltiz et al. (cited in Mouton, 1988: 32) note, ‘is the arrangement of 
conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to 
the research purpose’. Furthermore, the researcher should determine the nature of evidence 
required to answer the research questions, objectives and the research problem. As such, this 
study favoured a qualitative method of data collection since it allows the researcher to 
understand complex personal and social issues by delving deep into the phenomenon under 
study. In a qualitative research, data is interpreted to establish ‘an enriched and significantly 
meaningful perspective’ (Tavallaei & Abu Talib, 2010: 570). In contrast to quantitative 
methodology where the focus is on measuring parts of the issue, qualitative research tends to 
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create ‘a picture which covers the whole image in it’ (2010: 571). It was with this 
understanding in mind that the qualitative approach was adopted for this study.  
 
To further produce a research design that is more specific, focused and practical, this study 
employed a case study approach. In addition to providing the researcher with the opportunity 
to identify substantial resource materials for the study, the findings of a case study research 
can lead to the specialization of the area under investigation. One of the primary advantages 
of case-study research is that it allows the researcher to connect abstract ideas to concrete 
examples of cases that are explored in detail. This in turn, according to Neumann (2011: 42), 
further enhances the examination of intricate details of societal processes, thus contributing 
towards developing a richer and a more comprehensive explanation that can analyse the 
complexity of social life. The case study for this research is the AQIM phenomenon in the 
Sahel region. 
 
For the greater part, this study preferred secondary data analysis. As Vartanian (2011: 13) 
spotlights, secondary data analysis provides a broader interpretation of the area under 
discussion as it includes access to large amounts of information, coverage of a broad range of 
topics and take less time to organise. To this end, secondary data on AQIM was garnered 
from an array of scholarly sources that included reports and studies in journals, textbooks, 
newspapers, publications by both governmental and non-governmental organisations, 
magazines and news commentaries amongst others. Moreover, credible websites of 
international organisations and scholarly databases were accessed to amass data. To further 
enrich the validity of the findings of the study, global documents on AQIM such as those 
produced by the Centre for Security Studies, Amnesty International, Africa Centre for 
Strategic Studies, Human Rights Watch and United Nations were sourced and analysed. 
Finally, after collection, the different data sets were assayed qualitatively so as to distil from 
them the most desirable credible findings on the AQIM phenomenon. Given that the study 
did not opt for the quantitative approach, collected was analysed thematically as is the norm 
in qualitative research. The above methodology was chosen to achieve the aim of this study, 
which is to provide a thorough analysis of AQIM with the view of ontributing to the literature 






1.7 The significance and limitation to the study 
Among the plethora of studies on AQIM, some scholars have adopted a historical method by 
focusing on its inception as the GIA until its eventual merger with Al Qaeda Central (Filiu, 
2009; Le Sueur, 2010; Harmon, 2010). Others have attempted to identify the reason behind 
the merger between GSPC and Al Qaeda (Martinez, 2004; Botha, 2007; Jebnoun, 2007; 
Black, 2008). More recently, scholars who have analysed the prospect of AQIM associating 
with criminal networks and resorting to criminal activities for economic revenue, maintain 
that AQIM remains mostly a terror group that participates in criminal activities (Harmon, 
2010; Pham, 2011a; Liang, 2011; Echeverría, 2012). This study examines research that has 
been conducted on other groups such as the Taliban, the Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan, as well as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), since these 
groups are viewed as terrorist entities that are evolving into groups primarily engaged in 
criminal activities resulting in an obfuscation of the line between ideology and greed due to 
vast profits (Makarenko, 2004; Schmidt, 2010).  
 
These studies served as a prism through which the transformation of AQIM was analysed to 
determine whether its trajectory or operation shares any similarities with the above mentioned 
terror-cum-criminal groups. Subsequently, it can also observed that scholars differ on 
whether AQIM is a terror group involved in criminal activities or if it is an organized crime 
group using terror tactics to economic gain. This study filtered information from the 
aforementioned studies in order to better understand the phenomenon of AQIM and its 
evolution in the Sahel region while synthesising the differing views of these scholars with the 
prospect of achieving the study’s general objective.   
 
From the above-mentioned, it can be noted that previous research projects on AQIM have 
been conducted from perspectives that evaluate the social, political, religious and economic 
motivations of the group as separate entities. For instance, scholars who focus on a historical 
analysis of AQIM do not necessarily examine the social and economic motivations of the 
group (Filiu, 2009; Le Sueur, 2010). On the other hand, other scholars who focus on the 
economic motivation of the group give little attention to the group’s religious component 
(Pham, 2011a; Liang, 2011). The advantage of such an approach is that it allows the 
researcher to focus exclusively on a specific aspect related to the functioning of the group 
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thereby creating space for an in-depth analysis with the potential to provide more concrete 
results.   
 
In contrast, the shortcoming of such a method is that the researcher prioritizes certain aspects 
as more important than others, thus promoting the tendency to dismiss the other facets as 
unimportant. Consequently, this results in a major gap within the literature on AQIM. Taking 
a cue from this shortcoming, this study overcame this limitation by examining the religious, 
the political and the economic motivations of AQIM separately and then combined them as a 
whole in order to better comprehend the AQIM phenomenon. In turn, this aided the 
researcher in determining whether AQIM is a terror group involved in criminal activities for 
economic support - criminal political enterprise - or if it is a criminal group primarily 
motivated by financial gain yet focusing on grievance  (political or religious) as an 
ideological apparatus to attract recruits - traditional criminal enterprise - (Makarenko, 
2004).  
 
This study is limited in that it did not review other terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram, 
Al Shabaab and ISIL in Africa, although some references are made to these groups in the 
dissertation. Another limitation is that in terms of contribution to the originality of the study, 
the researcher was unable to interview members of the group directly due to the surreptitious 
nature of terrorism itself coupled with the restriction of access to members of terrorist 
organizations as well as time and financial constraints which would have made traveling to 
the research area almost impossible. Yet the amount of literature available enabled the 
researcher to overcome this lacuna. Consequently, in this dissertation, reference will be made 
to the documents and writings of AQIM available through credible internet and newspaper 
websites as noted above. 
 
1.8 Research Contribution 
The many studies that have attempted to study the phenomenon of AQIM, have done so from 
a historical perspective focusing primarily on the political and social causes that led to the 
commencement of the group. Added to that, while some researchers have investigated the 
economic motives of AQIM, there has been little systematic attention paid to the type of 
criminal identity that the group has transformed into. With these forewarnings in mind, this 
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study aims to fill in these gaps in the literature in order to provide knowledge and support 
effective counter-terrorism policies in the Sahel region and in Africa in general.   
 
1.9 Structure of the study  
The research study is structured as follows: 
Chapter One: General Introduction and Background 
This chapter has provided the background to the study. It has rationalised how the topic was 
chosen and provided the aim, objectives, hypothesis and research questions addressed in the 
study. Furthermore, it has demonstrated the research methodology, the significance and 
limitations and the structure of the study.  
 
Chapter Two: Preliminary Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
Chapter two will review existing literature on the theme of the study. It will summarise and 
engage with the sources. The strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature will be 
identified. Importantly, the chapter will indicate what is missing from the literature as 
justification for the proposed study. As such, it will clarify significant concepts pertinent to 
the research and explains how these concepts relate to the research literature in the field of 
religious terrorism and organised crime transformation in the Sahel and Africa. 
 
Chapter Three: Theoretical Frameworks 
The theoretical framework on which the study is based will be the focus of this chapter. After 
presenting a general discussion on the role of theoretical framework in research, the chapter 
will introduce the chosen theory and justify its relevance to this study. This study will be 
examined through the prism of two theoretical framework of analysis, namely, the greed and 
grievance theory and the convergence thesis. 
 
Chapter Four: The Religious Ideology of Terrorism 
This chapter will peruse the religious ideology of AQIM from its inception as the GIA to the 
eventual merger with Al Qaeda central and until its present status. 
 
Chapter Five: The Root Causes of Terrorism in Algeria 
The rise of AQIM in terms of its political motivations and the factors that facilitated its birth 
will be analysed in this chapter. Additionally, the dynamics that propelled the rise of AQIM 
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and incubated its radicalisation within the Algerian context and beyond will also be 
examined. 
 
Chapter Six: From the Islamic State of Algeria to the Economic Caliphate of the Sahel 
This chapter will examine the sources of AQIM financing such as existing financial 
networks, drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, so as to determine 
the economic motivation of the group. 
 
Chapter Seven: In Search of Solutions: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter will pull the study together by reiterating key discussion points. Importantly, 
drawing from the findings, the chapter will make recommendations for the future and identify 
other areas of further research on the theme of this study. As such, it will assess the current 
counter-terrorism policies formulated by the UN, the EU, the AU, and other regional blocks 
through their relevance and shortcomings in countering the threat of AQIM in Africa. In 
conclusion, multiple avenues in curbing terrorism and measures contributing towards 



















Chapter Two  
Preliminary Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
2.0 Introduction 
After having previously set the scene and introduced the dissertation, this chapter further 
continues in this endeavour by assessing and distilling from the range of existing literature 
relevant concepts that contribute towards a better understanding of the AQIM phenomenon. 
Blaxter et al. (2010:124) advance that the purpose of a literature review is to ‘to locate the 
research project, to form its context or background and to provide insights into previous 
work’. So conceived, the primary focus in this chapter is to review existing literature on the 
themes pertinent to the current study and these include the terrorism, ideology and organized 
crime. Particular focus is dedicated to the problem of religious terrorism, religious ideology 
and the connection between terrorism and organized crime since they assume a pivotal role in 
contributing towards a comprehension of the transformation of AQIM in the Sahel and the 
broader North African region. Additionally, this chapter also investigates the way in which 
different scholars have tackled or conceptualised these concepts. In short, this chapter on the 
literature review and conceptual framework attempts to contribute towards a correlated 
understanding of the phenomenon of AQIM.  
 
2.1 Terrorism: A Conceptualisation 
In a way, the terms “terrorism” is an abstraction. It is only given meaning by those who use it 
at any given time. Therefore, ‘It is virtually impossible to understand terrorism without 
examining the context of where and how it developed’ (White, 2002: 65). Taking a cue from 
this statement, the concept of terrorism merits a brief historical exploration as evidenced in 
the existing literature. The earliest account of organized terrorism can be traced back to first-
century Judea and involves a group known as the Zealots. In his writings, the Jewish historian 
Josephus Flavius documents the little that is known about the group which he describes as a 
highly organised religious sect whose aim was to end the Roman rule in Palestine.  The 
Zealots, also referred to as the Sicarii (a term describing their weapon of choice) utilised 
unorthodox tactics that included attacking their enemies in daylight and in public spaces 
(Laqueur 1987: 12).  
 
For instance, the Zealots would choose a feast day or any day when there would be a large 
gathering in Jerusalem. Once they had identified their target, whether ‘a moderate Jewish 
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leader (someone who advocated collaboration with the Romans), a local Greek resident of 
Judea, or a member of the Roman occupying power’, a Zealot would step out from the crowd 
and stab the victim to death using a short dagger or sica and then disappear into the crowds 
(Weinberg & Eubank, 2006: 22). According to Chaliand & Blin (2007: 57), the group had 
both a religious and political objective. Their political aim was to tussle power from the 
Roman occupiers through terror tactics and uprisings. As a religious group, they wanted to 
implement a high level of strictness in religious practices and they would go as far as 
attacking Jews who they felt were not complying with their rules. For the Zealots, both the 
religious and political aims, albeit different, were inseparable. Incidentally, the phenomenon 
of the Zealots also marked the beginning of the idea of purity both in the religious and 
political arena that would continue until our present day (Chaliand & Blin, 2007:57).  
 
Another organisation or sect that demonstrated similar characteristics to the Zealots came to 
the fore during the eleventh century under the name of the Assassins. In contrast to the 
Zealots, there is better documented information about this sect (Chaliand & Blin, 2007: 59). 
Founded in Persia by Hassan Sibai, the group was a messianic sect within the community of 
Shi’ite Muslims. Its primary focus was that of purifying the Muslim community who had 
been corrupted by the largely Sunni leaders of medieval Islam.1 Realising that its opponents 
outnumbered its members, the group enlisted the services of the feyadeen - individuals who 
were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the group in view of reaching paradise (Weinberg & 
Eubank, 2006:24). Their tactics included operating in complete secrecy. High ranking Sunni 
leaders, prefects, caliphs and Christian crusaders were among the group’s victims (Laqueur, 
1987: 13). Akin to the Zealots, the Assassins preferred the dagger as their weapon of choice. 
However, the dagger was not chosen for its effectiveness but rather for the ritualistic symbol 
that it represented since for the Assassins, the act of killing was perceived as a sacramental 
duty (Weinberg & Eubank, 2006: 13). The brief analysis of the two sects, the Zealots and the 
Assassins, spotlights that the religious dimension in contemporary terrorism is not a recent 
phenomenon but can be traced back to prior centuries.  
 
                                                 
1 The Sunni and the Shia’s are two predominant traditions within Islam that disagree over the succession 
following Prophet Muhammad’s death in 623 CE. Over time, this disagreement has extended to ‘political 
authority and legitimacy, and the nature of leadership of the masses’ (Alvi, 2014:41). Whereas the Sunni placed 
emphasis on social order which often meant greater tolerance of a tyrannical ruler, the Shias’ focus was more on 




A few centuries after the Assassins, the French Revolution signalled a turning point in the 
history of terrorism as it marked the emergence of the concept of ‘state terrorism’ (Chaliand 
& Blin, 2007: 95). Some scholars associate the French Revolution with the starting point of 
the history of terrorism. To support their claim, they advocate that it was the first time that 
terrorism found itself at the centre of a ‘comprehensive political philosophy and strategy to 
gain and retain power’ (Rubin & Rubin, 2008: 4). On the other hand, there are those who 
attribute the French Revolution to the beginning of modern terrorism (White, 2009; Cronin, 
2010). Incidentally, it was during the period of 1793-94 that the term ‘terrorism’ was first 
employed to designate the regime de la terreur or the ‘reign of terror’ of Maximillien 
Robespierre, the leader of the radical group known as the Jacobin, who took control of the 
French government (Weinberg & Eubank, 2006: 26). Robespierre employed terrorism as a 
means to remain in power by eliminating his enemies or those who posed a threat to his 
leadership.  
 
The system of terror during the French Revolution, according to Rubin & Rubin (2008: 4), 
reveals three elements that are relevant to contemporary scholars in their quest for 
understanding terrorism. Firstly, the Jacobins employed terror against others as a means to 
gain the support of its members. Unlike the Zealots or the Assassins who claimed religious 
inspiration, the Jacobins justified their actions in the name of the people (Weinberg & 
Eubank, 2006: 27). Secondly, Robespierre and his followers eliminated entire social groups 
that included the aristocrats, the Girondin moderates and rivals among the radicals. These 
groups were labelled criminals due to their social standing and the category they belonged to 
rather than for the acts that they have committed (2006:28). Finally, the Jacobins’ aim was to 
instil fear among those in the French populace who might have doubts and disagreements 
with the ideology of those in power (2006: 28). In short, the French Revolution ‘served both 
as the founding act of modern state terror and as the model defining and delineating the 
strategic use of violence by a state apparatus’(Chaliand & Blin, 2007: 101).  
 
Having thus briefly examined the history and development of terrorism from the earliest 
written account to the birth of modern terrorism, it can be noted that both the concept and 
meaning of the term terrorism has changed and evolved according to the corresponding 
historical epoch. Hence, to understand the meaning of terrorism within our contemporary 
context, the quest to discover a working definition of terrorism assumes an unprecedented 
mode of urgency.   
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2.1.1 Terrorism: Towards a Definition  
A brief etymological analysis of the term ‘terrorism’ reveals that it obtains its roots from the 
Latin verb terrere signifying ‘to bring someone to tremble through great fear’ (Schmid, 2011: 
68). Since terrorism is a complex and multifaceted concept, a simple etymological analysis is 
far from sufficient to capture the full dimensionality of the problem. Subsequently, scholars 
realised this shortcoming, attempted to produce a working definition of the term terrorism. 
This endeavour, though promising, was besotted with multiple difficulties since any 
definition of terrorism would not do justice to its complexities and multi-variance. For some 
scholars, as Schmid (2011:42) notes, searching for the perfect definition of terrorism amounts 
to ‘no more than a futile polemical exercise, chasing a chimera’. The problem is further 
compounded by the lack of consensus amongst scholars, politicians, social scientists, 
lawmakers and policy makers of what the term actually consists of.  
 
One of the difficulties associated with defining terrorism is the fact that terrorism contains an 
offensive connotation in that ‘when labelled a terrorist a person is politically and socially 
degraded’ (White, 2009: 4). The same usually occurs when an organisation is categorised as a 
terrorist group. Sometimes, governments suppress their opponents through lethal force and 
label them as terrorist groups in an attempt to obtain the legitimacy of the international 
community. The freedom fighter versus the terrorist debate is another quandary that arises out 
of the definitional issues of terrorism. Determining who can be labelled a freedom fighter or a 
terrorist spotlights the blurred line that exists between the two and the prevalent relativism 
that is inherent within such an undertaking. Two instances that exemplify this conundrum are 
the African National Congress (ANC) in apartheid South Africa and Hamas in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In both cases, the same group was/is perceived as ‘terrorists’ by some 
and as ‘freedom fighters’ by others. In order to overcome this impasse, Kushner (2003:143) 
posits that the freedom fighter differs from the terrorist in terms of target choices. While the 
former concentrates predominantly on military targets, the latter targets civilians and 
unarmed combatants in the aim of instilling fear into the government and populace. 
Nonetheless, the freedom fighter / terrorist debate remains a paradox that will continue to fuel 
debate about the legitimacy of group and individual actions (2003:144).  
 
Hoffman (2006: 40) defines terrorism as ‘the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear 
through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change’. Similarly for 
Chomsky, terrorism is ‘the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that 
15 
 
are political, religious, or ideological in nature…through intimidation, coercion, or instilling 
fear’ (Kushner, 2003: 69). In its attempt to find a working definition of terrorism, the U.S. 
Department of State (2004: xii) defined it as “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually 
intended to influence an audience”. Without claiming any absoluteness of this definition, it is 
fair to argue that it is the closest one could get to distinguishing it from warfare. However, in 
spite of its viability, the definition does have its limitations as there are certain aspects that 
are overlooked. The term ‘non-combatant’ is not clarified to ascertain whether it 
encompasses both civilians and military personnel. Additionally, since the definition 
constrains terrorism as acts performed by non-state actors only, it excludes a major aspect of 
terrorism, namely state terrorism (Schmid, 2011:49). Another weakness is that the definition 
does not refer to other motives behind terrorism besides the political (Hoffman 2006; Schmid 
2011).  
 
Retaining the Department of State definition, Sinai (2008:11) amends it to include terrorism 
as an act perpetrated against any citizen of a state - civilian and military. Moreover, he adds 
that ‘unlike guerrilla forces, terrorist groups are less capable of overthrowing their 
adversaries’ governments than on inflicting discriminate or indiscriminate destruction that 
they hope will coerce them to change policy’. The recent reign of terror perpetrated by ISIL 
in both Syria and Iraq, however, debunks the latter statement which would normally apply to 
most terror groups. It thus becomes clear that terrorism is a complex phenomenon and 
defining it becomes “the most ambiguous component in terrorist studies, with no universally 
accepted definition that differentiates attacks against civilian non-combatants or armed 
military or takes into account the latest trends in terrorist objectives of warfare” (Sinai, 
2008:9). Subsequently, a working definition of terrorism should encapsulate some pivotal 
elements of terrorism such as the threat of violence, the meaning of non-combatants, the 
legitimization of violence and the intimidation of both government and citizens by terrorist 
groups. Additionally, the definition should also enable one to distinguish between acts of 
terrorism, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare and armed rebel attacks.  
 
With the aforementioned caveats in mind, this study adopts the working definition of 
terrorism formulated by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 of 08 October 
2004 that defines terrorism as: 
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Criminal and violent acts, including those against civilians, committed with 
the intent to cause death or serious harm, or taking of hostages, with the 
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular  persons, intimidate a population or compel a government 
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any acts, which 
constitute offenses within the scope of and as defined in the international 
convent ions and protocols relating to terrorism (United Nations Security 
Council, 2004: 2).      
 
Although the distinction between state and non-state group is implicit in the above definition, 
it is important to further analyse these two modes of terrorism. Categorising terrorism into 
different typologies allow scholars to examine the range of terrorist activities, the specific 
type of terrorism to be analysed and further contribute to a holistic understanding of terrorism 
(White, 2009: 13). Consequently, three types of terrorism will be analysed, namely, state, 
non-state and transnational terrorism. 
 
2.1.2 Types of Terrorism 
2.1.2.1 State Terrorism 
State terrorism is the form of violence that government perpetrates against its own citizens as 
a means to retain power and to instil fear in the name of the state. This includes state 
operatives such as the police or military using repression, detention, torture and genocide as 
tactics in order to defeat actors within its territory or outside its borders (Ali Khan, 2006:77). 
Another dimension of state terrorism occurs when states secretly or openly support terror acts 
committed by non-state actors against people and institutions who are enemies of the state 
and this is often referred to as state-sponsored terrorism (2006: 78). In this instance, the 
function of the state is to provide moral, financial and military support to these terror groups. 
Prime examples of state terrorism are Hitler’s Gestapo, Stalinist’s regime of the 1930s and 
the Algerian military against the Islamists in the 1990s.  Similarly, the Syrian government’s 
support of Hezbollah in Lebanon exemplifies state-sponsored terrorism. 
 
2.1.2.2 Non-state Terrorism 
Non-state terrorism is usually performed by non-state actors against government, ethno-
national groups, religious groups and other perceived enemies (Martin, 2011:33). This type of 
terrorism can be further expounded into social-revolutionary terrorism and nationalist-
separatist terrorism. Social-revolutionary terrorism includes ‘acts perpetrated by groups 
seeking to overthrow the capitalist economic and social order’ (Post, 2005:56). An example is 
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the Algerian National Liberation Front which is examined in this study’s subsequent 
chapters. On the other hand, according to Post (2005:56-57), nationalist-separatist terrorism 
refers to ‘groups fighting to establish a new political order or state based on ethnic dominance 
or homogeneity.’ Prominent examples are the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain.  
 
2.1.2.3 Transnational Terrorism 
Transnational terrorism, a more recent phenomenon actualised through the 9/11 attacks by Al 
Qaeda, is defined as ‘cross-border terrorism that is not state-controlled or state-sponsored but 
operating in more than one country’ (Schmid, 2011:696). Transnational terrorist acts include 
attacks against foreign governments, institutions and representatives. The group often selects 
its targets based on the value as symbols of international interests as is exemplified in the 
choice of targets of Al Qaeda that include the World Trade Centre, The London Subway, and 
kidnapping of foreign hostages. Although Al Qaeda falls within the transnational category, 
the group can also be said to engage in religious terrorism as their methods appear to be 
informed by a religious ideology. This takes us to the next type of terrorism – religious 
terrorism. 
 
2.1.3 Religious Terrorism 
Religious terrorism, another important facet of non-state terrorism, is defined as an 
‘indiscriminate and unlawful use of violence against non-combatant civilians, justified by 
perpetrators in terms of a higher (divine) authority’ (Schmid, 2011:681). For the religious 
terrorist, acts of terrorism assume a transcendental dimension as they perceived as a direct 
response to some theological command from the Divine transmitted through either sacred 
texts or by clerical authorities who are representatives of the divine on earth (Hoffman, 
2006:272). People or groups that engage in religious terrorism range from lone wolves to 
large dissident groups to even governments. As Martin (2011:131) opines, even the 
motivations of groups engaged in religious terrorism vary as some are inspired by defensive 
motives while others are more interested in the hegemonic propagation of their faith whereas 
others consist of a combination of both aspects. From this, it becomes apparent that the 
definition provided by Schmid above fails to consider the varying motives of religious 




In attempting to procure a definition of religious terrorism, scholars face similar complexities 
in defining terrorism since there is little consensus on what religious terrorism actually 
consists of. Rapoport (cited in Gregg, 2014:39) posits that the difference between secular and 
religious terrorism lies in the use of sacred text and scripture by the religious terrorists in 
contrast to their secular counterparts. Sedgwick (2004:795) further adds that ‘while the 
ultimate aims [of religious terrorist groups] will be religiously formulated, the immediate 
objectives will often be found to be almost purely political’.  Taking the aforementioned into 
consideration, this study adopts the following definition of religious terrorism as proposed by 
Gregg (2014:40) who defines it as, ‘the threat or use of force with the purpose of influencing 
or coercing governments and/or populations towards saliently religious goals’. 
  
To further understand the underpinnings of religious terrorism, Hoffman (2006:88-89) 
highlights some important characteristics of this phenomenon. Firstly, acts of religious 
terrorism are identified as transcendental acts or a sacramental duty and as such the religious 
terrorist often disregards the political, moral or practical constraints that may otherwise apply 
to secular terrorists in the attainment of their goals. Secondly, unlike secular terrorists who 
would as far as possible disengage in indiscriminate killing as it would be incompatible with 
their political aims, religious terrorists often ‘seek the elimination of broadly defined 
categories of enemies’ (2006:89). Furthermore anyone who is not a member of the latter’s 
group or who does not abide or agree to their ideology is termed an ‘enemy’ and is a 
legitimate target (Cronin, 2010: 39). For the religious terrorist, this all-encompassing violence 
is perceived as both morally justified and a necessity for the achievement of their objectives.  
 
Thirdly, secular and religious terrorists differ in terms of perceptions of themselves and their 
acts. For the former, violence is a means to correct a flaw in a moderately good system or 
incite the creation of a new system. The religious terrorists, on the other hand, identify 
themselves as outsiders striving for achieving fundamental changes in the existing orders and 
replace the system (Hoffman, 2006:89). To these, Cronin (2010:39) adds a fourth feature 
when she notes that the religious terrorists do not regard themselves as bound by secular laws 
and values and hence, the overthrow of this secular state becomes a dynamic motivation.  
 
After analysing these characteristics, Gregg (2014:38-39) developed a threefold typology of 
religious terrorism, where he categorises religious terrorist groups into those that ‘1) foment 
the apocalypse; 2) aim to create a religious government; and 3) intend to religiously cleanse a 
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state’. Groups pertaining to an apocalyptic vision that focuses on maximising the destruction 
of people, property and the environment in the aim of ‘fomenting the end of time and 
ushering in religious promises of a new world’, tend to be the most common stereotype of 
religious terrorism (Gregg 2014:39).  
 
These types of apocalyptic groups abide by an ideology that focuses on the arrival of a new 
world or the coming of the messiah which will correspond with the end of the world 
(Rapoport cited in Gregg 2014:39). The Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo, that was responsible 
for the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 that resulted in the death of 12 people 
and more than 5000 injured, is a prime example (Juergensmeyer, 2008:179). Gregg (2014:39) 
warns that groups abiding by the apocalyptic paradox of destroying the world in order to 
create a new one are the most dangerous as they do not appear to confine to any rational 
thought and they do not engage into negotiated settlements. Furthermore, these groups are the 
ones who are the most prone to obtain Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in order to 
achieve their objective. 
 
The creation of a religious government is another objective that many religious terrorist 
groups adhere to. The most prevalent form of this objective can be currently ascertained by 
militant Islamic groups whose desire is to overthrow the secular government and install in its 
place a state that observes Sharia’ law (Gregg, 2014:40). This is exemplified by the Lebanese 
group Hezbollah, who used terrorism against Israel and its own government with the aim of 
installing a religious government in Lebanon. With the emergence of transnational terrorism, 
religious terrorist groups, which hitherto were confined to their states, have developed 
transnational ties with other religious groups that hold similar ideologies. For instance, not 
only does Al Qaeda have different sub-groups in different continents but it also has affiliated 
groups that include Abbu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Al Shabaab in Somalia and Al- Nusra 
Front in Syria, amongst others. In addition to forming a religious government within their 
states, some religious terrorist groups have greater ambitions of forming religious regions or 
‘super-states’ (Gregg, 2014:41) as is noted in the recent caliphate declared by ISIL in the 
region of Syria and northern Iraq. 
 
Religious cleansing, a third type of religious terrorism, is often linked to the second feature or 
may even pertain to result from it. For religious terrorists, the objective of cleansing or 
eliminating ‘unfaithfuls’ or infidels within their religion or another religion is very often a 
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sine qua non for creating a religious state. As such, all the citizens within a state’s border or 
region have to conform to the group’s interpretation of the faith (Gregg, 2014:42). In the 
context of this study, this is examined within the GIA’s indiscriminate killings of individuals, 
both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in its quest to overthrowing the Algerian government. 
Eventually, for its lack of supporting the campaign of the GIA, the entire population was 
labelled as infidels and became the target of undiscerning attacks (Harmon, 2010: 14). 
Although the notion of cleansing also features in secular terrorism (as perceived in the notion 
of ethnic cleansing in a separatist group), there is an apparent distinction to be made.  
 
In contrast to secular terrorism, religion instead of ethnicity is the striking feature of religious 
cleansing. As Gregg (2014:43) saliently notes, ‘religious terrorist groups can be multi-ethnic, 
such as Al-Qaeda, which is made up of Muslims from all over the worldwide community, but 
not multi-religious; they are all Muslim’. Terrorism is a multi-complex phenomenon and 
religious terrorism is no less different. Depending on the context, the three types of religious 
terrorism highlighted above may at times be interlinked or separate. The case of Aum 
Shinrikyo whose focus was on the apocalypse illustrates that these types of terrorism can be 
separated while, on the other hand, the GIA demonstrated the inter-relatedness of these types 
as the group amalgamated the second and third type. The different types of terrorism and the 
way they correlate are illustrated in Table 1 below.   
 
  Table 1: Types of Religious Terrorism 
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After having examined the notion of religious terrorism, it is important to note that although 
terrorism is not a recent phenomenon – as demonstrated in the illustration of the Zealots and 
the Assassins - there has seen a significant increase in terrorist attacks by religious groups 
during the nineties and the number is continuously on the rise (Hoffman, 2006:86). Since the 
9/11 attacks, religious terrorism has become synonym with Islamic terrorism and this is 
further exacerbated by the fact that over 70% of the groups added to the American Foreign 
Terrorist Organisations list after 2001 are Islamic (Beck & Miner 2013:854). Although this 
study examines an Islamic militant group, it is important to reiterate the fact that religious 
terrorism is not an exclusively Islamic phenomenon but has its occurrence in other religions 
such as Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism inter alia.   
2.2 Ideology 
The concept of ideology has become a central feature within the various narratives of 
terrorism and more particularly within the discourse of religious terrorism. However, there 
are difficulties that present themselves when attempting to define the term ideology despite 
its prevalence within terrorism literature. One of the problems encountered is the fluctuated 
meaning of the term in its application to differing contexts. Furthermore, the definition of the 
term has undergone several changes from the time of its inception in 1786 to its present day 
usage. Nonetheless, the importance of the relationship between ideology and conflict cannot 
be undermined as noted by Walid Phares (2007: xiv) who accentuates that 
Modern conflicts, especially since the nineteenth century, are grounded in 
doctrinal roots. Nationalism is the earliest form of militant ideology in the 
contemporary West, followed by Marxism and fascism. In the Arab and 
Muslim world, religious fundamentalism took the lead in the nineteenth 
century, followed by extreme nationalism, which alternated with socialism and 
Islamism throughout the twentieth century.         
  
2.2.1 Ideological Origins and Development 
In an attempt to analyse the boundaries of thought, Destutt de Tracy, a French philosopher, 
coined the term ‘ideology’ and defined it as ‘the study of the origin of our ideas about the 
world in sense experience’ (Lafraie, 2009:6). This science of ideas was presumably based on 
reason and empirical evidence and its aim was to rectify the metaphysical and unscientific 
method utilised by De Tracy’s predecessors in their quest for knowledge. The term 
‘ideology’, however, only obtained its prominence in scholarly discussions and modern day 
usage through the writings of Karl Marx who referred to it as a false consciousness 
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determined by social conditions and constituted the ‘ideas of the 'ruling class' that upheld the 
class system and perpetuated exploitation’ (Heywood, 2002:42). Lafraie (2009:7) further 
clarifies this Marxist’s notion of ‘ideology’ to include not only the theory of knowledge but 
also ethics, religion and any form of consciousness. Ideology, for Marx, had a negative 
connotation as it symbolised a distorted consciousness that obscured social contradictions 
while promoting the interests of the ruling class.  
 
Later, the rise of fascism and totalitarian regimes prompted scholars to develop an alternative 
view of ideology. Some scholars, for instance, Arendt and Popper posited that ideology is a 
form of social control that demands compliance and subordination (Heywood, 2002:43). In 
this regard, ideology is perceived as a closed system of thought that demands a monopoly of 
truth while refusing to accommodate opposing beliefs. In the context of terrorism, this is 
exemplified through the phenomenon of state terrorism where those in power utilise terror 
tactics against those who are opposed to their methods. On the other hand, ideology can also 
be perceived as a system of meaning where it assumes a cultural dimension by ‘rendering 
otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it 
possible to act purposefully within them’ (Geertz, 1973:220). From this brief exploration, it 
can be argued that ideology can serve as an effect that is positive in as much as it is a science 
of ideas or a notion that renders perplexing events meaningful or negative in that it 
perpetuates a false consciousness that promotes oppression.   
 
In turn, this demonstrates that the notion or the definition of ideology depends on the context 
in which the term is utilised. This study investigates the concept of ideology in conjunction 
with religion. Before exploring religion as ideology, there is a need to clarify that there are 
some elements that are common to all conceptions of ideology regardless of the context. 
These include: each ideology consists of a set of moral values that are considered as absolute; 
it has an outline of the ‘good society’ in which these values would be fulfilled; there is a 
methodical disparagement of the current social order; and there is a strategic plan of the way 
change can be achieved (Lafraie, 2009:11). Consequently, according to Selinger (cited in 
Heywood, 2002:44), ideologies should not be considered as rigid systems of thought but 
rather as mobile set of ideas that overlay with each other at numerous points.  
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2.2.2 Religion as an Ideology 
When de Tracy formulated the science of ideas, his primary goal was to overcome the 
religious and metaphysical explanations of ideas that were predominating in his time. 
Juergensmeyer (2008:19) notes that in proposing the science of ideas as a replacement for 
religion, de Tracy unknowingly placed religion and ideology on the same level. Akin to the 
secular framework of thought, religious ideology not only provides a coherent picture of the 
world and imbues the persons with a sense of meaning but it also ‘provides the authority that 
gives the social and political order its reason for being’ (Juergensmeyer, 2008:20).  
 
After analysing the different conceptions of religious ideology examined by scholars, John 
Plamenatz discovered the following five characteristics. Firstly, religion provides human 
beings with the false illusion that they have knowledge when in fact they are uninformed. 
Secondly, religion becomes a means through which people overcome their fear and allow 
them to express themselves in the face of their inabilities to control the force of nature. 
Thirdly, in giving a public and sacred character to certain actions and rituals, religious 
ideology serves to bind communities together. Fourthly, through its threat of punishment or 
promise of rewards from a higher being, religious ideology coerces individuals into observing 
social rules. Finally, through a religious ideology, individuals are satisfied with their 
condition as they are provided with a sense of direction and purpose for their future 
(Plamenatz, 1970:91-92).  
 
Although the notion of peace is a central tenet in religions such as Christianity, Islam and 
Judaism, there is also the propensity for religion to be considered as the cause of numerous 
conflicts. The French philosopher and mathematician, Blaise Pascal was well aware of the 
susceptibility of religion when he wrote in his Pensées, ‘men (sic) never do evil so openly 
and contentedly as when they do it from religious conviction’ (Pascal, 1941:314). In 
accordance with Pascal, it should be qualified that religion is not the cause of conflict per se 
but rather there are individuals who justify violence while adducing religious doctrines. This 
theme is further explored in the next chapter where notions such as Jihad and Takfir are 
examined to show how militant terrorists have utilised these terms to formulate and propagate 
a religious ideology of violence.    
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2.3 Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)  
Throughout most of its history, organised crime had been traditionally perceived as a law 
enforcement problem restricted to the domestic level (Williams, 1994:97).  However, the 
change in global politics and economics due to globalisation had led to the transformation of 
organized crime into an international phenomenon. The end of the Cold War had enabled 
organised crime groups to emerge from the boundaries that had hitherto confined them to the 
domestic sphere onto the global scene (Shelley 2005:102; Newburn 2007:420). Globalisation, 
hence, has allowed both legitimate businesses and transnational organized crime groups to 
equally benefit from the following factors: improved interdependence between nations, the 
effectiveness of international travel and global communications, the permeability of national 
borders, and the globalisation of international financial systems (Williams, 1994:97). As a 
result, there has been an increase in transnational commerce as information, money, physical 
goods and other commodities passage freely across states (Lyman & Potter, 2011: 241).  
 
In the post-Cold War era, transnational organized crime groups have emerged from countries 
that include the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and many of the former states of 
the USSR. Their transactions consist of drug peddling, human trafficking, arms dealing, 
narcotics and contraband smuggling (Shelley, 2005:102). Also, the increase in consumer 
demand of leisure products coupled with the advent of post-industrial economies have 
resulted in a fundamental change in many traditional organized crime groups. Traditional 
culture-bound syndicates like the Japanese Yukuza, the Chinese Triads and the Sicilian 
Mafia, who originally operated within their confines of their local areas, diversified their 
markets onto the international arena (Roth, 2010:8). Newburn (2007:19) broadly categories 
TOC into three main set of activities, namely, 1. Smuggling includes commodities, drugs and 
protected species 2. Contraband encompasses stolen cars, tobacco products and alcohol, and 
3. Services consist of immigrants, prostitution, indentured servitude, money laundering and 
fraud.   
 
2.3.1 Definition and Conceptualisation 
Organized crime, according to the FBI, can be defined as ‘any group having some manner of 
a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal 
activities’ (cited in Lyman & Potter, 2011: 4). Additionally, these groups consolidate their 
control of power over people in their locality, region or country through the use of actual or 
threatened violence, corrupting public officials and extortion (2011:4). In 1998, the European 
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Union (EU) defined organized crime as a criminal organisation consisting of a structured 
association of two or more persons, ‘acting in concert with a view to committing crimes or 
other offences that are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material benefits 
and…improperly influencing the operation of public authorities’ (cited in Wright 2006:8).  
One of the problems faced by law enforcement and judiciary systems, though, is that there 
has been a lack of a consensus concerning the definition of the term ‘organized crime’. This 
has resulted in a failure to formulate laws that can effectively combat this problem on both a 
national and international level. This conundrum is further compounded by the differences 
that exist between judicial systems and police strategies both on a national and international 
level resulting in a scarcity of information sharing between organizations (Roth, 2010: 6). 
Organized crime groups, aware of such discrepancies, have exploited these to their 
advantage.  
 
Realising this shortcoming and the dangers thereof, the United Nations attempted to 
formulate a working definition of organized crime at the 2000 Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). Due to the intricate and complex notion of organized 
crime, international representatives failed to achieve consensus on a working definition of the 
term (Lyman & Potter, 2011:8). To overcome this impasse, the UN representatives instead 
adopted a broad definition of organized criminal groups which they defined as: 
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or 
offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (TOC Convention, 
Article 2(a)). 
 
To further elaborate on the above definition, the convention expounded the features that 
would determine what constituted as a transnational offense when committed by an organized 
criminal group. An offense was classified as transnational if: (i) the offense was committed in 
more than one state; or (ii) a substantial part of the transgression was prepared, planned, 
directed or controlled in one state but executed in another state; or (iii) the felony  was 
perpetrated in one state by an organized group that engrossed in criminal activities in more 
than one state; or (iv) the offense was committed in one state but its repercussion extends to 
other states (TOC Convention, Article 3(2)). While there is no explicit iteration in the TOC 
Convention of what consists of criminal acts, the UN has nonetheless identified 18 categories 
of transnational offenses that display the characteristics denoted in Article 3 (2) above. These 
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include: money laundering, computer crime, terrorist activities, environmental crime, theft of 
art and cultural objects, trafficking in persons, theft of intellectual property, trade in human 
body parts, illicit arms trafficking, illegal drug trafficking, aircraft hijacking, fraudulent 
bankruptcy, sea piracy, infiltration of legal business, insurance fraud, corruption and bribery 
of public or party officials (Roth, 2010:7). Moreover, factors that facilitate and promote the 
flow of transnational organised crime offenses can be attributed to corruption, poor 
governance, failing states and porous borders (Shelley, 2014; Lacher, 2012; White 2009). The 
UN definition also highlights a crucial aspect of organized crime as compared to religious 
terrorist groups. Unlike the latter, the former is motivated by profits and ideology has no 
impact on directing or influencing the members of an organized criminal group. 
 
While there is often the enticement to delineate TOC groups as ‘organized’ groups with a 
hierarchal structure; this is not always the case. The above definition of organized criminal 
groups clarifies this misconception as it attempts to not ‘limit the scope of application [of the 
definition] to hierarchal structured or mafia type organizations only’ (UNODC cited in Roth 
2010:7). This clarification gains more significance within the scope of this study as it is 
applied to a terrorist group that either conjoined with or evolved into a TOC group, namely, 
AQIM. Additionally, having thus adopted a working definition of TOC, it is noteworthy to 
situate it within the context of the study.  
 
The significance of the Sahel-Sahara region in the organized crime domain, according to 
Lacher (2012:4), is not that it is a pivotal area for TOC but rather that there exists few other 
engagements that allow groups to acquire similar profits in that region. Nonetheless, the 
Sahel region of Mauritania, Algeria, Niger, Mali and Libya remains a hub for TOC 
operations that consist of the smuggling of Morroco cannabis resin, drugs, narcotics and 
kidnapping for ransom amongst others. Ab initio, cigarette smuggling was the original 
operation of the organised crime network in the Sahel and it contributed immensely to the 
subsequent emergence of the practice and networks that have solidified the growth of drug 
trafficking into its present state (2012:5). The smuggling of narcotics still remains a primary 
form of revenue for some criminal groups as typified in Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former 
commander AQIM, who was so successful in smuggling cigarettes that he was subsequently 
given the moniker ‘Mr Malboro’ (The Guardian, 2013). The increase in TOC has serious 
implications concerning the security in the Sahel region and this threat is further amplified 
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when terrorist groups evolve into TOC organisations. This phenomenon is often referred to as 
the crime-terror continuum and as such merits an explication.   
2.4 Crime-Terror Argument: A continuum of Terror and Organized crime  
From the preceding sections, it becomes evident that traditionally, organized crime and 
terrorism belonged to separate categories based not only on their definitions but on the 
motivations of the different groups. For instance, while the motivation of the terrorist often 
lies in changing the ‘system’ in order to achieve a greater ‘good’ for the community, the 
criminal has no interest in influencing or affecting the public opinion but is rather interested 
in material satiation and personal gain (Hoffman, 2006:42-43). Hence, profit becomes the 
primary motivation for organized crime groups whereas terrorist groups are guided by 
political or ideological objectives. Despite their differences, both organized crime and 
terrorist groups share striking similarities as illustrated in the Table below.  
 
Table 2: Differences and Similarities between Organized Crime groups and 
Transnational Terrorist groups 
 Organized Crime Groups  Transnational Terrorist Groups 
Differences • are motivated by economic gain 
    and greed 
•  have a status quo orientation 
•  shun media attention 
•  do not legitimate their action 
•  deny responsibility for their acts 
•  develop working relations with  
   state organizations 
• are motivated by political ideology    
and grievance 
•  have a revolutionary orientation 
•  seek media attention 
•  claim legitimacy for their actions 
•  accept responsibility for  their acts 
• rarely develop working relations 
with state 
 
Similarities •  are rational actors 
•  use or threaten severe violence 
•  use kidnapping, assassinations, extortions 
•  act clandestinely 
•  act illegally under national and international law 
•  pose an asymmetrical threat to states 
•  are highly adaptable and resilient organizations 
•  often act in sympathetic environments 
•  often provide social services for local communities 
•  profit from globalization and new technologies 
•  increasingly develop networks 
•  are particularly strong if operating from safe heavens 




In the aftermath of the Cold War, the line that demarcated organized crime from terrorism has 
become blurred. A study conducted by Shelly et al. (quoted in Daase, 2010:56) concluded 
that the interaction between terrorist groups and organized crime networks are growing 
deeper and more complex, sharply contrasting the prevalent belief that the two entities 
differed in terms of motivations only. The impending rise of globalization after the end of the 
Cold War meant that terrorist groups could no longer rely on state sponsorship to fund their 
operations and were compelled to turn to criminal activities for financial support. The 
primary reason for terrorist groups to embrace organized crime as their main source of 
funding is because of the similar characteristics that both enterprises share. These similarities 
between the two enable them to easily espouse each other’s organizational and operational 
characteristics (Dishman, 2001; Makarenko, 2004; Sanderson, 2004; Shelly, 2014).  
 
This process of criminal syndicates and terrorists adopting each other’s features and vice 
versa has compelled scholars to study this evolutionary feature of this crime-terror 
relationship. The culmination of these research activities/projects have proliferated a growing 
literature surrounding the crime-terror nexus resulting in two interrelated stream of debates, 
namely, (i) the nature of the crime-nexus and (ii) the contexts conducive to its birth and 
expansion (Carrapico, Irrera & Tupman, 2014: 214). On the opposing end, there are 
proponents who argue against the association between terrorist and criminal groups and 
hence posit that the two aspects have to be separated since terrorism and criminal activities 
are incompatible with each other (Laqueur 1999; Mathis 2004: 105). However, echoing 
Shelley (as cited in Roth, 2010:478), this study adopts the notion that transnational terrorism 
and organized crime are interrelated and analysing these two concepts separately becomes 
problematic. 
 
2.4.1 The Nature of the Crime- Terror Continuum 
According to Roth (2010:480), the crime-terror continuum is a concept that obtains its origins 
in the 1970s and 1980s when scholars first started to uncover the connection between 
terrorism and organized crime. During that time, the relationship between the two entities 
was designated as narco-terrorism. The term was coined by Lewis Tambs, the then US 
Ambassador to Colombia, in an attempt to describe terrorist acts perpetrated by drug 
trafficking organizations (Williams, 2008:126). White (2009: 68) posits that the term narco-
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terrorism refers to ‘terrorists who use either terrorist tactics to support drug operations or 
drug-trade profits to finance terrorism’. This is typified in the operation and tactics of the 
Medellin Cartel whose pursuit of power and profits led its members to resort to violence 
against governments and civilians that included public bombings and assassinations (Roth, 
2010: 492). From this period onwards, the crime-terror relationship would not only surge but 
also grow in complexity.  
Tamara Makarenko (2004) is credited as the first scholar to assess this complex relationship 
which is described as the crime-terror nexus (Carrapico, Irrera & Tupman, 2014: 214).  In 
addition to the rise of globalisation, the subsequent transnational dimension of organized 
crime entities coupled with the evolving nature of terrorism contributed towards the steady 
decline in the demarcation line between organized crime and terrorism. This process of the 
gradual amalgamation of the two phenomena is referred to as a security continuum which 
consists of organized crime on the one end of the spectrum and terrorism on the other end.  
This spectrum comprises of four gradual phases: 1) organized crime and terrorist groups form 
alliances to promote their respective interests; 2) each entity appropriate each other’s tactics 
and method; 3) terrorist and criminal groups converge creating a functional alliance and 4) 
transformation of one group into the other (Makarenko, 2004: 130-131; Carrapico, Irrera & 
Tupman, 2014:214). These four phases can be classified under the broad headings of: 
alliances, appropriation, convergence and transformation (as noted in Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1: The Crime-Terror Continuum 
Source: Makarenko (2010:185) 
 
Juxtaposing the latter phases on the crime-terror nexus are the following three levels, that is, 
the operational, evolutionary and conceptual (Makarenko, 2010: 184).  On the operational 
level, the nexus can adopt either one of two forms. Firstly, one group adopts the tactics of the 
other, for instance, a terror group employing criminal tactics and the other way round. The 
second form is the functional merging of the terror and criminal group which can be either an 
ad hoc alliance or the integration of one group into the other. The evolutionary plane refers to 
the ‘transformation of the tactics and motivations of one entity into the other’, that is, a 
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criminal network can evolve into a terrorist group or vice versa (2010: 184). Finally, the 
conceptual level occurs when both entities occupy the same space and time and as such, 
crime and terrorism are treated as clearly defined actions.  
 
This conceptual level mirrors the ‘convergence’ (third phase) context that engenders hybrid 
entities that pursue their ‘ideological and economic motivations by perpetrating acts of 
politically motivated terrorism and engaging in organized criminal activity for profit 
maximization’ (Makarenko, 2010: 184). Likewise on the crime-terror continuum (Fig. 1), this 
convergence context is situated in the middle of the spectrum and it consists of a ‘grey area’ 
symbolising the fulcrum where organized crime and terrorism are inseparable from each 
other (Makarenko, 2004: 28). While chapter three will examine the convergence and 
transformation in greater depth, the other two phases (alliances and appropriation) on the 
continuum is briefly examined in the subsequent paragraphs.   
 
2.4.1.1 Alliances 
In addition to being the most common type of linkage, alliances formed by organized 
criminal groups and terrorists are both tactical and strategic. Tactical alliances can be 
described as a once-off deal or a short-term negotiation (Dishman, 2001:52) whereas strategic 
relationships are based on mutual interests and last for a longer period (Wang, 2010: 15). 
Dishman (2001:53) spotlights that the reasons behind both strategic and tactical alliance 
include: ‘the desire of a TCO [Transnational Criminal Organization] to enter a new market, 
the need for a specialized service, or more generally, as a means to reduce the risk of a TCO’s 
illegal operations’. To these, Makarenko (2004:131) adds: sharing ‘expert knowledge’ in 
terms of bomb-manufacturing, money laundering or counterfeiting; providing operational 
support, that is, providing access to smuggling routes; and also procuring financial support, 
for instance, colluding in bringing illicit products like narcotics onto the market.  
 
The meeting of three IRA members with FARC members - in 2001 - in order to share expert 
knowledge of bomb-making typifies a tactical alliance (Sanderson, 2004). In other words, the 
encounter was temporary as it had a specific purpose with no endeavour of forging of a long 
term partnership. On the other hand, a strategic alliance can be exemplified in the relationship 
that was developed between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Albanian mafia 
during the Kosovo conflict involving heroin trafficking (Makarenko, 2004: 132). The profits 
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the Albanian mafia concurred in regard to the heroin transactions were funnelled towards the 
KLA’s political wing in order to purchase weapons (2004:132). This type of alliance, 
according to Hutchinson & O’Malley (2007:1104), can be described as ‘parasitic’ since it 
comprised of terrorist benefiting from organised crime profits in a relationship that ‘will only 
last as long as the terrorist group appears useful, and as long as the ideological differences 
between the two groups do not conflict’. Similarly, Wang (2010:16) assiduously observes 
that the strategic alliance between organized crime groups and terrorists can be perceived as a 
means of risk reduction that is mutually beneficial. As a way to guarantee their profits, 
organized criminals seek the protection of terrorist entities while the latter benefit by hiding 
themselves through their involvement in organized crime (Wang, 2010:16).  
 
2.4.1.2 Appropriation of Tactics   
The second phase on the continuum is an evolving step from the alliance phase. It refers to 
the operational tactics employed by both organized crime and terrorist groups and consists of 
a twofold feature: appropriation and integration. Appropriation occurs when terrorist groups 
learn to engage criminal activities to support or finance their activities or when organized 
crime groups that engage in terrorism tactics to further their own interests. In this regard, 
criminal organizations conduct ‘selective and calibrated violence to destroy competitors or 
threaten counternarcotic authorities’ (Dishman, 2001: 45) and the aim is often to coerce 
competitors or government into negotiation and compromise. This was exemplified by the 
Sicilian Mafia’s bombing spree in 1993 as way to force government to abrogate the anti-
mafia legislation (Jamieson, citied in Makarenko, 2004:134).  
 
Meanwhile, terrorist groups employ criminal tactics in order to secure funds for their 
operations and this includes ‘Basque Homeland and Freedom movement (ETA), the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)’, and more recently the Taliban, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, 
more importantly AQIM,  have all been linked to the drugs trade (Phillips & Kamen, 2014; 
Makarenko 2004: 132). Integration of tactics, on the other hand, is when an organised crime 
organization integrates within a terrorist group or vice versa, in order to acquire that group’s 
tactics. In sum, most relationship in the crime-terror nexus evolve into appropriation or 
integration as this phase eliminates the inherent difficulties associated with alliances. These 
include: ‘differences over priorities and strategies, distrust, danger of defections and betrayal, 
and the threat that alliances could create competitors’ (European Union, 2012:30).  
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 2.4.2 The Context of the Crime-Terror Continuum 
After having examined the nature of the crime-terror nexus, it becomes imperative to 
examine the context which incubates and provides the suitable climate for such a relationship 
to spur. Shelley (2005:102) discovered that the nexus between terrorist and organized crime 
groups thrive on a state of chaos, protracted conflicts and regions containing shadow 
economies. Makarenko (2010:187) echoes this when she notes that ‘weak and failed states 
foster nefarious collaboration, which subsequently seeks to perpetuate a condition of civil (or 
regional) war to secure economic and political power’.  
 
Therefore, in order to facilitate their operations, instability and the prolongation of conflict 
becomes a primary motive for both organized criminal and terrorist groups alike. Unstable 
environments often lead to ‘poor border security, weak law enforcement, corrupt public 
officials and established smuggling networks’ (EU, 2012:18). The infamous collaboration 
between organized crime and terrorism is given further impetus to thrive in spaces where 
government control is either fragmented and weak or non-existent. This is exemplified in 
countries like Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Pakistan, Thailand, Somalia and northern Mali. 
With particular importance to this study, northern Mali has recently emerged as an area that 
combines terrorism with criminal activities and it incidentally happens to be a training hub 
for AQIM members (EU, 2012: 19).  
 
Corruption is another aspect that is exploited by organized crime and terrorist groups as a 
way to enhance the crime-terror nexus. Despite the crucial role that corruption plays within 
the interplay of organized crime and terrorism, there are other factors that are essential to the 
sustenance of the nexus and these are: ‘endemic corruption, weak governments and a weak 
economic system in conjunction with unsupervised borders’ (Kittner, cited in Shelley 2014: 
84). Consequently, the conjunction of violence, corruption, organized crime, weapons 
smuggling, and other illicit activities creates a safe haven for both terrorist and criminal 
groups to operate with a state that has lost its legitimacy (EU, 2012:19). The aim of groups 
involved in the crime-terror nexus is to create a state within which corruption becomes 
widespread and endemic. In turn, this state would lose its authority and be viewed as a 
‘predator instead of a protector’ (Picarelli, 2012: 192). Facing a loss of legitimacy among the 
people, government can do very little to prevent terrorist and organized crime groups from 
expanding the crime-terror continuum. With this in mind, Picarelli (2012: 190) rightly 
observes that it is no surprise that ‘organized crime and terrorist groups gravitate towards 
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regions of the globe with high levels of corruption’. Some examples are Central Asia, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Philippines, among others (Shelley, 2014: 85). 
 
In the context of the Sahel, AQIM rely on factors that are conducive to perpetrating a crime-
terror nexus. The outbreak of the conflict in Mali in 2012 provided the perfect opportunity for 
AQIM to capitalise on expanding their activities. Erosion of state institutions, collusion with 
corrupted officials, involvement of security officials and business persons in contraband 
trafficking are among the factors that provided the perfect theatre of operations for AQIM. 
According to Lacher (2012:11), organized crime in Mali became a serious impediment in 
2006 after the rebellion of the Tuareg individuals residing in the region bordering Algeria and 
Niger. This eventually led to a loss of state legitimacy and authority in the area and opened 
up the opportunity for the influx of organized groups using the area as smuggling routes. In 
an attempt to expand their area of operations in Mali, AQIM, capitalising on the weak state 
legitimacy in northern Mali, joined forces with radical Tuareg Islamist group Ansar Al Dine 
and MUJAO of Mauritania and staged a successful coup against the Malian government in 
2012 and ended up controlling most of the northern Malian region (Chivvis & Liepman, 
2013: 9). During this time, AQIM increased its kidnappings for ransom and its weapons 
smuggling trade. This, as Lacher (2012:17) interestingly points out, was also due to the 
reluctance of the Malian leadership to tackle AQIM because of the complicity of high ranking 
state officials in organized criminal activities. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
The discussion in this chapter has delineated key themes that are significant to attaining a 
proper understanding of the AQIM phenomenon by examining concepts such as terrorism, 
organized crime and ideology. To further comprehend the transformation of AQIM in the 
Sahel, particular focus was given to religious terrorism and religious ideology. At the close of 
this chapter, the reader should have an understanding of the concept of religious terrorism, 
organized crime and the linkage of the two as examined in the crime-terror continuum. Next, 
this study attempts to develop a theoretical framework that seeks to examine the root causes 
of the conflict in Algeria that has given rise to the birth and subsequent élan to AQIM to 
transform into one of the most dominant terrorist group in Africa. To this end, two theoretical 
frameworks of analysis were chosen, that is, the greed and grievance theory and the 







The purpose of a chapter discussing the theoretical framework of a study is to both inform 
and situate the reader within the context of the development of the study. A theoretical 
framework aims to locate the present study in the broader context and to provide the author 
with a certain perspective through which to examine a particular topic with the hope of 
bringing a new dimension to their study. Whilst the previous section discussed important 
concepts that can be considered as the thematic underpinnings of the study, this chapter 
examines the theories that in turn create a structure which guides the research. Approaching 
research from this angle enables the reader to develop a clearer understanding of the direction 
in which the study is progressing. With this in mind, this chapter sets out to accomplish this 
deed by discussing the theories that guided the study or the theories on which the presented 
study is premised or grounded.  
 
The end of the Cold War witnessed a gradual change in conflict dynamics from interstate to 
intrastate. This paradigm shift prompted scholars to advance theoretical approaches to explain 
this change in the conflict domain. Some of these theories include: state-failure (Rotberg, 
2003), frustration and aggression (Dollard et al, 1939), neo-patrimonialism (Chabal, 2005), 
clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1993; 1996), greed and grievance theory (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Steward, 2008), inter alia. To situate the reader within the context of the 
discussion, some of these theories are skimmed since it would be an ambitious undertaking to 
exhaust them all within this chapter. In continuation with the literature review from the 
preceding chapter, this chapter aims to provide a broad theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon of AQIM by propounding on two theoretical frameworks of analysis. Primarily, 
the greed and grievance theory is used to examine the factors that have contributed to the 
growth of the militant extremist group. Secondly, the study examines the transformation of 
the group within the spectrum of the convergence thesis.  
3.1 Explaining Conflict: An Examination of Some Theories  
In an attempt to explain the dynamics of violent conflicts, scholars have proposed various 
explanations. One of these is the state failure thesis which posits that a state fails when it is 
unable to discharge its responsibilities of providing political goods and services to its citizens 
living within its borders (Rotberg, 2003:2). Failure to control its territory and a loss of 
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legitimacy weakens the state’s security apparatus rendering it vulnerable to the disgruntled 
populace who form insurgent groups which rebel against the state with the hope of changing 
the status quo. Consequently, it turns into a security threat to its neighbours and to the greater 
region at large. This theory strikes resonance within the African continent as most states that 
are engaged in conflicts within their borders can be said to exhibit a failure of governance to 
a certain degree (Libya, DRC, Somalia etc.).  
 
Despite its usefulness, the state failure thesis does run into some difficulties with regard to its 
dominant political narrative in its analysis of conflict. As Bates (2008:261) succinctly puts it, 
this theory remains unpersuasive as it only highlights the effects such as poor governance, 
lack of political institution and loss of legitimacy but does little to explain the actual cause of 
the conflict. But despite this criticism, the theory remains useful and relevant to this study 
because it explains (at least in part) why people resort to terrorist activities.      
 
Neo-patrimonialism is another theoretical approach used to explain conflict, with specific 
focus on Africa. Neo-patrimonialism can be defined as a form of governance that is sustained 
through ‘unequal forms of political reciprocity which link patrons with their clients along 
vertical social lines’ (Chabal, 2005: 3). This is characterised by the fact that the legitimacy of 
the politicians lies not in a system of accountability but depends rather on their ‘ability to 
provide for their own’ (2005:4). Despite functioning well in certain regimes in post-
independent African states, the inherent instability within neo-patrimonialism meant that it 
possessed the seeds of its own destruction. The eventual demise of this system leads to 
conditions where ‘the line between the private and public spheres is so blurred that notions of 
the public good and of independent civil society are ultimately absent’(Englebert and Tull, 
2008: 117).  
 
Within this situation of confusion coupled with disorder and even violence, political actors, 
seizing the opportunity to maximise their own interests, undermine the state and loot its 
resources. In short, the political elite use ‘disorder as a political instrument’ to pursue their 
own interests and satisfy their greed (Chabal, 2005:7-8). The regimes of Sani Abacha of 
Nigeria and Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire exemplify ‘predatory states’ where the political elite 
feats on the state resources with ‘any more regard to the welfare of the citizenry than a 




This theory becomes problematic, however, due to its ardent focus on the gluttonous appetite 
of the elite. Similarly to the state failure theory, it fails to take into account other factors that 
led to the unfolding of the post-colonial system into conflict. These include ‘the collapse of 
the post-colonial mode of accumulation that was in part linked to the pressures from 
globalisation, and the anti-state market reform agenda promoted by the IMF, World Bank and 
other donors’ (Obi, 2009: 111). However, the theory remains useful in the sense that it 
explains how reciprocity results into dissatisfaction among sections of society and thus 
triggers violent activities which include terrorism. 
 
Moving away from a political explication of conflict, Huntington (1993) developed the clash 
of civilisations theory that examines conflict from a cultural perspective. This theory 
advocates that in the aftermath of the Cold War, the causes of conflict are no longer 
ideological, political or economic in nature but cultural as it emanates from a clash between 
groups or nations of different civilisations. The core of this thesis rests on the premise that 
‘these civilizations are based on irreconcilable values, rivalry and conflict among them is 
inevitable’ (Heywood, 2011:514). The primary irreconcilable value that Huntington attributes 
to the cause of ethnic conflict and identity wars is religious division or ‘fault lines’ among 
civilisations, especially between the West and Islam (Franks, 2006:79).  
 
In the wake of the 2001 Trade Centre attacks and the current wave of violence of Islamist 
extremism, Huntington’s statement that Islam has ‘bloody borders’ and possess a high 
propensity to resort to violence in international crises (1996:258), has gained prominence 
amongst many scholars. As Abrahamian (2005: 529) articulates, ‘the mainstream media in 
the USA automatically, implicitly and unanimously adopted Huntington’s paradigm to 
explain September 11’.  
 
Although Huntington deserves credit for his prescient theory, some elements within his 
argument are questionable. Firstly, it fails to take into account why some states fight each 
other while others do not (Jacoby, 2008:80). Secondly, the model of civilisations painted by 
Huntington is rigid and homogenous which is far from the objective reality since cultures are 
complex and open to external influence (Heywood, 2011:515). From this, it can be concluded 
that the argument oversimplifies religion as the sole instigator of conflict while disregarding 




After having briefly examined these three frameworks mentioned above, it can be noted that 
although these theories are useful in analysing conflicts, they are limited in assessing the 
causal factors that lead to violence in the first place. This further reinforces the debate 
surrounding the insurmountable task of developing a theory that seeks to explain warfare at 
the abstract level (Jacoby, 2008: 182). This difficulty of such an undertaking is captured by 
Levy (1998:140) in the following words: 
there is no consensus as to what the causes of war are, what methodologies are 
most useful for discovering an validating those causes, what general theories 
of world politics and human behaviour a theory of war might be subsumed 
within, what criteria are appropriate for evaluating competing theories, or even 
whether it is possible to generalise about anything as complex and 
contextually dependent as war. 
 
While this sullen communiqué spotlights the setbacks that scholars face, it is far from an 
indication that the task is impossible.  Keeping the foregoing warning in mind, the study 
favours the greed and grievance theory as it provides a more nuanced analysis of the causes 
of conflict. It is also a more viable paradigm with which to assess the phenomenon of AQIM 
and its context. So conceived, the theory is examined under separate headings (greed then 
grievance) before reconciling both in order to promote a broader and more encompassing 
analysis. 
3.2 Theories that guided the Study 
3.2.1 Greed and Grievance Theory 
3.2.1.1 Greed Thesis 
The greed thesis, developed through the research of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), ascribes an 
economic approach to the causes of conflict. It claims that the ‘feasibility of economic 
predation and the rational pursuit of economic interest’ are the primary causes of conflict 
(Cater, 2003:20). This system of thought can be traced back to the writings of Grossman 
(1999: 269) who modelled rebellion as an industry that incurred profits from looting in so 
much that ‘the insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates’. With its emphasis on 
the economic motivations of conflict actors, this view is quite popular among economists. For 
Collier (2000), the fundamental tenet of the greed theory is that all societies experience 
grievances but it is only when opportunities for rebellion present themselves that civil war 
breaks out. This is further reinforced when Collier (2000: 91) asserts that he 
 
investigated statistically the global pattern of large-scale civil conflict since 
1965, expecting to find a close relationship between measures of these hatreds 
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and grievances and the incident of conflict.  Instead, [he] found that economic 
agendas appear to be central to understanding why civil wars get going.  
 
Thus, he concluded that ‘conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities 
than by grievance’ (2000:91). It can be deduced, then, that conflicts are caused by rational 
actors seeking their own advantage and benefits. In this respect, Hoeffler (2011:277) argues 
that since the rational choice argument plays a crucial role in much of economists’ 
understanding of economic behaviour, it becomes evident that the argument lies at the centre 
of the greed theory. This can be exemplified in the context where potential recruits only join 
a rebellion after making a rational decision based on cost-benefit analysis (2011:277). In their 
analysis of civil wars from 1960 to 1999, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) developed the Collier-
Hoeffler (CH) model to study the motive and opportunity behind the 78 civil wars that 
occurred during that time frame. The CH model is econometric and it focuses particularly on 
opportunity as the determining factor of rebellion and civil wars (Collier et al, 2005:3).  
 
The findings of the study demonstrated that ‘opportunity as an explanation of conflict risk is 
consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as greed motivated’ (Collier et al, 
2005:18). Additionally, other significant risk factors that increase the probability of conflict 
or rebellion include: dependence on primary commodity exports, geographic dispersion of 
population, a previous history of conflict, low education opportunities, unequal ethnic and 
religious composition, high population growth, low average income and economic decline 
(Cater, 2003: 20; Collier, 2006: 5-7). On the other hand, grievance factors such as inequality, 
political rights, ethnic polarization, and religious fractionalization yielded little correlation in 
relation to conflict incidence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004: 588). 
 
The fact that ‘opportunity can account for the existence of either for-profit or not-for-profit 
rebel organizations’ (Collier et al, 2005:18), it highlights the importance of the notion of 
opportunity within the greed model. In that regard, Murshed & Tadjoeddin (2009:89) provide 
a threefold classification of opportunities, namely, financing, recruitment and geography. The 
sources of finance for rebel groups often include: arrogation of natural resources, funding by 
sympathetic diasporas living abroad who are sympathetic to the ideology of the group, 
contributions from other states that are against the government, and multinational 




The concept of recruitment rests on the ability of the group to attract recruits to increase the 
fighting force. A context consisting of high percentages of unemployed male youths among 
the population, low levels of education and endemic poverty is a thriving atmosphere for such 
recruitment. In terms of geographical context, rebel groups and insurgents prefer 
mountainous topography or other safe havens to hide or plan their operations. Al Qaeda’s use 
of the mountainous territory in Afghanistan to launch attacks against the US led coalition in 
2003 is a prime example. In short, the greed thesis sums up that conflict ‘occur in poverty 
stricken, failed states characterised by venal, corrupt and inept regimes, with the dynamics of 
war sustained by a motivation akin to banditry’ (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009:89).           
 
3.2.1.2 Grievance Thesis 
The earliest account of grievance as a catalyst of conflict can be located in the writings of 
Aristotle who noted that grievances due to inequality of society coupled with the inefficiency 
of the government to respond to this problem resulted in social conflict (Jacoby, 2008: 103). 
Building on Aristotle’s notion, Tedd Gurr (1970:24) developed the theory of ‘relative 
deprivation’ (RD) that he defined as the actors’ perception ‘of discrepancy between their 
value expectations and their value capacities’. In other words, it is the disparity between what 
people think they deserve, and what they actually believe they can attain (Murshed & 
Tadjoeddin, 2009: 96). This incongruence between aspirations and achievement becomes ‘a 
frustrating experience that is sufficiently intense and focused to result in either rebellion or 
revolution’ (Davies, 1962: 5). Gurr’s core argument in his RD theory can be described as 
follows, ‘the greater the deprivation an individual perceives relative to his expectation the 
greater his discontent; the more widespread and intense discontent is among the members of a 
society, the more likely and severe is civil strife’ (1970: 24). For instance, the mass protest of 
the youth in Algeria in the 1980s leading up to the violent revolution resulted from the 
frustration of being unemployed despite having educational qualifications. As Murshed & 
Tadjoeddin (2009: 97) pointedly note, ‘educational achievements may raise the aspirations of 
young people, but they will become frustrated if unemployed…venting their feelings in mass 
political violence’. 
 
Horizontal inequality (HI) is another notion of the grievance theory that overlaps with 
relative deprivation. HI is defined as the systematic ‘inequalities in economic, social or 
political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups’ (Stewart, 2008:3). 
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Stewart (2002: 2) distinguishes HI from the equality amongst homogenous groups or 
populations also known as vertical inequality (VI).  The HI thesis is relevant as a conflict 
analysis tool in that it takes into account the effect of collective group grievance. A group 
identity is construed through either religion or ethnicity or class or religion.  
 
As Cater (2003: 22) points out, there are four sources of economic and political 
differentiations between groups: 1) political participation, 2) economic assets, 3) employment 
and 4) social access and situation. Hence ‘a collective perception of an intergroup disparity 
within one or more of these dimensions constitutes horizontal inequality’ (2003:22). While 
Vertical Inequality (VI) focuses on inequality of personal income among individuals, HI 
encapsulates a broader range consisting of the political and economic causal factors of 
conflict. For example, HI denotes inequalities across groups that share common identities 
such as ethnic, religious or regional in terms of distribution of income, assets, educational 
opportunities, political opportunities, allocation of state subsidies (Stewart 2000). To further 
propound on her theory, Stewart introduces four sources of horizontal inequalities. 
 
The first source arises as a result of discrimination in public spending and taxation lead to 
conflict. In societies where employment is the principal source of personal advancement, 
discrimination in allocation of job opportunities can lead to frustrations and resentment as in 
the case of Burundi in the 1990s (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009:98). Secondly, high asset 
inequality is another source of HI. Countries with high agrarian inequalities are often prone to 
conflict and these include El Salvador, Guatemala, Nepal and the Philippines (Russett, 1964). 
The third source of inequality consists of economic mismanagement and recession. Many 
countries in Africa, Latin America, and former Soviet Union that were engaged in conflict 
have also been plagued with economic mismanagement and collapse of the state.  
 
Despite the IMF and the World Bank’ adjusted programmes to assist with economic 
development, many of these countries (such as the DRC and Somalia) have failed to achieve 
economic recovery (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009: 98). Finally, grievance related to resource 
rents is another source of HI. If the local population perceive that they are not benefitting 
from the resources of their land, natural resource rents can become a source of frustration and 
eventual conflict as in the example of the Niger Delta of Nigeria (See Mngomezulu, 2013). In 
a nutshell, the grievance theory draws on the ‘human motivation of participants engaged in 
violent conflict, particularly the role of political, cultural and economic factors in influencing 
41 
 
and constructing group identities and mobilizing such groups to compete for power’ (Stewart, 
2000: 246-247). 
 
Since no theory can claim infallibility, both the greed and the grievance theories have their 
share of difficulties.  The greed theory, according to Keen (2012:759), is limited in that it 
views ‘human motivation in terms of terms of economic motivation and individual rational 
choice’. Murshed & Tadjoeddin (2009:96) also add that the theory fails to examine 
‘institutional mechanisms that cause the competition for resource rents to descend into 
outright warfare’. In so doing, it ‘fails to point to the mechanisms that link economic 
conditions to political outcomes’ (Bates, 2008: 261). For instance, the conflict in the DRC, 
despite its economic undertone, was triggered by institutional grievance (Zartman, 2011:300). 
Therefore, there is danger for studies that focus solely on the economic motivations of 
conflict actors to produce ‘probabilistic statements of conflict rather than the factual 
descriptions of actual conflict dynamics’ (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003: 5).  
 
Adhering to the latter caveat, the grievance theory attempts to mend that problem by 
providing an understanding of the causal factors of inter-group conflict. However, while the 
grievance theory may be more adept at explaining the causes of the emergence of conflict 
than the greed thesis, it fails to show why these conflicts persist (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 
2009: 108). Moreover, an overemphasis on grievance as a cause of conflict can lead to 
ignoring other factors like the economic variables and ‘the difference in power resources 
between parties concerned’ (Jacoby, 2008:123). As Hoeffler (2011: 275) rightly asserts, ‘a 
well-defined theory of rebellion has to consider both aspects [greed and grievance] because 
they are interrelated’. It is this perceptive statement that informs the following subsection.  
 
3.2.1.3 Greed and Grievance Theory 
Although the greed versus grievance dichotomy may be a purposeful starting point to 
investigate the cause of a conflict, this separation leads to an impasse that fails to do justice to 
the analysis in the first place. Murshed & Tadjoeddin (2009:102) remark that while ‘greed 
and grievance are regarded as competing views, they may be complementary, as greed may 
lead to grievances and vice versa’. There is a possibility that grievances may be present 
without greedy motives but the opposite may not be so true. In agreement with this statement, 
Keen (2012:770) notes that even situations where greed is ‘powerfully fuelling’ the conflict, 
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the origins of that greed can be located within a set of grievances.  Additionally, there are 
several instances where conflicts contain both proponents of the greed and grievance.  
For example, the LTTE conflict in Sri Lanka can be observed as a conflict where the Tamil 
people who were facing discrimination (grievance) at the hand of a greedy government 
(greed). Another instance is that of the Liberian conflict of 1989-2007 resulting from ethnic 
resentment (grievance) towards government discrimination (greed) (Zartman 2011:302-303). 
Conflicts in our present age have assumed a complex and intricate combination of economic, 
political, cultural and security subtleties (Ballentine, 2003:280). Therefore, attempting to 
understand the underlying motivations that sustain such conflicts through the framework of a 
greed vis-à-vis the grievance theory is not only limited but also myopic. In order to overcome 
this deficit, it is imperative to perceive the greed and grievance theory not as two incongruent 
theories but rather as, in the words of Zartman (2011:303), ‘two sides of the same coin’. 
 
This study adopts the approach of combining both theories as a means to analyze the 
underlying motivations behind the creation and evolution of AQIM. The grievance theory 
serves to examine the roots and motivations behind the formation of AQIM and its propensity 
to use violence in promoting its cause. The events leading up to the Algerian civil war within 
which AQIM finds its origins consisted of a series of grievances arising from the emergence 
of new social cleavages and political demands (Cristiani, 2013:74). Furthermore, the 
subsequent annulment of the 1992 elections meant that in denying victory to democratically 
elected opposition party, the military had effectively stifled the voice of the people and 
further increased their anger and frustration. The GIA, capitalising on the people’s 
grievances, amassed support and launched a series on the Algerian military and security 
forces under the banner of turning Algeria into an Islamic state (Harmon, 2010:14; Filiu, 
2009). This notion of the grievance theory is examined in more details in chapter five. 
 
Meanwhile, the greed theory assesses the motivation for the evolution of AQIM from a 
religious terrorist group with political motivations to a terror group involved in criminal 
activities that include kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking amongst others. In line with 
the notion that conflict actors operate from a rational perspective, the greed theory conceives 
AQIM members as rational actors engaging in terrorism to further their end of amassing 
profits rather that rectifying injustices or grievances. Next, the discussion of the convergence 
thesis attempts to further examine the reason behind why terrorist groups evolve into 
organized criminal networks. In the light of this study, this framework sets out to evaluate the 
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link between AQIM as a transnational terrorist group and a transnational organised crime 
network.    
 
3.2.2 The Convergence Thesis 
The convergence thesis, according to Makarenko (2004:135), refers ‘explicitly to the idea 
that criminal and terrorist organizations could converge into a single entity that initially 
displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously’,  producing a change in the aims and 
ultimate end towards which the organization strives for. The notion of a convergence purports 
that the two organizations – terrorist and organized crime – become a single hybrid entity that 
display similar characteristics and motivations in such a way that it becomes almost 
impossible to distinguish one from the other. This process extends beyond the mere 
cooperation or alliance between the two groups as discussed in the previous chapter since 
both entity assume each other’s identity to the extent of becoming inseparable. The 
convergence theory can be further divided into two components that are independent yet 
related. Firstly, it includes criminal groups that display political motivations. Secondly, of 
importance to this study, it refers to terrorist groups that are so attracted to criminal profits to 
the extent of ‘using their political rhetoric as a façade solely for perpetrating criminal 
activities on a wider scale’ (2004:135).  
 
This second component is also labeled by some scholars as the transformation process and it 
serves to reinforce the convergence thesis (Picarelli, 2012:188). While the convergence 
theory primarily implies the fusion of two entities, transformation refers to the evolution of 
the aim and motivation of a single group in lieu of two to the extent that it results in a drastic 
change in nature of the group. During the transformation of a terrorist group into a crime-
terror entity, there are certain organizational changes that take place. Of these changes, 
Rosenthal (quoted in Picarelli 2012: 189) lists three: ‘a degradation of the leadership cadre 
committed to the political cause; political transformations that undermine the political raison 
d’être of the group; and opportunities for significant criminal profits’. To these, the following 
can be added: change in the group’s motivation from perpetrating violence to maximising 
profits; there is a decrease in the intensity associated with political demands and a change in 
the recruitment strategy (EU, 2012:38). In other words, terrorist groups that undergo the 
transformation process ‘shift their raison d’être from political to economic goals’ (Picarelli, 




Consequently, this tactic is used by such groups as it presents a twofold advantage. Firstly, 
government and law enforcement authorities are deceived into focusing on political issues 
and problems instead of investigating the criminal activities of the group. Secondly, the use 
of terror tactics becomes a method or tool to promote the group’s hegemony within the 
criminal network and dissuade any form of competition from other organized crime groups 
(Makarenko, 2004:137). Also, the group continues to attract recruits to its rank with its focus 
on political grievances combined with financial rewards. Thornberry and Levy (2011:8) 
contextualizes this within the AQIM phenomenon when they assert that ‘the extreme poverty 
experienced by people living in Mali, Niger and Mauritania ensures that AQIM will remain 
an attractive employer and provider in the region’.  
 
Rosenthal (cited in Picarelli, 2012:189) denotes terrorism-for-profit as a criminal activity that 
includes ‘kidnapping, banditry, looting, or smuggling—legitimized by an ideological veneer’. 
This is reflected in the funding operations of AQIM which include kidnappings for ransom, 
illegal cigarettes, human and drug trafficking in the Sahel and cocaine smuggling inter alia 
(Levy & Thornberry, 2011:8). As a result, ‘such operational ambiguity has by now become a 
distinctive feature of AQMI’s “Islamist terrorism” wherein hostage-hustling, car-smuggling, 
drug-trafficking, money-counterfeiting, arms-dealing, cigarette-reselling, and gasoline-
bootlegging are more present than political or religious pronouncements’ (Mohamedou, 
2011:3).  
 
Another important aspect pertinent to both the convergence and transformation process is the 
context that enables these hybrid groups to perpetuate their activities. In addition to 
contributing to state failure, issues such as violence, corruption and conflict create an 
environment that scholars refer to as a ‘black hole’ that aims to ‘foster the convergence 
between transnational organised crime and terrorism, and ultimately create a safe haven for 
the continued operations of convergent groups’ (Makarenko, 2004:138). Subsequently, a 
‘black hole state’ emerges where poor governance and a lack of security enable hybrid groups 
to conduct their illegal activities in the open without fear of reprisal from government or 
security forces.  
 
An example of a black hole state is the tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay 
where terrorist and organised crime groups operate comfortably (Picarelli, 2012:190). In a 
45 
 
study conducted by Philips and Kamen (2014), the authors describe the emergence a black 
hole state within Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban movement. Furthermore, the authors 
highlight three factors that propel a transforming organization into a black hole state. These 
include: 1) the entity should operate within the geopolitical context of a weak or failing state; 
2) the group must be continuously involved in both criminal and terrorist activities and 3) the 
organization’s original founding principle should hold a strategic value to the group (Philips 
and Kamen, 2014:42-43).  
 
In applying these three factors to AQIM, one can determine the extent to which AQIM has 
undergone a transformation and whether the group operates within a black hole state. In the 
preceding paragraphs, it was noted that AQIM is involved in both criminal and terrorist 
activities. At the same time, AQIM’s theatre of operations in the conflict stricken region of 
Northern Mali resonates with the second factor in that the organization operates within the 
context of a weak or failing state. The third factor, however, appears to pose a problem since 
it is difficult to ascertain whether AQIM still adheres to its founding principles. However, it 
can be argued that AQIM, similarly to the Taliban, was founded on religious principles but 
eventually evolved into an entity involved in organised criminal activities. Nonetheless, as 
Philips and Kamen (2014:45) posit, Al Qaeda remains committed to its original religious 
principles of radical Islam and global jihad which still hold strategic value. Additionally, ‘its 
message has been propagated worldwide through its networks of operatives and splinter 
groups’ (2014:46).  
 
With the foregoing logic in mind, it can be concluded that the third factor applies to a 
significant degree to AQIM since it is one of Al Qaeda’s most allegiant affiliate. As a result, 
it can be concluded that the group has undergone a transformation and operates within a 
black hole environment. The subsequent chapters of this dissertation further expand and 
evaluate the notion of transformation that facilitated the transformation of AQIM within the 
Sahel context.  
3.3 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to situate the present study within the two theoretical 
frameworks, namely, the greed and grievance theories and the convergence thesis. Before 
analyzing these theories, the chapter briefly examined other theories of conflict highlighting 
their positive and negative aspects. In addition, a rationale and justification for choosing these 
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theories were provided. While the grievance theory served to account for the rise of AQIM 
within the Algerian context, this will be expounded in greater detail in chapter five. On the 
other hand, the greed theory served to examine the economic motivations behind the 
continuous evolution of AQIM. Similarly, this aspect will be further examined in chapter six. 
In extension to the greed theory, the convergence thesis aimed to demonstrate the 
transformation of AQIM from a terrorist group with political motivations to an organized 
crime entity focused on criminal activities for the sole purpose of profits. As such, the greed 
and grievance theory in tandem with the convergence thesis with particular focus on the 
transformation process aimed at guiding the study to a closer understanding the phenomenon 
of AQIM. 
 
Before engaging into the historical antecedents of AQIM within the Algerian context, it is 
fitting to revisit the pivotal role religion plays as an ideology within the founding principles 
of the group. Since militant Islamism not only predated extremist groups such as Al Qaeda 
and the GIA but also influenced their formation, it is imperative therefore to analyze the 
antecedents that have given rise to this school of thought. In this regard, the next chapter 
discusses the history and development of militant Islamism from the time of its emergence to 
























The Religious Ideology of Terrorism 
4.0 Introduction 
According to De Azevedo (2010: 5), Thomas Aquinas once posited that he feared the person 
‘of a single book’. In this regard, Aquinas was referring to the dangers of enclosing oneself in 
a single point of view and refuting any objectivity while at the same time embracing a form 
of solipsism. The ‘person(s) of the single book’, regardless of their religion whether it be 
Christianity, Judaism or Islam, share the common traits of purporting to a deviation of the 
original position of their religion to one that is ‘superficial, exclusivist and xenophobic’ 
(2010: 3). These ‘fundamentalists’ adhere to a literal following of the sacred texts such as the 
Gospel, Torah or the Quran and consolidate a rudimentary intolerance towards those who do 
not share in their ideology. Consequently, religion becomes an ideology that certain 
extremists utilise in order to perpetrate violence against innocent victims. The previous 
chapter considered the theoretical frameworks that informed this study towards formulating 
an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of AQIM by studying its birth, operations and 
transformation. In turn, this present chapter investigates the religious ideology behind AQIM, 
which falls under the broad banner of militant Islamism. 
 
As such, the present chapter follows a linear trajectory in analysing militant Islamism. It 
begins with the examination of the thinker whose thoughts gave rise to the militant school of 
thought –  Ibn Taymiyya. Then, Salafism and Wahhabism, the two schools of thought that 
originated from the writings of the Taymiyya are examined through the prism of the 20th 
century. The Iranian revolution and the Afghan jihad, two events that are often cited as 
having a profound influence and impact on the ideology of present day militant Islamists are 
investigated. The chapter concludes with the examination of the ideology behind the most 
notable contemporary militant Islamist group, namely, Al Qaeda. A brief historical 
background of the origins of the group and its ideology is provided in order to dispel some 
misconceptions that are commonly attached to its infamous leader Osama Bin Laden.  
Moreover, the dangers of the ‘person(s) of a single book’ is illustrated through the prism of 
Al Qaeda’s intolerance and solipsism in its interpretation of Quranic texts with its relativistic 
interpretation of concepts such as jihad, takfir and kufr. 
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4.1 Militant Islamism 
According to the Global Terrorism Index (2014), the top four groups responsible for the 
majority of terrorism fatalities from the period extending from 2000 to 2014 include Al 
Qaeda, The Taliban, Boko Haram and ISIL. At a cursory glance, it is quite evident that these 
groups have numerous differences in their tactics, strategies, goals and their areas of 
operation. Yet, looking beyond these differences reveals that these groups share a common 
feature in terms of the ideology of militant Islamism2. Kushner (2003:230) defines militant 
Islamism as ‘a fundamentalist, utopian ideology that often justifies violence for what is seen 
as a higher cause’ and notes that it is in many respects similar to past ideologies such as 
Fascism and Marxism. Militant Islamism rests on three common characteristics, namely, the 
implementation of a strict interpretation of the Quran and shari’a (Islamic law); a united 
Muslim state ruled by a caliph and the use of jihad in attaining these two latter objectives 
(Kushner, 2003:230). Moreover, Vertigans (2009:5) observes that militant ideologues who 
lack formal religious authority often refer to Islamic doctrine as a means to justify violence 
and killings. For Migaux (2007:258), ‘Islamic fundamentalism becomes Islamism only when 
its ideology is used to impose a strictly interpreted model of original Islam based on shari’a, 
or Islamic law, on society and on the state’.  
 
Ironically, the birth of militant Islamism can be attributed to the decline of the great Islamic 
civilisation. Examined from this perspective, militant Islamism symbolises a desire to return 
to the past era where Islamic civilisation was the predominant culture in the world. From its 
nascence in the 7th century CE –  when the Prophet Muhammad received divine revelations 
from the archangel Gabriel that would become the moral and political foundations of the 
religion – up until the early 19th century, Islam spread into ‘a vast empire that would become 
the cradle of the greatest known civilization’ (Migaux, 2007: 261). Within the first seventy 
years of its existence, Muslim armies conquered countries such as Palestine, Syria, Persia and 
Armenia, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, the Algerian coast, and Morocco. The period from 685 to 
945, however, is etched into Islamic history as the period where the Muslim civilisation 
reached its zenith and is also generally referred to as the period of the High Caliphate. The 
advancements during that period included ‘improved river irrigation and long-distance 
trade…people of diverse languages, religions, cultures, and ideas…and the flourishing of 
artistic and intellectual creativity’ (Goldschmidt & Davidson, 2010:65). It was often the case 
                                                 




that the hegemony of the Arab empire was challenged during the tenth to the thirteenth 
century by other nations such as the Turks, Persians and Christians amongst others. Yet, it 
was only from the fifteen century onwards that the West became a serious competitor to the 
Muslim empire which extended from the Middle East to South Eastern Europe and North 
Africa. 
 
Towards the eighteenth century, the West had both achieved and consolidated military, 
economic and political power over the Middle East (Goldschmidt & Davidson, 2010:147). 
This period marked the beginning of the decline of the supremacy of the Islamic civilisation 
as the West conquered many of the Arab states. In 1796, the Ottoman Turks suffered its first 
military defeat at the hands of the Russian army. Further losses ensued with European armies 
successfully invading at least seven Muslim countries with the most notable ones including 
Aden (Yemen), Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt between the period of 1798 and 1912 
(Kushner, 2003: 230). By the end of World War I, the slow decline of the Islamic cultural and 
political supremacy found its culmination in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The latter 
began to lose its grip on the Middle East as ‘the British and French consequently divided up 
the former Muslim empire as spoils of war’ (Kushner, 2003:231). The most humiliating 
defeat, however, was incurred by the newly formed state of Israel against a combined Arab 
force of five armies. The event was a revolutionary one for the Muslims since it humiliated 
their armies and discredited their regimes and…established a colonial settler state in their 
midst’ (Goldschmidt & Davidson, 2010: 293).  
 
The demise of the once powerful Islamic civilization led many Muslim scholars to critically 
reflect the reason of the growing strength and superiority of the West in contrast to the Arab 
world. As Hiro (2002:44) strikingly points out, the only plausible answer was that, 
either Europeans had devised a system better than Islam or the Muslim 
community had failed to follow true Islam. Since none of them [the 
intellectuals] was prepared to concede the inferiority of Islam to any other 
social system, the inevitable conclusion was that Muslims had deviated from 
the true path. So, the state was set for Islamic reform.   
     
It is against this backdrop that militant Islamism became an enticing feature among Muslims 
who wanted to return to the dominant era of the Islamic civilisation. While many Muslims 
adjusted to the ideas and concepts of the West, a few rejected the West and its innovations 
completely. Adhering to an ideology deeply entrenched in fundamentalist interpretation of 
Islam, these militant Islamists rejected the changes brought forth by the West and perceived 
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the latter as the enemy. According to Kushner (2003:230), militant Islamists comprise only of 
about 10 to 15 per cent of the whole Muslim population of the world. While militant 
Islamism was influenced by the historical context surrounding its incubation, there are many 
factors that underlie its characterisation. One salient concept contributing to militant Islamism 
is the school of thought within the Islamic tradition that is often referred to as Salafism and/or 
Wahhabism. Prior to examining the development and interrelationship of the school of 
thought upon militant Islamism, it is merited to firstly undertake a brief examination of the 
thoughts of Ibn Taymiyya who is considered the theologian who set the foundations for the 
Salafist and Wahhabist ideology and as such holds a ‘central significance for contemporary 
militant [Islamists]’ (Vertigans, 2009: 17).  
 
4.1.1 The Precedence of Militant Islamism: Ibn Taymiyya 
Ibn Taymiyya was a Syrian jurist and theologian who was born in 1263 and died in a 
Damascus prison in 1328. Similar to other great thinkers within history, his thoughts were 
greatly influenced by the difficult context in which he lived (Migaux, 2007: 270). It was time 
when the Islamic empire was splitting into smaller states due to the threats of the Crusaders in 
the Holy Land. At the same time, the advancing Muslim Mongols from the East had recently 
plundered Baghdad and ended the Caliphate (Ayubi, 1991: 126; Migaux, 2007: 270). 
Taymiyya, realising that Islam was jeopardised by these external pressures and was in 
desperate need of unification, condemned all original form of Islam as heretical and 
perceived ‘adoration of saints, pilgrimages to tombs, and Sufi practices all were viewed as 
idolatrous’ (Migaux, 2007: 270). For him and his followers, the only true sources of 
knowledge were the Quran and the Hadith.3 In terms of his political thoughts, Taymiyya 
followed the orthodox consensus on the necessity of government and leadership to all 
societies (Ayubi, 1991:126). In one of his books entitled Al-Siyasa al-Shar’iyya (Governance 
in Accordance with the Islamic law), he presents the shari’a-based rules for governing 
relations between the authority and the people. In line with his objective of achieving unity, 
his political thoughts drew inspiration from Islam practiced in its original and fundamental 
form. Although Taymiyya may have followed the conventional Islamic teachings of his time, 
he did introduce some new nuances to existing concepts. 
                                                 
3 The Hadith refers to the sayings that are attributed to the prophet Muhammad. 
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Turner (2010: 547) observes that Taymiyya ‘introduced the concept of the new jahiliya4, 
positioned the importance of jihad as equal to the five pillars of Islam’. In as much as he 
acknowledged that Jihad should be utilized against infidels, he also provided a twofold 
delineation of the latter. Firstly, infidels were perceived to be any persons who constrained or 
prevented total piety to God. Secondly, the term referred to any person who opted out of or 
deviated from the shari’a even if the person had uttered the ‘credo’ (Ayubi, 1991:126). 
Furthermore, he extended the concept of infidel to include Muslim leaders who gave 
allegiance to non-Muslims. In this context, he was referring to the local Muslim leaders who 
pledged allegiance to the invading Mongols (Ayubi, 1991:167). In promoting the notion of 
jihad as a duty to fight the forces of the infidels, Taymiyya propelled it as a concept that was 
at the centre of Islamic practice (Turner, 2010: 547). The fact that radical Islamists who 
assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981 quoted Taymiyya when they accused the former Egyptian 
president of being an infidel demonstrates the influence of the scholar within modern militant 
Islamists’ thinking (Mousalli, 2009: 9). In sum, the life and influence of Ibn Taymiyya is 
encapsulated by Migaux (2007:271) in the following words, 
Ibn Taimiya, considered subversive by the authorities and challenged by the 
ulama, was nonetheless, thanks to his simplistic sermons advocating the use of 
violence, quite successful among the marginalized classes and those lacking 
an in-depth knowledge of the Muslim religion. It would seem that, six 
centuries later, the situation has not changed much.  
    
From his time onwards, Taymiyya’s thoughts and concepts have held great influence over 
many militant Islamist ideologues such as Al Wahhab, Hasan al-Banna, Sayid Qutb, Osama 
Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri amongst others. After having examined the influence of the 
thought leader behind the ideology of militant Islamism, the next section turns towards the 
two schools of thought instigated by the thoughts and doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya.  
4.2 Wahhabism 
Wahhabism started as a theological reform movement founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab (1703 – 1792) in the 18th century. Influenced by Ibn Taymiyya, al-Wahhab 
recommended a basic and literal return to the practice of Islam as it was in the time of the 
Prophet Muhammad and the pious ancestors of the first three Muslim generations.  The belief 
was that this would help purge the Muslim community from its adherence to superstition, 
adultery and tribalism that contributed towards a deviation from the observance of Islamic 
                                                 
4 Jahaliyya refers to the total pagan ignorance that is meant to have characterised pre-Islamic Arabia. 
Contemporary political Islamists such as Qutb and Mawdudi use this term to typify all societies that are not 
thoroughly and genuinely Islamic (Ayubi, 1991: 254). 
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rites and practices (Hiro, 2002:38). In this regard, he advocated a return to a puritan form of 
Islam that was ‘purified of all its dross and restored to its original strictness’ (Migaux, 
2007:272). With this renewed vigour, al-Wahhab and his followers perceived themselves as 
the true believers and set out to purify their community by destroying the sacred trees and 
tombs of the saints. Consequently, the community drove out al-Wahhab and his followers 
who found refuge in Diriya where they made an alliance with the ruler Muhammad ibn Saud 
(Hiro, 2002:38). The newly formed Wahhabites launched a jihad against those who they 
perceived as infidels or apostates. They subsequently spread throughout the region that would 
later become known as Saudi Arabia. 
 
In terms of its teachings, Wahhabism adheres to a literal interpretation of the Quran and the 
Sunna5 of the Prophet Muhammad (Alvi, 2014: 40; De Azavedo, 2010: 51). Muslims should 
thus act in accordance with the Quran and the Sunna combined with the rules and teachings 
prevalent during the time of the prophet (Rakic & Jurisic, 2012: 650). Strictly puritanical and 
conservative, Wahhabism regards any Muslim who fails to follow the principle of Islam in its 
original form as advocated by the Wahhabite as liable to face excommunication (takfir) and 
thus be considered a heathen or kufr. Wahhabism exuded a strong intolerance towards Shias, 
Dervishes and Sufism as their centres, places of pilgrimages and sanctuaries were destroyed 
by Wahhabites (De Azavedo, 2010: 52). In sum, al- Wahhab did not add anything new to the 
teachings of Ibn Taymiyya other than simply putting them into praxis while giving them an 
extremist aspect. Nonetheless, Wahhabism has spread from the time of its founder to 
currently becoming the official religion in present day Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In other areas, 
it has influenced other Islamist thinkers such as Sayid Qutb, the ideologue of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. According to Rakic & Jurisic (2012: 651), ‘contemporary Wahhabism creates a 
climate suitable for the birth of extremism, creation of closed and fanatical groups and get 
into the phase of destruction and demolition’ as exemplified in groups such as Al Qaeda. 
Another school of thought which has been greatly influenced by both Taymiyya and 
Wahhabism is Salafism. It is to this school of thought that the discussion will now turn.     
 4.3 Salafism 
Salafism, a concept featuring prominently in the works of Iranian political thinker Jamal al 
din al Afghani (1838–1897),  emerged as a school of thought in the 19th century in reaction to 
the diffusion of European ideas (Kepel, 2002: 219; Turner, 2010: 543). Although the term 
                                                 
5 Sunna are the sayings, ways and traditions of the propet Muhammad (Ayubi, 1991: 256). 
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salafi is almost impossible to translate, it is derived from the word salaf denoting devout 
ancestors or predecessors particularly the immediate predecessors of the prophet Muhammad 
(Ayubi, 1991:68). Salafist thinking is characterised by a literal and puritan approach to 
Islamic doctrines and scriptural texts combined with the sole emphasis on the Quran and the 
hadith as the only legitimate sources of conduct and reasoning. Inspired by Taymiyya and 
akin to their Wahhabite counterparts, Salafists comprehend the sanction of the sacred texts in 
their most literal and traditional sense (Kepel, 2002: 220). Hegghammer (2009: 249) 
pointedly observes that many militant Islamist ideologues readily use the nomenclature 
‘Salafi’ to describe themselves and this exuberance is also observed in groups that adopt the 
term in the title, for example, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) of 
Algeria – a group examined in this study. The reason behind the enthusiasm in adopting this 
adjective is that it ‘connotes doctrinal purity and therefore affords a degree of religious and 
political legitimacy to whoever describes himself as such’ (Hegghammer, 2009: 249).  
 
Despite the fact that the diversity of the Salafis community is spread among multiple factions 
around the world, they are invariably united by a common religious creed containing the 
central facets of religious interpretation and comprehension. Central to the Salafi article of 
faith is the tenet of the unity of God that is referred to as tawhid with a threefold character. 
These include: 1) only Allah is the creator and sovereign of the whole universe; 2) the 
uniqueness and supremacy of the one God; and 3) Only God has the right to be worshipped 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006: 208-209). Following the Quran denotation of God as the supreme 
legislator, Salafists advocate that Muslims follow the shari’a in their entirety while 
denouncing secularism which in their view symbolises the power of human laws over divine 
authority. Repudiating the separation between state and religion, Salafists believe that the 
only rules for governing state, institutions, human conduct and belief must be based on the 
Quran and the Sunna (2006: 209). While the Salafist community comprises of various 
groups, they can be broadly categorised under three major factions: the purists, the politicos 
and the jihadists. The purists, perceiving politics as a deviation from the true path of Islam, 
focus on propagation, purification and education through nonviolent means. Conversely, 
Politicos identify the importance of the Salafi creed within political affairs as it ‘dramatically 
impacts social justice and the right of God alone to legislate’ (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 208). 
Finally, the jihadists adopt a more militant approach as they believe that their current context 




It is imperative to note that the third category is the one that is of most relevance to this study 
since AQIM adheres to the Jihadi-Salafist approach. AQIM fits in the Jihadi-Salafist 
prototype due to its emphasis on the use of violence to establish Islamic states governed by 
shari’a. One of the differences between jihadists and Politicos Salafis is that while the latter 
debated concepts and ideas at universities, the former acquired their political knowledge on 
the battleground (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 225). As such, Jihadi-Salafism emerged in Afghanistan 
during the war against the Soviet army invasion in the late 1980’s where the jihadists 
acquired their lessons in politics as war and it is within this context that Al Qaeda was 
formed. While the Afghan war provided the incubation and birth of Jihadi-Salafism, its 
members were influenced by the radical ideas of contemporary political thinkers such as 
Sayid Qutb and Mawlana Mawdudi. 
4.4 Contemporary Militant Islamism: The Influence of Qutb and Mawdudi 
The downfall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 shattered the illusion of Muslim unity 
producing a sense of cultural tragedy. In addition to having a profound influence on the 
ascent of Salafi-Jihadism, the situation of a lost identity also provided the space for Islamist 
movements to strive towards reclaiming their cultural identity and restore Islamic unity. A 
teacher named Hasan al-Banna established one such movement which began as a youth club 
‘with its main stress on moral and social reform through communication, information and 
propaganda’ (Hiro, 2002:60). The movement would later turn out to be one of the most 
influential as well as controversial organization in Egypt’s political history. The influence of 
the movement al-Ikhwan al- Muslimun, or more commonly referred to as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, would extend beyond the borders of Egypt into Algeria, Palestine, and Tunisia 
amongst others. The objective of restoring Islamic unity is clearly captured in the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s motto ‘God is our objective; the Qur’an is our constitution; the Prophet is our 
leader; Struggle is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations’ 
(quoted in Turner, 2010:548). In this way, the society envisaged Islam as a total ideology that 
offered ‘an all-powerful system to regulate every detail of the political, economic, social and 
cultural life of the believer’ (Hiro, 2002:60).  
 
The movement grew rapidly and soon its members consisted primarily of the urban lower-
middle classes such as students, civil servants, artisans and traders who were inspired by its 
religious slogans (Kepel, 2002:28). The Muslim Brotherhood attracted a wide following 
through its charitable activities involving running schools, dispensaries, mosques and 
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workshops (Hiro, 2002:61). Through its popularity, the movement established itself within 
the political arena and supported the coup perpetrated by Nasser and his allies in 1952. 
However, when Nasser renegaded on the vision of a unified Egypt through the 
implementation of an Islamic order but instead followed a nationalist agenda, he met with 
opposition from the Brotherhood movement. This drift further exacerbated when a failed 
assassination attempt on Nasser’s life in 1954 was blamed on the organization. In response, 
Nasser executed 6 members of the Brotherhood and sent another 4 000 to jail while others 
went into self-exile into other countries including Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon 
(Hiro, 2002:65). Among those jailed, was Sayyid Qutb who would become known as ‘one of 
the original theorists of modern Islamism’ (Kepel, 2002:23) and whose thoughts would make 
him albeit infamously ‘the most essential contributor to what is the Al Qaeda ideology’ 
(Turner, 2010:549).              
            
4.4.1 Sayyid Qutb 
It was during his time in prison undergoing persecution and hard labour that Qutb produced 
some of his major works amongst which Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones) would become the 
most influential among radical Islamist thought worldwide (Ayubi, 1991:139). In this book, 
Qutb expounds on the key concept of jahiliyya. For Qutb, the world is divided into two 
spheres, namely, the Order of Islam or the order of jahiliyya (total ignorance). According to 
Qutb, this ignorance not only referred to the pre-Islamic Arabia but it was part and parcel of 
the current age as he argued,  
We are also surrounded by jahiliyya today, which is of the same nature as it 
was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole 
environment, people's beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws is 
jahiliyya, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, 
Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of 
jahiliyya (Milestones, 2006:34). 
  
As far as Qutb is concerned, jahiliyya is a result of the moral deterioration of the Islamic 
values due to Western culture and ideas seeping into the Egyptian society particularly, during 
Nasser’s regime. It can be argued that his anti-Western stance and his disdain towards the 
Nasserist regime can be attributed to two experiences in his life. Firstly, the culture shock he 
received while he was in America furthering his studies and secondly, the long-term jail 
sentence and the tortures he underwent while he was in prison (Ushama, 2007: 172). To 
overcome this jahiliyya, Qutb suggest following the Salafis teachings underscoring the 
importance of tawhid, the prominence of following the Quran, Sunna, and the pious ancestors 
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(salaf), the continuous battle against shirk (worshipping any other than God) and fighting the 
enemies of Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 222). Consequently, Qutb reasoned that a revolution is 
required to abolish jahiliyya and restore in its place an Islamic state governed by Allah 
through the shari’a.  
 
Whether Qutb personally advocated for a violent revolution through the use of jihad remains 
a disputed issue amongst scholars. While Kepel (2000:26) and Ayubi (1991: 140) advance 
that Qutb advocated for the use of violent jihad, Ushama (2007:187) argues that Qutb had no 
intention of instigating violence. Hiro (2002:67) reconciles both views when he interestingly 
points out that although Qutb wanted to elude violence, he could not dissuade his radical 
followers from waging jihad against the social order which he had labelled jahiliyya. As 
Kepel (2000:31) observes, this created a situation where those who were living in jahiliyya 
were no longer viewed as Muslims (this would consist of the members of society) and were 
labelled takfir (infidels) and they thus became legitimate recipients of violence. The 
execution of Qutb by the Nasser regime, which many of his followers perceived as 
martyrdom, provided the impetus for the spread and acceptance of his ideas within the Arab 
world (Hiro, 2002:68). 
 
4.4.2 Mawlana Mawdudi 
Another important thinker whose writings greatly influenced contemporary militant Islamists 
is prolific Pakistani author and journalist Mawlana Mawdudi. He was born in southern India 
in 1903 during the period of the British occupation of the region. Mawdudi believed that 
Islam was facing multiple threats, specifically, from the foreign occupiers and the Hindu 
majority in India. As a result, he advocated for a revival of Islam that could only be achieved 
by returning to the fundamental aspects of the faith and allowing the restoration of Islam 
within all aspects of life including the political. This author and journalist rejected 
nationalism and democracy as he believed both would lead ‘to the predominance of Indian 
and / or non-Islamic forces and influences’ (Ayubi, 1991: 128). Instead, he urged Muslims to 
remove any Indian, Western and secularist inspiration. Rather, he advocated, they should 
focus on reviving their faith and aim towards establishing an Islamic state. Mawdudi argued 
that ‘Islam is a revolutionary doctrine and system that overturns government. It seeks to 
overturn the whole universal social order . . .and establish its structure anew . . . Islam seeks 
the world’ (cited in Milton-Edwards, 2006:26). To achieve this change or revolution toward 
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Islamic independence, Mawdudi followed in the footsteps of Hassan al-Banna and founded 
the Jama’at al Islami (Islamic Group). Yet, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood, the newly 
formed organisation was legal for most of its history (Kepel, 2002:35). 
 
A major distinction within the vision of Mawdudi was the importance of jihad as a means to 
achieve Islamic governance and statehood. There is a view that ‘Jihad is at the same time 
offensive and defensive . . . The Islamic party does not hesitate to utilize the means of war to 
implement its goal’ (quoted in Milton-Edwards, 2006:26). Echoing al-Banna and Qutb, he 
believed that the solution of the problems that Muslims were facing is found in the way of 
Islam. His major premise for establishing an Islamic state was that God was the sovereign 
ruler and there was nothing outside of His control and His laws (Habeck, 2006:38). As such, 
he advocated for a state where sovereignty in the name of Allah would be exercised and 
complimented by the implementation of shari’a (Kepel, 2002:34). Mawdudi’s notion of the 
absolute sovereignty of God (al-hakimiiya) would influence other radical fundamentalist and 
militant groups as it implied that humans are only delegated to implement shari’a which is 
ultimately superior to any human-made political or economic system. Turner (2010: 549) 
identifies Mawdudi as ‘the link for the transition between Hassan al-Banna’s vague 
methodological approach to establishing an Islamic state and the sophisticated ideology of 
Sayid Qutb’. 
 
In the later years, Salafi-Jihadi movements would find ideological justifications for their 
movements through the ideas discovered in the writings of al-Banna, Mawdudi and Qutb. 
Concept expounded by these thinkers particularly tawhid, jahiliyya, and jihad would become 
prominent within the statements of Jihadi groups utilizing them as justifications for violence 
against innocent civilians including Westerners, non-Muslims and Muslims (Habeck, 2006: 
39). The pivotal role of Qutb and Mawdudi’s thoughts and ideas cannot be denied as they 
hold a threefold importance for current militant Islamist groups. Firstly, their writings 
intellectually justify an anti-Western attitude on both a cultural and political level. Secondly, 
they justify the establishment of an Islamic state based on shari’a. Thirdly, in their writings, 
there is a justification for overthrowing secular governments. These also include Muslim 
leaders who fail to govern according to Islamic rule (Bahari & Ahmad, 2012: 23). 
Zimmerman (2004: 223) accentuates the impact of Sayyid Qutb’s ideas as one aspect 
contributing towards the creation of Al Qaeda since its former leader Osama Bin Laden was 
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mentored by Mohammed Qutb, Sayyid’s brother. The other two contributions towards the 
formation of Al Qaeda are: the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Afghan jihad of the 1980’s. 
4.5 The First Inspiration in the Contemporary Era: The Iranian Revolution 
The Iranian revolution of 1979 is considered as one of the most significant events in the 
history of Islam as it was the only contemporary event where the ideas of political Islam were 
put into practice. This occurrence helped the Arab world to regain some of the confidence 
that was lost over a decade earlier when Israel defeated the Arab armies in the Six Day War. 
The detrimental effect of the latter war reverberated within the Arab world to the extent that 
some scholars, such as White (2009: 203-205), advocate that it was one of the major 
propellants of the rise of violence in the Middle East including the rise of militant Islamism. 
The Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, however, brought a glimmer of hope as it 
represented the revolution that prior thinkers and thinkers had advocated.  
 
Although Khomeini did not personally create the Iranian revolution nor was he the ideologue 
behind it, he became the undisputed leader over the revolution as his political theory was 
incorporated into the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ayubi, 1991:147). In 1963, 
Khomeini attempted to overthrow the Shah Mohammed Reza from power resulting in the 
Ayotallah being sent into exile in 1964. Between then and 1979, Khomeini built up a network 
of revolutionaries while at the same time buttressing his influence and reputation among the 
people of Iran. Ali Shariati, who was among those revolutionaries, is considered as the 
ideologue behind the Iranian revolution. While Khomeini influenced the urban middle class, 
Shariati who was well versed in Islamic teachings and Marxist philosophies became a major 
source of intellectual influence for the young militants (Kepel, 2002: 37). After having 
mobilised the people, Khomeini and his followers led the revolution against the Shah in 1979. 
Unable to supress the masses and insurgents, the military surrendered with the Shah escaping 
the country, allowing Khomeini to step in ‘as the undisputed leader of the Islamic revolution 
and establishing his Islamic republic’ (Hussain, 1984: 189). In short, Khomeini (with the help 
of his revolutionaries) had managed to put into practice what many other thinkers and 
scholars had thus far only advocated in writing.  
 
Kepel (2000: 23) singles out an interesting point when he advances that although Khomeini 
differs with Qutb and Mawdudi in terms of sect affiliation (Qutb and Mawdudi belonging to 
the Sunni sect while Khomeini was a Shiite), all three ‘shared a vision of Islam as a political 
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movement…and called for an Islamic state’. Following a similar line of thinking as Qutb and 
Mawdudi, Khomeini posits that the four functions of government is: 1) to enforce the shari’a, 
2) to combat the oppression of the rights of ordinary individuals and eliminate corruption, 3) 
to fight heresies and errors in the legislations and 4) to prevent foreigners from intervening in 
Muslim affairs (Hussain, 1984: 186). One of the reasons associated with the success of the 
Iranian revolution in contrast to other failed revolutions in the Arab world, is that Khomeini 
was able to unite all levels of the Iranian population including the middle classes, the radical 
intellectuals, the clerics, and the disinherited (Kepel, 2002: 24).  
 
The effect of the Iranian revolution on the Arab world was phenomenal since it provided a 
display of Islam overcoming Western hegemony in the form of the Shah. Furthermore, it 
demonstrated that an Islamic revolution was a definite possibility and not mere rhetoric. 
Although the euphoria subsided after a while due to the reign of terror in Iran that ensued 
including the hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran, the revolution has maintained itself 
as a milestone for numerous militant Islamists. Another event that would inspire militant 
Islamist and provide further impetus to their cause was the Afghan jihad that began the same 
year as the Iranian revolution. 
4.6 The Second Inspiration: The Afghan Jihad 
In 1978, after a coup d’état reminiscent of Marx’s notion of revolution, the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) under the leadership of Nur Mohammed Takari 
came into power with the sole objective of transforming Afghanistan into a socialist state. 
Principled on Marxist’s ideology, the new leaders envisioned ‘the establishment of a socialist 
nation in which class oppression would be wiped out and the productive energies of the poor 
mobilized’ (Edwards, 2002: 25). In a move to quell the incertitude of the people, the new 
government astutely reassured them that all the reforms would be in accordance with the 
Shari’a (Hiro, 2002: 202). On the international front, the PDPA leadership and its Marxist 
counterparts the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation emphasising 
close military, political and economic ties between the two.6 To fulfil its promise to abolish 
class oppression according to Marxist principles, the government of the PDPA began its 
campaign of implementing policies to achieve its goal. These policies consisting of ‘radical 
agrarian reform, compulsory literacy and the imposition of socialism through thousands of 
                                                 
6 For instance, Article 4 of the Treaty read that ‘the signatories shall consult with each other and take, by 
agreement, appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two 
countries’ (Hiro, 2002: 205).  
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arrests and summary execution’ (Kepel, 2002: 138), alienated the majority of the population. 
A growing sense of estrangement coupled with public dissatisfaction resulted in an increase 
of people and religious leaders began voicing their discontents against the leadership.  
 
In order to suppress a growing opposition, the government began to target religious leaders. 
This led to many fleeing and joining resistance groups in neighbouring Pakistan. The 
momentum of the wave of opposition against the Marxist regime intensified and in April 
1979 reached its crescendo with a general uprising. In December 1979, the ruling party made 
the grim realisation that it had lost control of the majority of the country and subsequently 
appealed to the Soviet Union for help. As a result, the Soviet Union responded by sending in 
its troops on the 24th of December 1979 and three days later, the Red army captured the 
military installations and seized the presidential palace. Taking control of the Afghan 
government, the Soviet Union appointed Babrak Karmal as the new leader of Afghanistan in 
a move to restore peace and stability (Hiro, 2002: 208; Kepel, 2000: 138). In short, the 
revolution envisaged by the PDPA did not deliver the intended benefits as they had expected 
it to. The so-called ‘socialist paradise’ that the regime wanted to institute only managed to 
create a situation where ‘tens of thousands…took up arms against the regime and millions 
chose exile in Pakistan and Iran’ (Edwards, 2002: 25). Instead of contributing towards the 
promotion of the socio-economic welfare of the population, the revolution ushered in an 
epoch of violence and conflict with consequences that would have resounding effects for 
years to come.  
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan horrified the West as President Carter describing the act 
as the ‘greatest threat to peace since the Second World War’ (cited in Urban, 1988: 56) and 
pledged to help defend the Persian Gulf region. Meanwhile, the Afghan exiles who fled to 
Peshawar in Pakistan, began to organise their own resistance movement to launch an attack in 
order to remove the Soviets from their homeland. It is important to note that these fighters 
belonged to a heterogeneous group of organisations under the umbrella of Islam and the 
differences extended to the social, ethnic, political and military arena. In terms of ethnicity, 
the fighters or mujahedeen varied from members of Traditional Sufi groups, the Muslim 




Nonetheless, the mujahedeen set their differences aside, organised themselves and set out to 
defend the territory of Islam from the Soviet infidels through the launch of a struggle or 
defensive jihad.  
 
In addition to the support of the international Muslim community, the fighters soon received 
‘assistance from the United States, logistical support from Pakistan, and financial 
contributions from Saudi Arabia’ (Migaux, 2007: 292). At the beginning of the jihad, Islamic 
solidarity consisted mainly of monetary help but gradually it became more practical in that a 
number of foreign jihadists joined the movement in Peshawar then proceeded to the 
battleground of Afghanistan. Mignaux (2007: 293) describes the widespread influence of the 
Afghan jihad on these Arab volunteers from different parts of the Muslim world. As such, 
more than 20,000 Muslims from the Middle East and the Maghreb were 
involved in jihad. The largest battalions came from the Middle East. Their 
numbers likely included approximately 6,000 Saudis, 4,000 Egyptians, and 
1,000 Yemenis, as well as several hundred Syrians and the same number of 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin. A smaller number came from the Maghreb—
maybe 2,000 Algerians and a few hundred Tunisians, Moroccans and Libyans. 
Some hailed from farther afield, including a few Westerners and a handful of 
Indonesians, Malaysians, Filipinos, and Sudanese.   
 
Although these recruits possessed the will and determination to engage in jihad, they lacked 
the combat training required for such an undertaking. On the other end, the huge amount of 
monetary donations provided by Saudi Arabia and wealthy Muslim donors for the training 
and accommodation of the volunteers opened up opportunities for corruption and thus the 
services of a trustworthy person was required. A Jordanian professor of Palestine origin 
Abdullah Azzam who was a pivotal figure among the Afghan Arabs was chosen as the 
trustworthy person and he was responsible for housing and training the new recruits. To this 
end, he co-founded an organization known as Maktab al-Khidmat ulMujahideen al-Arab 
(MAK) in Peshawar and it ‘housed, trained and financed the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad’ 
(Gunaratna, 2002: 4). Azzam’s objective was to promote the cause of mujahedeen and 
illustrate that it was the duty of every Muslim to participate in the Afghan jihad through 
either physical participation or monetary assistance. This message was propagated through 
his magazine Al Jihad containing news from the war, doctrinal texts and editorials written by 
Azzam himself.  
 
From an ideological standpoint, Azzam’s modelled on Salafist scholar Ibn Taymiyya as he 
advocated that the only way for Islam to restore its original glory was for the faithful to 
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engage in jihad (Hiro, 2002: 215). Although both Azzam and his predecessors called for 
jihad, their resulting effects were different in that Azzam attracted thousands of volunteers to 
fight while for his predecessors the result was purely rhetorical. In other words, while his 
predecessors only managed an idealistic result, Azzam had a more practical success. Kepel 
(2002: 147) links this practical accomplishment on the context and circumstance within 
which Azzam found himself. Unlike his antecedents, he had an organised group at his 
disposal to make the jihad a reality. Finally, a decade after they invaded Afghanistan, the 
Soviet troops withdrew in February 1989 with the casualty of about 14 500 soldiers. For the 
Afghan mujahedeen, this was a monumental victory demonstrating that the infidels had 
finally left the land of Islam. Subsequently, the Arab and Asian mujahedeen, inspired by the 
victory over the Soviets, returned to their country of origin with the aim of effecting radical 
political and social change in their societies (Gunaratna, 2002: 5).  
 
Azzam, who eventually became the symbol of the mujahedeen movement, died together with 
his sons in a bomb blast in Peshawar in December 1989. Prior to his death, Azzam 
anticipating the victory of the Afghan mujahedeen, decided to put in place a new project that 
would continue the work of the Afghan jihad in the form of an international jihadi army after 
the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. He would presciently note that 
obligation will not end with victory in Afghanistan, and jihad will remain an 
individual obligation until we have reconquered all Muslim lands and 
reinstalled Islam: we still have ahead of us Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, 
Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, Yemen, Tashkent, and 
Andalusia (cited in Migaux, 2007: 294).  
 
This ideological vision would be carried on even after his death by his former protégé and 
deputy of the MKA – Osama Bin Laden. In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal and the 
return of the mujahedeen to their respective region of origin, the MKA gradually became 
obsolete in terms of pursuing its original objectives. Nonetheless, Osama was resolved to 
continue the legacy of his mentor by creating an international network of jihadists who had 
participated in the Afghan jihad (Hiro, 2002: 227).7 Mahamedou (2007: 46) asserts that in 
late 1989, Bin Laden was joined by Ayman al Zawahiri, the leader of the Islamic Jihad group 
                                                 
7 In this regard, it is noteworthy to clarify certain aspects concerning the relationship between Osama and 
Azzam. Robin Gunaratna (2002:25-26) believes that the alliance between the two slowly deteriorated over the 
issue of reconfiguring MAK once they reached their objective of removing the Soviets. Osama wanted MAK to 
adopt terrorist tactics to achieve its aim to which Azzam was strongly opposed. Gunaratna further posits that 




in Egypt and together they formed what became one of the world most infamous terrorist 
network, more commonly known as Al Qaeda.8    
4.7 Al Qaeda: The Face of Militant Islamism in the 20th Century 
Despite the fact that Al Qaeda would become almost synonymous with Osama Bin Laden, 
Azzam was the one responsible for its ideological blueprint. As mentioned above, about a 
year before his death, Azzam formulated the outlines of what would become the founding 
charter of Al Qaeda. His aim was to establish an organization consisting of mujahedeen who 
would fight for the cause of oppressed Muslims worldwide (Gunaratna, 2002: 24). The 
organization would also be a vanguard for the establishment of the Umma and it would be a 
symbol of Islamic resistance. Turner (2010: 550) describes Azzam as the ‘Godfather of 
Jihad’ whose legacy was to transfer a struggle that had hitherto been confined to the Middle 
East into a global political phenomenon with worldwide security concerns. Regardless of his 
gift as an original thinker and ideologue behind the would-be Al Qaeda, Azzam lacked the 
vision to operate the organization unlike his deputy Osama Bin Laden (Turner, 2010: 551).  
 
Thus, after the death of Azzam, Bin Laden took over the reign of Al Qaeda and adopted new 
tactics while at the same retaining the original ideology put forth by his predecessor. The 
reason behind this, according to Gunaratna (2002: 23), is that Bin Laden was ‘not an original 
thinker but an opportunist, a businessman at heart, who surrounds himself with a good team, 
manages it well but borrows heavily from others’. Interestingly, although Bin Laden is 
perceived as the most notable contemporary of Jihadi-Salafism, he played a minor role in the 
intellectual development of militant ideology. Rather, this role is fulfilled by his deputy 
(current Al Qaeda leader) Dr Ayman al Zawahiri who became the ‘ideological brains’ behind 
the twin tower attacks on the 11th September 2001 (Riedel, 2008: 16).  
 
The ingenuity of Zawahiri resided in his ability to transform Al Qaeda’s ideology from 
focusing on local jihad, as in the case of Afghanistan, to adopting an international perspective 
focusing on international jihad. In contrast to Azzam who only managed to gather and 
influence a fighting force, Zawahiri went a step further by providing the dispersed Afghan 
mujahedeen with a distinct ideology; hence enabling them to unify under the one banner of 
Al Qaeda. Zawahiri indicated his seriousness in cause for a global jihad when he willingly 
                                                 
8 The original name of the organization was Al Qaeda al Askariya which meant the military base. The author 
also notes that the name Al Qaeda has a twofold meaning. In Arabic, the term could mean ‘precept’, ‘rule’, 
‘norm’, or ‘column’ where as in a modern context it can refer to ‘database’ (Mohamedou, 2007: 121).   
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conceded his leadership position at the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and joined Al Qaeda. 
Moreover, he adroitly developed an argument to convince the reluctant leadership of Al 
Qaeda and Jamaat Ismalia to amalgamate under one international organisation. This event 
not only marked the beginning of the transformation of jihad from a local to an international 
sphere but also ‘synthesised the Al Qaeda ideology’ (Turner, 2010: 553). Zawahiri exerted 
such a great deal of influence over Bin Laden that the latter appointed him as the head of Al 
Qaeda’s religious committee (a branch that issued fatwas or religious rulings) and the Shura 
Majlis also known as the consultative council (Gunaratna, 2002: 27).   
 
In one of his publications entitled Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, Zawahiri presents the 
Al Qaeda manifesto including the organization’s strategies, objectives and ideology.  In 
relation to the type of ideology that Al Qaeda embraces, it can be best defined as Salafi-
Jihadism which, in the words of Kepel (2002: 220), has a ‘supercilious respect for the sacred 
texts in their most literal form…and an absolute commitment to jihad’ and whose target was 
the West. One of the contributions of Zawahiri to the Al Qaeda ideology is that he managed 
to provide an international dimension to the localised Islamist struggles and thus established a 
space where ‘local groups with local interests obtain links with Al Qaeda headquarters and 
act in its name’ (Turner, 2010: 554). In this way, through their links with Al Qaeda, these 
dispersed groups would operate under its ideology and propagate Al Qaeda’s message. In the 
context of this study, the GSPC prior to its merge with Al Qaeda Central exemplified one of 
these groups that acted in the name of Al Qaeda.  
 
To further understand the workings of Al Qaeda, it is important to examine the strategies that 
flow from the group’s ideology that consists of both a political and a religious nature.  Firstly, 
it seeks to overthrow the present world order and liberate Muslim territories from foreign 
occupation before unifying all Muslim countries into one Caliphate. To this end, the group 
advocates for the use of the holy war (jihad) in order to purge Muslim lands from the 
influence of non-Muslim culture. Thus, after the caliphate is established, it will have one 
caliph (ruler) who will govern according to the shari’a and ‘a puritanical interpretation of 
Sunni Islam’ (Piazza, 2009: 66). These strategies are prominent within the discourses of Bin 
Laden, especially within the two fatwas he released: ‘Jihad on the Americans occupying the 
Country of the Two Sacred Places’ in 1996 and ‘Declaration of Jihad against Jews and 
Crusaders’ in 1998. These two fatwas reveal three issues that sustains the group’s momentum 
and these include: 1) the despoiling of Saudi Arabia (holy land) by the on-going ‘occupation’ 
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of the American troops, 2) the devastation and infliction of suffering of the Iraqi population 
by the United States and its alliances9 and 3) the persistent occupation of Jerusalem and the 
murdering of innocent Muslims by Israel (Perry & Negrin, 2003: 44). In reaction to these 
accusations, Bin Laden perceives America as the far enemy who has proclaimed war against 
Allah, the prophet and all Muslims. Therefore, according to him, it becomes only logical for 
every Muslim to declare jihad against the enemy and he reiterates this in his 1998 fatwa when 
he instructed all Muslims  
To kill the American and their allies—civilians and military—…in order to 
liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] 
from their grip, so that their armies leave all the territory of Islam, defeated, 
broken, and unable to threaten any Muslim (Bin Laden, 2003:46).    
     
He further supports his pronouncements with quotes from the Quran. Although Bin Laden is 
not a religious scholar per se, he does have a strong establishment within religious traditions. 
This plays a crucial role as his recurrent quotes from the Quran and other religious texts 
(including Ibn Taymiyya’s writings) as an attempt to legitimize his jihadi objectives appear 
to resound with his audience in the Muslim world (Perry & Negrin, 2003: 43). For instance, 
within a few months of issuing his 1998 fatwa, his call for jihad was duly answered when two 
bomb blasts within minutes of each other annihilated the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salam respectively.  
 
A few years later on 11 September 2001, the plane attacks of the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon would symbolise the devastation that Al Qaeda and its ideology can cause to a 
nation regardless of whether the latter is a leading global superpower. The ferocity of the 
group would continue as it would claim the 2002 Bali bombings, the Madrid train bombings 
in 2004 and the London bombings in 2005. In Africa, it would manifest itself by forging ties 
with several groups such as Al Shabaab, Boko Haram and most importantly in the context of 
this study, the GSPC who would later become AQIM. It would also capitalise on the fertile 
ground for recruits in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of 2003 and even parent ISIS within 
the Iraqi war context. Ironically, ISIL would overtake Al Qaeda as the most dangerous 
terrorist group while utilising some of Al Qaeda’s tactics.  
 
                                                 
9 For clarification purposes, it should be noted that the war referred to is the first Gulf war following the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991. As Perry & Negrin (2003: 44)  note, the ‘inflictions’ that Bin Laden makes 
reference to is the subsequent sanctions imposed by the UN upon Iraq in the aftermath of the war.   
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More importantly, one aspect that all these groups share in common is the notion of jihad. To 
the extent that most groups use this concept to perpetrate mass killings, it becomes imperative 
to understand this concept. Thus, it merits a brief explanation so as to present the reader with 
a fuller understanding of what jihad is and in so doing preventing it from become a mere 
nomenclature devoid of any true meaning. 
 
4.7.1 Jihad: A Misinterpreted Pretext 
There is no other term within Islam that consists of a rich and complex nature yet at the same 
time full of contestations than that of jihad (Cooper, 2004: 110). For non-Muslims, the term 
evokes disturbing images of extremism and the indiscriminate belligerence of jihadists 
towards innocent victims. Noorani (2002: 45) parallels the term jihad with the word ‘crusade’ 
that has a positive connotation for Christians in that it describes ‘peaceful religious 
gatherings’ whereas for a Muslim the same terms denotes a message of religious violence and 
suffering reminiscent of the middle ages. Similarly, while jihad conveys a negative meaning 
for the non-Muslims, it has a positive undertone for the Muslim as it symbolises an important 
truth of their religion. In the Quran, the word jihad appears 41 times while 28 ayas (verses) 
make reference to it.10 The contestations surrounding the doctrine of jihad evolve around the 
fact that its meaning, definitions, justification and appropriate application is not based on a 
single authoritative interpretation (Turner, 2010: 544). It may thus be the reason why many 
jihadists abuse this interpretative liberty in advocating the doctrine of jihad as a means to 
legitimise their spate of violence against innocent victims. Thus, to comprehend the doctrine 
of jihad, a brief historical analysis of the term follows. 
 
In its original Arabic syntax, the word jihad means haalat al Jihd (a state of jihd) which can 
further be transliterated as ‘a state of permanent efforts’ (Phares, 2005: 21). In other words, 
the term alludes to something more than just a ‘holy war’ in that it advocates for a physical, 
moral, spiritual and intellectual effort. To further drive this point across, Noorani (2002: 49) 
saliently notes that if war was the primary way of engaging in this effort, then the Quran 
would have used other terms that represent armed combat, such as harb (war), sira’s 
(combat) or even qutal (killing),  instead of the term jihad. Yet, while the doctrine of jihad 
advocates for a ‘personal endeavour to follow the will of Allah, resist temptation and strive to 
be a better Muslim’ (Turner, 2010: 544), it also purports a collective effort to defend or 
                                                 
10 The Quran consists of 114 suras (chapters) and 6, 234 ayas (verses). 
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expand one’s community through means of war. Hence, the two descriptions of jihad are, the 
lesser jihad which symbolises fighting for the community in as a form of self-defence and the 
greater jihad which refers to the inner struggle of the person towards realising one’s capacity. 
Simply put, ‘the lesser jihad is the visible struggle against the enemy on the battlefield while 
the greater or supreme jihad is the ceaseless war humans are called to wage against their 
lower selves’ (Khomeini, 1981: 429).  
 
However, Salafi-Jihadists such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates tend to focus primarily on the 
lesser jihad as a means to promote their cause. This is redolent of the 8th century when 
Muslim rulers, who for the sole purpose of expansion inspired by greed, wealth and ambition, 
needed a reason to engage in unprovoked wars. In a similar way, as Turner (2010: 545) 
notices, ‘Osama bin Laden and other militants seek to characterise terrorist acts as a response 
to a perceived injustice rather than an act of outright aggression’. The prophet Muhammad, 
whom these Islamist militants claim inspiration from for their violent jihad, lived in a 
dangerous context where his umma (community) and he had to flee or otherwise face the 
danger of extermination. In contrast to the depiction of the prophet as a warlord who forced 
reluctant people to convert to Islam through the wielding of the sword, he and the first 
community of Muslim were battling for their lives and violence was thus inevitable 
(Armstrong, 1995: 10-11). Consequently, due to the different context that Muslims find 
themselves presently, the relevance of the lesser jihad is not the same as in the times of the 
prophet. On the other hand, the importance of the greater jihad within the contemporary 
context is pivotal and necessary. According to Miller (cited in Noorani, 2002: 46), it should 
be directed towards two facets: individual virtue and the society’s struggle for justice. 
  
Meanwhile, for the Salafi-Jihadists, the only way to achieve justice for the community is to 
restore the lost glory of the Islamic civilisation through the establishment of an Islamic 
caliphate based on shari’a law. In turn, the only means of attaining this renewal is by using 
the greater jihad. For the Salafi-Jihadists, the notion of jihad can be summed up in the words 
of Abdullah Azzam (cited in Turner, 2010: 545) as ‘jihad and the rifle alone, no negotiations, 
no conferences, no dialogues’. The targets of the jihad include apostate Muslim rulers (Near 
enemy) and Western powers (Far enemy). By extension, any Muslim, whether a ruler, an 
individual, or a group, who does not adhere to the ideology of the Salafi-Jihadism is 




Arguably, it is only ‘the right ruler (the caliph or his appointee) or the legitimate scholars 
(clerics) [who] can designate someone or a group as kufr and put this label on the enemies of 
the state or the opponents to jihad’ (Phares, 2005: 54). Subsequently, once a group or an 
individual is designated as kufr, the conception of takfir (excommunication) can be extended 
to that group or person. In this instance, the group or person is excommunicated and the 
person is no longer under the protection of the Islamic law and as such they are vulnerable to 
the proclamation of the violent jihad against them (Vertigans, 2009: 105). In the context of 
this study, as will be noted in subsequent chapters, these notions such as takfir, jihad and kufr 
play a pivotal role within the ideology of the GIA and its rise to prominence on the Algerian 
scenery.            
4.8 Chapter Summary  
The aim of this chapter was to examine the religious ideology behind militant Islamism in 
order to situate the reader within the broader context of the study. The groups examined in 
this study such as the GIA, GSPC and AQIM share this ideology and hence it is imperative to 
have an understanding of the constituents of militant Islamism. To this end, this chapter 
provided a brief historical background of militant Islamism by examining the background and 
thoughts of its original instigator, that is, Ibn Taymiyya. The two schools of thought 
(Salafism and Wahhabism) which his ideas set in motion were also viewed in tandem with 
modern thinkers who further continued his legacy either through their writings (Qutb) or by 
forming a movement (Mawdudi and later Azzam). The ideas of Taymiyya find their practical 
realisation in the infamous organization known as Al Qaeda within the context of the Afghan 
jihad. It is important to note that the aim of this chapter was to trace the ideological thread of 
militant Islamism from its historical origins until the present day. Hence, historical 
backgrounds of thinkers, events and movements were provided as a means to clarify and 
situate the reader within the broader perspective of the context. 
  
After examining the religious ideology of militant Islamism, the next chapter proceeds 
specifically into the analysis of the antecedents that gave rise to the incubation and formation 
of AQIM. So conceived, the next chapter analyses the root causes of conflict in Algeria from 
its struggle against the French colonial power in the 1960s to its local battle against militant 
extremists in the 1990s to the current sporadic spate of violence perpetrated by AQIM, which 





The Root Causes of Terrorism in Algeria 
5.0 Introduction 
When analysing the emergence of terrorism in North Africa, particularly in the Maghreb 
region, there is a tendency to view this crisis in the light of the post 9/11 context. While this 
approach is advantageous to a certain extent in that it provides an understanding of the 
present situation, it is also limited in other aspects as it fails to capture the historical 
development behind such a situation. Realising this deficiency, especially when applied to the 
Algerian context, scholars who study the emergence of terrorism in Algeria often begin their 
analysis from the epoch prior to the Algerian civil war of 1992. While this method 
undoubtingly captures the historical antecedents to the emergence of terrorist groups such as 
the GIA in the wake of the military coup that denied Islamists a legitimate democratic 
victory, it is reticent in providing an understanding of the dynamics that led to this unfolding 
of events. It is within this milieu that this chapter seeks to bridge the gap between the 
foundations of violence within the Algerian political domain and the emergence of jihadists 
groups in the post-coup era.  
 
To this end, this chapter argues that terrorism in present day Algeria is a product of its 
experiences and as such situates it within the larger historical background. It is imperative for 
scholars to comprehend that the emergence of terrorism in Algeria cannot be studied apart 
from the country’s colonial, soco-economic and political background. The chapter begins 
with the Algerian war of independence and its colonial influence on the political system 
inherited by the French in the aftermath of their departure. Subsequently, it examines the 
political development of post-independent Algerian under the three former head of states, 
Ben Bella, Boumedienne and Chadli. A brief analysis of the decline of the ruling party and 
the rise of the opposition party situates the reader within the context of the political situation 
prior to the civil war outbreak. The emergence of terrorism in Algeria in the aftermath of the 
military coup is examined through the lens of the greed and grievance thesis discussed in 
chapter three. The chapter concludes with a brief exploration of the two antecedents to 
AQIM, namely, the GIA and the GSPC. 
5.1 Algeria: A Brief Pre-Colonial Historical Excursion  
Algeria is situated in the north-west Mediterranean coast of Africa and is surrounded by 
Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Libya and Tunisia. It is argued that from a geographical 
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perspective, Algeria had always been a difficult region to rule because the Tell and Saharan 
Atlas mountain chains hinder communication between the North and South of the country 
and ‘the few good harbours provided only limited access to the hinterlands’ (McKenna, 2011: 
63). The disintegration of the Almohad Empire in the thirteenth century saw the emergence 
of three distinct communities, namely, the Hafsids in Tunisia, the Abd al-Wadids in Algeria, 
and the Marinids in Morocco. These geographical boundaries were further redefined during 
the Ottoman rule as: ‘Tunisian Husaynid beylik, the Moroccan Sharifian Saadian, Alawi 
sultanates and the Algerian deylik (known as the Regency)’ (Naylor, 2000:6). The latter acted 
as a sovereign state. It later became known as the first Algerian state or the Algerian Ottoman 
Republic. Under the Ottoman rule, the Algerian regency was economically successful and 
Algiers became the capital city. It was at this place from where power was exercised from 
1671 onwards by officers known as the dey who were the representatives of the Ottoman 
rulers. Due to the stability of the Algerian regency, there was an influx of people into the 
urban society of the coastal cities among whom was an ethnic mix of Turks, Arabs, Berbers, 
Moors (Muslim Spanish descendants) and Jews (Stone, 1997: 29). Meanwhile the interior 
ethnic composition of the populace consisting of local Berbers and Arabs remained 
unchanged.  
 
By the second half of the 18th century, widespread revolts by the Darqawa brotherhood, the 
increasing independence of the deys and the decline in exports contributed towards the 
weakening of the Ottoman rule in the central Maghreb and specifically Algeria. A financial, 
political and social crisis ensued throughout most of the region where the populace gradually 
lost trust in their rulers. Resenting their Turkish rulers, local residents translated their anger 
into rebellions led by religious leaders throughout the 19th century. The rapid decline of the 
Ottoman rule in a way paved the way for another foreign occupier to seize the opportunity. 
Unbeknownst to the Algerian locals at that time, the next conquest would last for about 130 
years and become ‘one of the most ignominious examples of systematic colonisation that the 
world has ever seen’ (Stone, 1997: 31).  
 
On June 14, 1830, at the request of the French king Charles X, French troops landed in 
Algiers and invaded the city, expelling the Ottoman dey but not before committing brutal acts 
of savagery and religious vandalism. On the 5th of July 1830, the French seized control of the 
city in an event that would be referred to later as the prise d’Algiers (the taking of Algiers) 
where the Hussein dey was defeated by the French marshal Louis de Bourmont. The pretext 
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for the French conquest is often attributed to the ‘coup d’évantail’ episode where Hussein dey 
is said to have hit Pierre Duval (the French king’s consul at Algiers) three times on the arm 
with a fly swatter. The reason for this incident was that the French ambassador refused to 
answer the Ottoman ruler’s question concerning the monetary debt that France owed Algeria 
(Stone, 1997: 30; McKenna, 2011: 64). The French conquest of Algiers signified an end to 
the Ottoman rule and marked the beginning of a new colonial era that would indelibly 
redefine Algeria and its people.      
5.2 A Colonial Legacy 
Modern Algeria ‘can be understood only by examining the period—nearly a century and a 
half—that the country was under French colonial rule’ (McKenna, 2011: 64). Although this 
statement may appear to contain some exaggerations, it nonetheless captures the important 
role that the French occupation played in the history of Algeria. The victory of the French 
troops over the Ottoman rulers in Algeria was difficult as the invasion encountered resistance 
from the locals who viewed them as a cultural and political threat. The inhabitants that the 
French discovered in Algeria had varied ethnic identities and differing interests but shared a 
common bond in that 99 per cent of those inhabitants practised Islam albeit under different 
forms (Lowi, 2009: 49). To their disappointment and surprise, the French troops encountered 
inflexible armed resistance from the Berber and the Arab population. One such resistant 
movement was led by the emir Abd el-Kader who was also the leader of a state consisting of 
local Berber tribes based on the Islamic principles (Stone, 1997: 31). His aim was to prevent 
Christian infidels from dominating the Muslim believers and thus perceived his resistance as 
a form of a jihad.  
 
Abd el-Kader was so successful in his endeavour that even the French acknowledged his 
political authority when both factions signed the Treaty of Tafna in 1837. By this time, the 
land under the emir’s control included much of the west and centre of Algeria while the 
French only occupied Algiers and the coast. However, two years later, the French under the 
leadership of Marshal Bugeaud defected on the treaty resulting in Abd el-Kadel launching a 
jihad against the French. The ensuing war would last for the next eight years before the 
French, reverting to terrorist tactics and brutal repression, would defeat the emir who 
eventually surrendered and was sent into exile in 1847. Incidentally, this event would 
foreshadow another war between the French and the Algerians more than a century later 




After their victory, the French occupiers started the process of systematic colonisation of 
Algeria through ‘disinheriting and disorienting the colonized’ (Naylor, 2000: 7). Overnight, 
the once prosperous Muslim population found themselves as second-class citizens thoroughly 
dispossessed of their land. An influx of European settlers resulted in more land being taken 
away from the local populace and being given to the newcomers. McKenna (2011: 66) points 
out that ‘there was a relative absence of well-established native mediators between the French 
rulers and the mass population. At the same time there was an ever-growing French settler 
population (the colons, also known as pieds noirs) which demanded the privileges of a ruling 
minority in the name of French democracy. In addition to the ever-growing number of French 
settlers in Algeria, European hegemony began to appear in all sectors of the Algerian society 
including the political, economic and even the religious spheres. The relegation of the Arab 
population as second- class citizens caused a major disruption in Algerian culture and society 
while at the same time their mode de vie slowly disintegrated. For instance, the local tribes 
who relied on land for their subsistence had only 10 per cent of the land by the end of the 19th 
century whereas the settlers occupied almost 1 million hectares of land. The French 
government possessed 6 million hectares by 1919 (Lowi, 2009: 51). In turn, Algerians who 
had lost their lands were left with no option but to work on the settlers’ farms as wage 
labourers. 
 
Discrimination against the locals extended to other realms such as the political, legal, fiscal, 
juridical and civil. The colonisers effected an institutionalised system of class discrimination 
where the Jews were classified as the best among the locals while the Berbers were 
considered slightly superior than their Arab counterparts. Algerians were considered French 
subjects rather than citizens and whoever wanted to acquire French citizenship had to 
renounce their Muslim civil status and accept to live under the settler’s law instead of Islamic 
law. Unsurprisingly, for many Algerians this was equivocal to apostasy and many preferred 
to maintain their second-class political and societal status (Ruedy, 1992: 75-76). The 
objective of this discriminatory system was not only to assert the occupier’s superiority over 
the colonised but also to create division among the locals in order to intensify social conflicts. 
In this regard, this generated a divide and rule situation that allowed for a more effective way 
of governing the populace (Lowi, 2009: 52). McKenna (2011: 66) characterises the pattern of 
rule of the French from the time of conquest until independence as ‘a tradition of violence 
and mutual incomprehension between the rulers and the ruled’. The machinery of 
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colonisation had a detrimental effect on the Algerians, affecting them psychologically, 
physically and personally. In short, according to Franz Fanon (cited in Naylor, 2000: 7), the 
trauma inflicted by the French on the Algerians was a ‘massive psychoexistential complex’ 
resulting in a feeling of non-existence.  
 
Alexis de Tocqueville, the French political thinker, acknowledged that the unwarranted 
system of colonisation perpetrated by the French in Algeria had a negative effect as it ‘made 
Muslim society more barbaric than it was before the French arrived’ (McKenna, 2011: 66). 
Furthermore, he presciently noted that should the French not change their method, it would 
result in a war between the colonisers and the colonised. Nonetheless, the occupiers, 
disregarding any advice concerning their method of rule, continued their process of 
assimilating Algerians into the French culture while discriminating against those who were 
obstinate towards embracing their culture. This system of systematic colonisation by the 
French displays the characteristics of an anti-dialogical theory of action which consisted of 
the divide and rule method, the manipulation of the colonisers over the colonised and of 
cultural invasion (Freire, 2000:138-167).  
 
In continually maintaining discrimination and injustices combine with forced repression, the 
colonisers aimed to dehumanise the colonised and propel the latter into a state of 
disparagement. However, continued grievances and injustices eventually promote a sense of 
fatalism within the population resulting in a violent reaction on their part. Freire (2000: 49) 
justifies this violent response on the part of the colonised as follows, 
In order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle for their liberation, 
they must perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which 
there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform. This 
perception…must become the motivating force for liberating action…The 
oppressed can overcome the contradiction in which they are caught only when 
this perception enlists them in the struggle to free themselves.        
 
Eventually, the largely marginalised population of Algeria realised the reality of oppression 
and began to conscientize themselves to the perception of liberating themselves from the 
yoke of their oppressors. Slowly, nationalist aspirations began to spread among the Muslim 
Algerian population from both within the country and abroad. These included the 
assimilationists (those who were exposed to French education), the Muslim reformers (those 
who were inspired by the religious Salafi movement of Muhammad Abduh in Egypt) and the 
proletarians (those who belonged to a movement of Algerian workers in France) (McKenna, 
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2011: 69). This oppressive system of colonial abuse by the French that enforced the ideology 
of European superiority vis-à-vis native inferiority had its parallels in other oppressive 
colonial systems on the continent like Kenya, Rhodesia and South Africa at the time. Akin to 
these systems, there was little room for peaceful revolution and the only viable solution for 
the oppressed to seek their right of self-determination was through organized violence. It is 
against this backdrop that the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN – National Liberation 
Front) was formed in 1954. Its aim was to embody the Algerian’s peoples struggle with the 
ultimate aim of fighting for the liberation of its people. Thus, more than a century after the 
French defeated the Ottoman rulers and subdued the locals, they faced another greater 
challenge – the war for Algeria’s independence.  
5.3 The War of Independence and the Birth of Modern Algeria        
The war of independence commenced on the 31st October 1954 when the FLN, whose 
objective was to restore an autonomous Algerian state based on social democracy within an 
Islamic paradigm and equal citizenship for all Algerians, launched its first attacks in the 
Aures Mountains and Batna. To achieve their goal, the FLN had two main weapons in their 
arsenal, namely, guerrilla warfare within Algeria and diplomatic action abroad especially at 
the United Nations (McKenna, 2011: 71). Despite the initial repression by the French military 
on the members of the FLN after the first assault, the revolution soon gained impetus and 
spread throughout the whole region. In terms of tactics, the FLN resorted to direct attacks 
against the French military, assassinations, economic sabotage and intimidation of opponents 
within the Muslim and European communities (Stone, 1997: 37). Alarmed by the increase of 
violence and the intensity of the uprising, the French National Assembly declared a state of 
emergency soon after the war began, initially in certain regions that were most affected and 
later over the whole country.  
 
Despite the revolution, France remained obstinate about defending its colonial conquest as 
encapsulated in the words of François Mitterrand, who was the Interior minister at the time, 
‘Algeria is France, because Algerian departments are departments of the French Republic’ 
(cited in Naylor, 2000: 18). It was this prevailing perception that caused the French 
government to increase its effort to retain Algeria at all cost as it deployed a French army of 
about 500, 000 troops to its colony. Meanwhile, unable to maintain its hegemony in the other 
regions of northern Maghreb, the French government decided to grant both Tunisia and 
Morocco full independence in 1956 (McKenna, 2011: 72). This enabled the French to 
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concentrate solely on ‘French’ Algeria since ‘to abandon Algeria is to condemn France to 
decadence’ (Soustelle, 1957:69). The prominence of the situation in Algeria was such that it 
bore a direct influence on the course of politics and government in France. In addition to 
combatting the FLN and nationalists, the French government also had to deal with the pieds 
noirs (colons) who became increasing concerned that an independent Algeria meant that they 
would lose their elitist position and protection from the French government. It is imperative 
to consider the Algerian war of independence not solely in terms of a coloniser (French) 
against the colonised (Algerians Muslim) since it encompassed a more conglomerate conflict 
between the pieds noirs (Algerians of French descent) who wanted to remain 
in their native land under French protection, and the indigenous Muslims, who 
demanded initially an end to their second-class status…the war also involved 
feuds and disputes between rival Muslims and between the pieds noirs and the 
French authorities (Stone, 1997: 37). 
 
Faced with an increasingly problematic situation regarding Algeria’s right to self-
determination, president de Gaulle conducted secret negotiations with the FLN in view of 
establishing a referendum as a first step for Algeria to achieve sovereignty. On 18 March 
1962, both the French government and the FLN leadership signed a final cease-fire at Evian. 
After eight years of war in which thousands lost their lives, the Evian Accords officially 
ended 130 years of colonial rule by the French in Algeria and the FLN was recognised as the 
only representative of the people of Algeria. The referendum occurred on the 1st July 1962.  
When 91 per cent of the 6.5 million electorate voted in favour of self-governance, Algeria 
finally became independent and the FLN party ascended to power.   
5.4 The Rise and Decline of the FLN 
5.4.1 Ben Bella Era 
Ahmed Ben Bella became the first head of state of post-independent Algeria in September 
1962. One of the consequences of the eight-year war of independence was the mass migration 
of at least 90 per cent of the French settlers back to their native country. They consisted of 
mostly the working class such as teachers, doctors, engineers and skilled workers. The 
primary task of Ben Bella and his newly appointed government was to reconstruct an Algeria 
that had become ‘overwhelmingly disoriented, bewildered, displaced and hopelessly ill-
equipped for the task ahead’ (Stone, 1997: 42). This would require a threefold feature of 1) 
creating a peaceful country, 2) gaining the trust of the populace in order to consolidate power 




With regard to the reconstruction of the economy, the new government remained faithful to 
its political rhetoric before independence and proceeded to veer the Algerian economy 
towards socialism. While in theory the endeavour appeared feasible, in practice the task was 
more challenging. The major obstacle encountered by the leadership was that the previous 
administrative system was both complex and powerful. Not only was it modelled after the 
French public administration but it also comprised of strongly assimilated tribal alliances 
(Talahite, 2008: 53). Despite this impasse, Ben Bella and his leadership incorporated socialist 
features within the system (Werenfels, 2007:37). Yet, as Tlemcani (1986: 91) pertinently 
notes, ‘the repressive colonial state apparatus inherited by [the government] was to be 
maintained and modernized but not smashed’. This would prove to be a costly mistake on the 
part of the government as for the next three years of Ben Bella’s rule, the country was 
plunged in an economic crisis.  
 
An upsurge in unemployment forced many Muslim Algerians to leave the country to seek for 
working opportunities in Europe and other places. With the decline of the Algerian economy,   
its leaders had to rely on foreign aid donations from France, the Soviet Union and some Arab 
countries. One of the contributing factors towards the failure of Ben Bella to address the 
economic decline stemmed from the political power struggle prevalent within the ruling 
party. In the immediate aftermath of independence, the once unified FLN, which had defeated 
the French colonisers, began to show fissures as members placed personal ambitions over the 
rebuilding of an Algerian state on the brink of failure. Furthermore, the combination of Ben 
Bella’s inconsistent style of political leadership and poor administrative record resulted in 
further dissention within the party. He grew increasingly paranoid as he ‘felt threatened not 
only by those whom he had alienated in his seizure of power, but also by those who had 
helped him take power’ (Yefsah, 1990: 112). Ben Bella gradually removed the members of 
the top echelons of the FLN so that within a short period of time he was head of state, head of 
government, secretary-general of the ruling party and chief of the army at the same time 
(Lowi, 2009: 79).  
 
In an effort to consolidate his power, Ben Bella had envisaged reducing the influence of the 
military in politics and replacing his closest ally, the minister of defence – Colonel Houari 
Boumedienne. This proved to be Ben Bella’s final mistake as on the 19th of June 1965, he 
was usurped through a bloodless coup and was later sent to prison. After successfully 
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carrying out Algeria’s first postcolonial coup d’état, Houari Boumedienne took control of the 
government and became the new head of state. 
  
5.4.2 The Boumedienne Era                     
As head of government, Boumedienne almost immediately set out to undo the political 
institutions and systems that were put in place by his predecessor. Meanwhile, Boumedienne 
retained certain provisions put forth by Ben Bella in the 1963 Constitution of Algeria which 
stated that ‘Algeria was a socialist state, Arabic the official language, Islam the official 
religion, and the FLN the sole legal party’ (Lowi, 2009:80). In this regard, it can be argued 
that one of the legacies of former president Ben Bella is the adoption of authoritarianism 
within Algerian politics as it manifested itself in the form of the exclusive single party rule of 
the FLN. Furthermore, if the war of independence was the blueprint for the participation of 
the army in the political sector, then the events of the 1965 coup led to a more direct 
involvement of the military in politics (Werenfels, 2007:35). Boumedienne dissolved 
parliament, suspended the constitution and established a Council of the Revolution as the 
main political body regulating government. Notwithstanding the fact that Boumedienne 
assumed power through a coup, the former head of the military wing of the FLN still 
maintained the same legitimate authority he possessed during the war of independence in the 
eyes of the people. This legitimacy arose from the fact that the post-independent political 
regime installed by Ben Bella assumed its legitimacy through the national struggle for the 
liberation of Algeria (Adamson, 2004: 26).  
 
In the economic sphere, Boumedienne introduced some new policies advocating a break from 
the vision of his predecessor. In order to allow the state to take control of its natural resources 
and reduce its dependence on foreign aid, the government introduced new economic policies 
with the threefold objectives of rapid large-scale industrialisation, nationalisation and land 
redistribution (Stone, 1997: 87). The government resolved to concretize their new plan and 
by 1972, most sectors of the economy, including the most important ones of hydrocarbon and 
oil, had been nationalized. The revenues gathered from oil, which had become the primary 
commodity export, enabled the government to establish new projects such as ‘provision of 
extensive social insurance: free, universal education and health care, subsidized foodstuffs 
and public transportation…and free housing’ (Lowi, 2009: 83). The vision of establishing a 
socialist economy gradually became a practical reality through the development of heavy 
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industry and human capital including the instituting of numerous public enterprises and state-
owned farms (Meliani, Aghrout & Ammari, 2004: 93). Yet, focusing solely on establishing 
large-scale industries meant that the non-industrial sector such as the agricultural sector inter 
alia was neglected (Werenfels, 2007:39). According to Boumedienne, this was not an 
oversight but rather a sequitur from the argument that the revenues from oil contribute 
towards creating a strong economic infrastructure that solidifies heavy industries that in turn 
provide industrial support for agricultural productivity. In short, Boumedienne demonstrates 
his logic when he notes that ‘heavy industry will be the locomotive which will draw behind 
it, agriculture, light industry, and other carriages (on the railroad) of our economic life’ (cited 
in Tlemcani, 1986: 113).  
 
As regards land redistribution, it did not accrue the same benefits for the people as the 
nationalisation and industrialisation processes. Instead, the authoritarian characteristic of 
Boumedienne and his government translated into the regime having monopoly over land 
redistribution. Following from its neglect of the agricultural sector, the government failed to 
distribute fecund land to the agricultural peasants in rural areas.  Instead, land was reallocated 
along hierarchal lines with former militants, allies and the regime’s friends benefiting the 
most, thus reinforcing the bureaucratic and military elitist characteristic of the regime. This 
system, as Lowi (2009: 84) aptly observes, ‘reinforced clientelism, which in turn bolstered 
the already strong collegial networks and regional ties that had carried over from the colonial 
period’. Consequently, there was a mass exodus of people moving from rural to urban areas 
in search of employment opportunities in the industries. While this situation had a positive 
effect in economic terms as the Algerian GDP grew at a rate of over 6.8 per cent per year 
(World Bank, 1982; 1990), the increasing population growth in urban areas contributed 
towards ‘housing shortages, rising unemployment and social discontent’ (Lowi, 2009:84).  
 
By the time of his death in 1978, Boumedienne had transformed Algeria into a socialist 
model with a healthier economy than during his predecessor’s time. One of his legacies 
would be the institution of the 1976 National Charter that would later become the basis of the 
new constitution adopted the same year. The 1976 constitution retained certain provisions of 
the previous one but reiterated the position of Islam as the official religion of the state, the 
mode of government as republican, the basic rights of freedom of expression and equal rights 
of women amongst others (Le Sueur, 2010: 29). In short, while Algeria enjoyed a period of 
relative economic growth during the Boumedienne era, the implementation of his reforms 
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had opened a social and economic lacuna between the bourgeoisies and the masses (Naylor, 
2000:123).  
5.4.3 Chadli Benjedid Era 
In 1979, Colonel Chadli Benjedid succeeded Boumedienne after he was chosen by the 
military leadership over two other popular candidates. The first candidate was Mohammed 
Yahiaoui who was the coordinator of the FLN and the prime choice of the radical socialists. 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika who held the position of foreign minister in the previous government 
was the second candidate. Ironically, the latter went into exile after his defeat and returned 
twenty years later to rule the country at the request of the military. The senior military 
leadership perceived Chadli as a compromise candidate and chose him for two reasons. 
Firstly, in selecting a former military person, there was the surety of the dominance of the 
military within the country’s politics. Secondly, the fact that Chadli was also a FLN member, 
the ‘symbolic role of the party was acknowledged’ (Lowi, 2009: 102). Hence, in the three 
regimes of post-independent Algeria, there was an increasing hegemonic influence of the 
military.  
 
Algerians often referred to the period during Boumedienne’s rule as one of the ‘golden age’ 
(Meliani et al., 2004: 92) due to the social and economic development whereas Chaldi’s era is 
referred to as the ‘décennie noire’ (black decade). During the reign of Chadli, the challenges 
that were present in the Boumedienne years such as unemployment and lack of housing grew 
more challenging due to the political failure of the Chadli regime. A major catalyst propelling 
the crisis within the Algerian economy was the plummeting prices of oil in 1986 resulting in 
re-evaluation of the socialist paradigm advocated by the two previous heads of state. The 
dependence of Algeria’s economy on hydrocarbon and oil revenues at the expense of other 
sectors spelt that the economy was slowly deteriorating. In addition to poor implementation 
of policies and a failure of the industrialisation process, other reasons for the failure of the 
Chadli regime included: a high level of corruption within government, an ever-growing level 
of unemployment, an increasing housing crisis, a rapid decline in the Algerian economy and a 
lack of political competition against the ruling party (Barka, 2011: 102).  
 
People who had hitherto relied on the state for provisions and benefits were left without state 
welfare resulting in a growing opposition to the ruling party. Despite its continuous 
reaffirmation of change within its rhetoric, the FLN government failed to alleviate the 
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situation of the people. After three decades of rule, the FLN had only managed to embody an 
authoritarian-bureaucratic system that saw the suppression of other political opponents and 
the absence of free elections. Converting Algeria into a one-party state through the 
justification of being the only legitimate party due to its struggle accolades, the FLN 
struggled to achieve its objectives it promised after independence. Furthermore, the FLN 
began alienating itself from the middle class (who had been the hardest hit from the economic 
crisis) comprising mostly of the youth. The drift between the ruling party and the masses 
widened as the Algerians became more frustrated with the political and social grievances 
exerted upon them by the ruling party. Suddenly, the FLN, which few decades earlier had 
struggled so hard to defeat the French colonisers had eventually followed in their footsteps. 
This phenomenon is reminiscent of Paulo Freire’s prescient warning:  
Many of the oppressed who directly or indirectly participate in revolution 
intend—conditioned by the myths of the old order—to make it their private 
revolution. The shadow of their former oppressor is still cast over them…In 
their struggle the oppressed find in the oppressor their model of "manhood" 
(Freire, 2000:46). 
 
The accumulated grievances of the people meant that it was only a matter of time before they 
themselves would openly express their discontents towards the ruling party. The stage was set 
for a confrontation between the government and the people and it arrived in the form of a 
public demonstration in October 1988. The protests began as a demonstration by people who 
felt marginalized by the current regime and within four days, it turned into a riot. Despite the 
massive suppression of the protesters by security forces, the government had little choice but 
to listen to the voice of the people. Within days, Chadli initiated a process of liberalisation 
when he introduced political pluralism which allowed the organisation of other political 
parties, thus officially ending the FLN monopoly of power (Naylor, 2000:164). After a new 
constitution was adopted in 1989 allowing for the public participation of opposition political 
parties, Chadli authorised multi-party elections throughout the country and scheduled the first 
democratic election in Algeria.     
5.5 The rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 
The 1988 October riots (also referred to as Black October) signalled a new dawn in the 
Algerian political scenery as Islamism emerged as an alternative to the ideology purported by 
the FLN. After the socialist approach endorsed by the FLN resulted in failure in the economic 
and social domain, the majority of the population were left disillusioned and placed the blame 
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solely on the FLN. The Islamists capitalised on the failures of the ruling party and seized the 
opportunity to enter into the political domain by attending to the grievances of the people. 
They established ‘food markets and religious schools, invested in mosques and provide cheap 
services and food’ to the Algerian population (Borka, 2012: 103). The youth who were the 
hardest hit by unemployment became the primary target of those Islamists. The party also 
attracted to its ranks the unemployed, Arabic teachers, merchants who were opposed to state 
socialism, engineers, jewellers, former discontented members of the FLN and a few 
intellectual (Zoubir, 1993: 94). Gradually the Islamists set out to build a rapport with the 
people by attending to their grievances in view to obtaining the support and legitimation of 
the people.  
 
Although the FLN had claimed to be an Islamist party since its inception, Islam never 
influenced any decision made by the leaders as it remained confined either to the cultural 
domain or on the political periphery (Kepel, 2002: 163). Thus, when the Western economic 
method adopted by the FLN failed dismally, the Islamists had little problem in convincing the 
people that a radical change was required; a change where Algeria would return to its Islamic 
roots. The Islamists, interpreting the text of the Quran to fit their messages, proposed that the 
solution to the problem of the people was to establish an Islamic state of Algeria ruled by a 
religious government guided by Sharia. It is against this background that the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS – Front Islamique du Salut) emerged on the Algerian scene as a political 
party under the guidance of Abassi Mandani and Ali Belhadj. The FIS soon became a legal 
political party and won a resounding victory at the 1990 municipal elections. Frederic Volpi 
(2009: 132) posits that the success of FIS as a political party can be attributed to  
profitant pleinement de l'effet de nouveauté, du manque de competition 
politique organisée dans la sphère religieuse, de la lenteur de la mobilisation 
des autres partis politiques, du réseau des mosques indépendantes, et jouant 
sur l'impression très répandue que les acteurs islamiques ont directement 
contraint le régime à faire des concessions démocratiques. [Fully benefiting 
from the novelty effect, the lack of political competition from other religious 
parties, the tardiness of other political parties to mobilise, the network of 
independent mosques and capitalising on the widespread impression that the 
Islamists were directly responsible for pressuring the regime into making 
democratic concessions]     
 
The momentum the FIS obtained from their small victory continued into the general elections 
a year later. With their newly found stimulus, the FIS continued to rally the support of the 
people through its efficient social services and political rhetoric. The FLN realising the threat 
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posed by their main opposition party, started to repress the FIS supporters that were 
organising protests and demonstrations through the country in a bid to challenge the 
government. A few months prior to the general elections, the military leadership declared a 
state of emergency because of the fierce resistance by the FIS supporters and members. This 
resulted in the arrest of numerous FIS members, amongst whom were its leaders Mandani 
and Belhadj (Volpi, 2003:50). Opposition parties including the FIS and other secular parties 
began doubting the validity of the so-called democratic transition instituted by the FLN and 
began searching for alternative political options. Despite the fact that some executive 
members of the FIS encouraged for an end to the political participation with preference for 
other means of political struggle, Abdelkader Hachani who was the interim leader, arbitrated 
that the party continues in its campaign through the proper political and legal channels. He 
believed that ‘the political legitimacy gained through the ballot box was the best insurance 
the FIS could get at the time’ (Hachani cited in Volpi, 2003:51).  
 
Regaining its confidence, the FIS re-launched its electoral campaign. Hachani’s decision 
proved accurate, as the FIS emerged victorious in the first round of the general elections 
triggering surprise among many analysts and observers. President Chadli and his leadership 
anticipated a close contest between the FLN and the FIS but regretted their decision for 
political democratisation when the ballots were finally counted. Late in the evening of 26 
December 1991, the results were made official: out of the 231 contested seats in the national 
assembly (430 in total), the FIS won 188, the FFS (Socialist Forces Front) which was the 
main democratic opposition party captured 25 and the FLN came third with 15 seats (Le 
Sueur, 2010: 51; Volpi, 2003:52). Not only did the FIS win by a huge margin but they won 
by majority which meant that they would have the power to change the constitution when 
they came into power.  
 
Hence, the conversion of Algeria into an Islamic state was within reach of the FIS party. If 
the defeat in the municipal elections proved a waking call for the FLN, then the result of 
general elections was a humiliating calamity for the ruling party. To exacerbate matters, the 
fact that the new elections law stated that only the two parties with the most votes from the 
first round were eligible to contest in the next round, the FLN did not qualify to stand as a 
candidate in the next round of elections. After almost three decades in power, it appeared that 
the FLN’s leading role in Algeria’s politics ended with the people looking forward to change. 
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5.6 The Military Coup and The Decline of the FIS 
Accepting defeat would be difficult, especially if the one ruling party has been in power for 
as long as the FLN had been in the epicentre of politics in Algeria. The military, which had 
removed itself from the political arena in the wake of Chadli’s political pluralism process of 
1989, had earlier issued a warning that it would not allow any party to use the democratic 
process as a means to put an end to democracy in Algeria (Zoubir, 1993: 97). Meanwhile, 
Chadli conceded defeat and was prepared to work with the leadership of the FIS. By contrast, 
the military realised that victory for the Islamist party in the second round was imminent 
which signalled an end of the republic and decided to deliver on their prior threat. On the 11th 
of January 1992, the military annulled the second round of legislative elections, forced 
President Chadli Bendjedid to resign, dissolved the FIS and suppressed its members. After 
the coup, the military established a High Committee of State (HCE –Haut Comité D’État) to 
rule the country with Mohammed Boudiaf – a veteran of the war of independence who had 
returned to the country after 28 years in exile – as its head. The military continued its mission 
to dissolve the FIS as it unleashed a wave of suppression against its members that included 
mass arrests, confinement in camps in the Sahara and ill-treatment of the prisoners (Joffé, 
2012: 132).  
 
Five months after he was chosen as leader of the country, Boudiaf was assassinated by one of 
his own guards. Some scholars such as Benjamin Stora (2001:17) delineate this incident as 
the starting point of the Algerian civil war. From that point onwards, the military would 
increase its efforts in supressing the Islamists and their supporters, contributing towards the 
radicalisation of the affected Muslim population (Joffé, 2012: 132). This context compelled 
the FIS to establish an armed wing under the name of the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA – 
Mouvement Islamique Armé) which would later become the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS –
Armé Islamique du Salut) (Naylor, 2000: 336). Furthermore, the situation also allowed 
violent Salafi-Jihadist groups to enter the playing field with the most infamous amongst them 
being the Armed Islamic Group (GIA – Groupements Islamique Armé).  
5.7 Opportunity Seized: Thus Enters the GIA 
Although the 1992 military coup and the subsequent suppression of Islamists by the army are 
perceived as catalysts for the emergence of jihadist groups such as the GIA on the Algerian 
scene, their antecedents can be traced back to an earlier time, that is, a decade earlier to be 
precise. In 1982, Mustafa Bouyali formed a militant Salafist inspired association known as 
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the Armed Algerian Islamic Movement (MAIA – Mouvement Algérien Islamique Armé) in 
order to launch jihad against the state and security forces in retaliation for the killing of his 
brother (Volpi, 2003: 146).  Bouyali (who was incidentally a FLN veteran of the War of 
Independence) and his followers managed to mount spectacular attacks against the regime 
between 1982 and 1987 (Moussaoui, 1994: 1324–25). After the death of Bouyali at the hands 
of security forces in 1987, many of his followers were arrested but later released in 1989. 
Upon their release, some followers (such as Belhadj) became members or co-founders of 
Islamists movements while others pledged allegiance to the armed jihadist groups in the 
period after the military-backed coup (Joffé, 2012: 124; Kepel, 1995:122). Lowi (2005:226) 
spotlights the influence of Bouyali on the jihadist groups of the post-coup period when she 
notes that his movement was ‘the first guerrilla formation in the history of independent 
Algeria and the precursor to the armed Islamist groups of the 1990s’. 
 
5.7.1 GIA: Formation and Tactics 
In addition to the Bouyali influence, there were other factors contributing towards the 
formation of the GIA. Firstly, the returning jihadist fighters from the war in Afghanistan, 
often referred to as the ‘Algerian Afghans’, played a pivotal role within the GIA cadre. Faced 
with unemployment and lack of work opportunities upon their return, the Algerian Afghans 
soon became potential recruits of the armed Islamists movements. Secondly, after their 
release from prisons, numerous former members and supporters of the FIS who underwent 
radicalisation while in prison, further bolstered the ranks of the GIA. Thirdly, since the GIA 
operated primarily in the urban areas of Algeria, many recruits migrated from the countryside 
to join the armed group (Lowi, 2009: 131-132). It is important to note that in the beginning, 
the GIA consisted of splintering jihadist cells that operated distinctly of each other. It would 
only be later that they would be unified under the command of a single leader. Concerning 
the composition of the GIA, it comprised of young unemployed males mostly under 25 years 
of age whilst there were those who were older albeit with criminal experience. Financially, 
the group received funds from the Algerian diaspora living in Europe and North America 
who sympathized with their cause and at other times through criminal activities such as bank 
robberies (Stone, 1997:189).  
 
In relation to its tactics, the objectives of the GIA was diametrically opposed to those of the 
MIA or the AIS who were prepared to negotiate with the government in their bid to ascend to 
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power. The GIA for its part rejected any means of dialogue or compromise with the Algerian 
government in its bid to transform Algeria into an Islamic state ruled by sharia. To attain 
these objectives, the GIA preferred ‘short-term spectacular terrorist attacks’ that extended to 
suicide bombing and transnational terrorism (Stone, 1997: 184). Another tenet that separated 
the GIA from other armed groups such as the MIA or the AIS is the group’s adoption of 
violence and ‘sweeping use of takfir’ (Rudolph, 2008: 126) where the latter included any 
person who did not participate in the fight against the government. While the GIA and the 
MIA shared the same goal of Islamising Algeria, their means to achieving that end differed 
radically.  
 
The commonality between the GIA and AIS has ignited a form of debate amongst scholars 
concerning the relationship between the two. Some scholars in line with Stone (1997: 184, 
188) view the GIA’s role as complementary to the MIA and the AIS. They argue that the 
relationship between the two groups oscillated between hostility and cooperation as at one 
stage the GIA and the AIS attempted to assimilate.  By contrast, other scholars such as Kepel 
(2002: 265), posit that the AIS was established as a competitor to the GIA in order to recruit 
individuals who were dismayed with the moderate stance of the MIA but wanted to 
participate in the jihad against the government. Furthermore, the formation of the AIS was 
more of a political weapon for the FIS to gain leverage against the government on the 
negotiation table while this was not the case for the GIA. In adopting this latter line of 
argument, it can be argued that the tactics and objectives of the GIA and the AIS were too 
different for there to exist any chance of merger between the two. 
 
5.7.2 GIA: Leadership and attacks 
As noted in the previous subsection, in the aftermath of the military coup, the GIA consisted 
of loosely formed extremist cells without a common leader. These conglomerate groups of 
jihadist managed to carry out significant attacks against the military and security forces in 
different regions of Algeria. One of these attacks is often associated as the one that initiated 
the civil war. It occurred in 1992 in Algiers and resulted in the death of six police officers 
(Joffé, 2012: 132). The heterogeneous jihadist groups realised that these assaults were 
effective but limited. The existing power struggle among the different leaders of the cells 
proved difficult to foster any kind of unity among the jihadist fighters. Eventually, the 
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Algerian extremists evolved and amalgamated under one leader or emir (the Arabic term 
designating a prince) and became known as the GIA. 
 
Abdelhaq Layada became the first emir of the newly unified GIA in 1992. Immediately, he 
drew up the statutes of the GIA and disseminated the rules of conduct for its members. He 
envisaged the unity of the GIA based on the Salafist principle of ‘the way of orthodox Sunni 
Islam as the pious ancestors understood it’ (Layada cited in Kepel, 2002: 261). He further 
perceived the role of GIA as the new emissary of Islamism in Algeria since the defeat of the 
FIS at the hands of the military. Hence, the GIA embarked on its cycle of violence with the 
aim of neutralising their opponents who comprised of the government, its officials and any 
person who had a link with the enemy. As a result, what followed was a succession of 
assassinations of not only government officials but also intellectuals who were also perceived 
as the enemy since they embodied the image of the French-speaking intellectuals. However, 
one of the characteristics shared among the GIA leaders was that their reign was usually short 
as they would either be arrested or killed by the security forces within months or a few years 
after they assumed power. Layada, the first emir of the GIA was arrested in May 1993 and 
thus ended his time at the helm of the armed group. 
 
Mourar Si Ahmed (also known as Djafar al Afghani) succeeded Layada as new leader of the 
GIA. Under his leadership, there was an exacerbation of violence and the GIA expanded its 
support base to outside of Algeria. Abroad, a weekly paper Al-Ansar was published in 
London providing publicity and doctrinal justification for the actions of the GIA resulting in 
amassed support for the group among the worldwide Salafist communities (Kepel, 2002: 
263). On the local front, the GIA’s support base increased as the group gradually 
encompassed other factions which launched attacks in the name of the GIA. This is 
exemplified in the abduction and killing of two French surveyors in Sidi Bel Abbes by 
extremists affiliated with the GIA. This incident also marked the beginning of the GIA’s 
campaign of attacks against foreign nationals. In October 1993, the group issued an 
ultimatum to foreign nationals by giving a letter to a hostage kidnapped from the French 
consulate shortly before her release with the following words, ‘we are giving you one month 
[to leave the country]. Anyone who exceeds that period will be responsible for his own 
sudden death. There will be no kidnapping and it will be more violent than Egypt’ (Stone, 




Exactly two months later, the GIA actualised their threats when twelve Croats were killed in 
the most brutal manner – some were beaten to death while others had their throats slit with 
their hands tied behind their backs. Even Algerians were not spared as exemplified in the 
killing of Mohammed Bouslimani who was a prominent figure of the Hamas party. His crime 
was that he refused to issue a fatwa supporting the tactics of the GIA. The ferocity of the 
violence was unrelenting since the GIA interpreted their jihad by ‘killing and dispersing all 
those who fight against Allah and his prophet’ (Si Ahmed cited in Willis, 1996: 285); 
whether those enemies were foreign nationals or local Algerians. After an encounter with the 
security forces near Algiers, Si Ahmed was killed in February 1994.  
 
In the wake of the death Si Ahmed, Cherif Gousmi (whose nom de guerre was Abdullah 
Ahmed) was chosen as the emir of the GIA. Despite his short reign as GIA leader, lasting 
until September 1994, he achieved the feat of unifying more factions into the GIA which 
included some of the original members of the FIS such as its former provisional leader 
Mohammed Said (Stone, 1997: 188). He was also the most influential leader of the GIA as he 
had both militant experience (national and international) and religious credentials (he was an 
Imam and a former local representative of the FIS). In July 1994, the group killed seven 
Italian sailors and kidnapped the Yemeni and Oman ambassadors to Algeria whom they later 
released. As a means to terrorise the population and mount pressure on the government, the 
GIA adjusted its modus operandi by detonating bombs in and around the capital Algiers. 
Gousmi had a clear message for the government and the ‘infidels’: the GIA would not stop its 
relentless attacks on the kufirs until Algeria was an Islamic state run by an Islamic 
government through the shari’a. In short, this memorandum to the government was as simple 
as the slogan that accentuated its communiqué: ‘No Agreement, No Truce, No Dialogue’ 
(Kepel, 2002: 266). However, akin to his predecessor, Gousmi met his end at the hands of the 
security forces in September 1994. 
 
If his forerunner was the most efficacious leader, the new emir – Djamel Zitouni – could be 
labelled as the most visionary head of the GIA. He became the first emir who launched jihad 
on foreign soil. Two months after he was elected leader, in December 1994 four members of 
the GIA hijacked a French plane, Air France flight 8969 with 171 passengers and crew 
members, in an attempt to blow up the plane over the streets of Paris. When the aircraft 
stopped for refuelling at the airport in Marseilles, French commandos stormed the plane, 
eliminated the four jihadists and foiled the plan of the GIA. In response, the GIA praised the 
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hijackers for their courage and affirmed in its bulletin that ‘this operation is the start of a new 
phase which is the Martyrdom phase in which the enemy will be completely overwhelmed by 
the attacks’ (quoted in Kohlmann, 2007: 7). This event became a case study from which 
future extremists would learn from the mistakes of their antecedents. About seven years later, 
nineteen hijackers would accomplish what the GIA had planned to do; yet, the target would 
be the United States and not France.  
 
Despite its initial failure with the foiled hijacking, the GIA intensified its attacks on French 
soil contrary to those who expected the initial failure to serve as deterrence. The GIA’s first 
casualties on French soil included 4 dead and more than 80 injured when it detonated a bomb 
at the Saint Michel-Notre Dame Metro station in Paris on the 25th of July 1995 (Le Sueur, 
2010: 131). Two weeks later, a nail bomb at the Arc de Triomphe injured 17 people amongst 
whom were 11 tourists. Gunaratna (2002: 122) depicts the carnage of the GIA in France 
between the period of July and December 1995 thus, ‘the GIA detonated a further eight 
bombs in France, three of which went off in Paris metro stations, killing ten and injuring over 
200 people’. The GIA was as relentless on the local scene as it was abroad in its jihad. In 
March 1995, a bomb exploded outside the police station in Algiers resulting in 40 fatalities 
(Stone, 1997: 193). During his time as leader of the GIA Zitouni had achieved some 
unprecedented feats such as initiating the jihad in France but he also committed some grave 
tactical mistakes resulting in a loss of legitimacy among many of the GIA members. The 
contributing factor to Zitouni’s decline was his indiscriminate attacks against government, 
foreigners and innocent Algerians alike. Slowly, many members of the GIA (including 
former FIS adherents) withdrew, distanced and even denounced the group.  
 
In retaliation for the ‘betrayal’ of his former comrades, Zitouni coldly ordered reprisals 
against these infidels and their families. Among those who were captured and executed were 
Abdulrazaq Redjem and Mohammed Said. However, Zitouni’s final act that would seal his 
demise resulted from an attack that shocked even the most extremist fundamentalist. In 
March 1996, GIA militants raided a Trappist monastery in the village of Tibhirine and 
kidnapped seven monks. When the French government did not succumb to Zitouni’s 
demands, he ordered the killings of the monks (Le Sueur, 2012: 132-133; Kohlmann, 2007: 
8-9). Soon afterwards, support for the GIA rapidly declined as it lost its legitimacy in the eyes 
of its members, the public and its recruitment image was dealt a crippling blow from which it 
would not recover. Furthermore, the editors of Al-Ansar in London suspended the bulletin 
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and withdrew their support from Zitouni. The latter was eventually denounced by his 
members and in July 1996, he was ambushed and shot dead by dissident members of the GIA 
(Kohlmann, 2007: 9).     
 
The unity that previous emirs had so diligently aimed to achieve fragmented due to the 
actions of Zitouni. His eventual killing led to further infighting among the GIA members and 
there was no suitable candidate to take over the group. With the shortage of aspirants to fill 
the leadership vacuum, one of the junior members of Zitouni’s Shura council, Antar Zouabri 
advanced to take over the rule of the GIA. What he lacked in practical experience, he tried to 
commensurate with blind aggression. Consequently, he further alienated the group’s ‘own 
membership and fellow Islamists in North Africa’ (Kohlmann, 2007: 10). Continuing in his 
predecessor’s footsteps, Zouabri extended the concept of takfir to the whole Muslim 
population of Algeria without any religious justifications. Kohlmann (2007: 11) aptly 
captures the plight of the most brutal extremist group in Algeria when he remarks that, 
cast out by other mujahedeen, abandoned by many of its supporters, and 
targeted by both its “apostate” enemies and its own former Islamist allies, the 
GIA was no longer an effective or cohesive military force. The GIA was never 
officially dissolved, though by 2001, it had become largely defunct.   
 
The last emir of the GIA was killed in February 2002 while involved in a clash with security 
forces. Zitouni’s time at the head of the GIA ‘had brought the Algerian jihad to its knees and 
his successor, Zouabri, finished it off altogether’ (Kepel, 2002: 271). Although Al Qaeda who 
was formerly an ardent supporter of the GIA had withdrawn its support from the GIA in the 
wake of the deviation of Zitouni, it was still interested in the Algerian jihad.  In the late 
1990s, a group emerged on the Algerian militant landscape that adhered to Al Qaeda’s 
ideology and objectives. Despondent with the GIA tactics and killings of innocent Muslims, 
the faction broke away to form its own group under the name of the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (GSPC –Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat). 
 5.8 Out with the GIA and in with the GSPC 
The GIA’s unrivalled brutality coupled with its deviation from its original raison d’être were 
the main contributors towards the fragmentation of the jihadist group. Under the direction of 
former paratrooper and GIA commander Hassan Hattab (also known as Abu Hamza), a new 
splinter group was formed which adopted the name Al-Jamaah al-Salafiyyah li-al-Dawah wal 
Qital or the GSPC. In terms of its ideology, the newly formed group followed Jihadi-Salafism 
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in the aim of overthrowing the apostate Algerian regime through jihad and install in its place 
an Algerian Islamic state ruled by shari’a. As can be noted, the ideology is not a novel 
concept but similar to the one adhered to by the GIA. In fact, the GSPC stated in its first 
communiqué that it is ‘a continuation of the Armed Islamic Group, following its ideology, 
before it deviated and went astray.  Thus, [the GSPC] represents the genuine path that jihad 
has followed since its inception in Algeria.’ (cited in Kohmann, 2007:13). The semblance that 
the GSPC is a mere replica of the GIA can be easily assumed were it not for the tactics 
espoused by its leader.  
 
From its inception, the GSPC had clarified its twofold aim of 1) continuing the war against 
the government and 2) to extend the GSPC’s operation beyond the Algerian border. As such, 
the GSPC was contending to undertake jihad on both a local and international level –
reminiscence of Al Qaeda’s tactic. To further delineate itself from the GIA, the GSPC 
emphatically emphasised that the jihad would be undertaken against security forces only and 
not civilians (Filiu, 2009: 220). The GSPC attracted new dissidents from the GIA, the FIS 
and members of other jihadist groups who were not willing to accept the government’s truce 
of laying down their arms. As a result, the GSPC rapidly expanded into one of the most 
active jihadist group operating within Algeria and in Northern Africa. 
 
5.8.1 The leadership of the GSPC: Hassan Hattab 
As the first leader of the GSPC, Hassan Hattab’s primary role was to rebuild the image of the 
Salafi-Jihadist movement in Algeria as it had been stained by the previous exploits of the 
GIA.  To this end, Hattab tried to foster ties with other militant movements in Algeria and 
eventually took control of these groups. He also followed a Salafist ideology focusing attacks 
on military personnel only, though at times this would include executing civilians who were 
either informants or spies. Unlike the GIA, the GPSC would refrain from attacking innocent 
civilians or kidnapping women in order to turn them into sex slaves. Hattab was serious in his 
vision of reviving the local jihad against the government and set out to persuade those with 
the same foresight as him to join in with the GSPC. One of those targets was Mokthar 
Belmokthar, a former Afghan and GIA veteran, who brought to the GSPC his expertise in 
smuggling weapons and cigarettes between Algeria and the Sahel. Belmokthar would later 




On the international arena, Hattab restored contacts with former GIA sympathisers who had 
returned to the Salafist movement in Europe and favoured the tactics and vision of the GSPC 
(Migaux, 2007: 312). One of the most notable attacks that occurred during time of Hattab’s 
leadership was the kidnapping of 32 European tourists in February and March of 2003. Some 
scholars would indicate that the GSPC’s commander, Amari Saifi, as a way to challenge 
Hattab, conducted the kidnappings (Filiu, 2009: 220). By that time, there was growing 
discontent towards the leader of the GSPC as his members perceived him as too moderate 
and therefore ineffectual in continuing the mission of the GSPC. As Kohlmann (2007:13) 
points out, during Hattab’s tenure as leader the ‘GSPC made no major achievements of 
note…nor did it launch the dramatic, inspiring military operations of previous eras’. In 
September 2003, after a meeting by the GSPC leadership, Hassan Hattab was disposed as 
leader and replaced by the more radical Nabil Sahrawi (also known as Abu Ibrahim Mustafa).  
 
5.8.2 GSPC under Sahrawi 
The election of Sahrawi who had close links with former Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden 
as he had trained in the Afghan camps prior to joining the GIA was an indication that the 
leadership wanted the GSPC to adopt a more global outlook. The new leader was resolute in 
attacking the apostates comprising of the Algerian government at home and the US and allies 
abroad. Before Sahrawi could actualise his new vision, he was killed by security forces in 
June 2004. After his death, another former GIA member, Abdelmalek Droukdel (who chose 
the moniker Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud) was chosen as the new emir of the GSPC and 
carried on with Sahrawi’s plan. Within the GSPC, there was a struggle between focusing on 
the local jihad that consisted of overthrowing the FLN government and the global jihad that 
meant defeating the Far Enemy (Harmon, 2010: 15).  
 
5.8.3 GSPC under Droukdel: The beginning of an Al Qaeda Alliance  
The success of president Bouteflika’s amnesty program for former jihadist fighters dealt a 
major blow to the recruiting capacity of the GSPC and further intensified the debate within 
the GSPC of local versus international jihad. The Iraq war initiated by the US and allies in 
2003 provided the answer to that struggle. The US-led invasion provided the impetus for 
young recruits to join the GSPC in order to be trained and sent into battle in Iraq. The war in 
Iraq and the ensuing insurgency popularised the notion of jihad and soon the GSPC was 
inundated with volunteers from around North Africa that included fighters from Libya, 
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Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia who were willing to help their brothers in Iraq. Similarly to 
the Afghan jihad against the Soviets the war in Iraq ‘became a magnet for thousands of 
activists in the Arab world and beyond’ (Filiu, 2009:221). 
 
Realising that this was the opportunity for the GSPC to establish itself on the global arena, 
Droukdal pursued closer relations with Al Qaeda by initiating conversation with Al Zarqawi, 
the leader of Al Qaeda Iraq (Le Sueur, 2010: 155). Soon the contribution of Algerian jihadists 
of in Iraq became eminent as Saudi Arabia’s intelligence would later indicate that 20 per cent 
of fighters in Al Qaeda Iraq were Algerians (Filiu, 2009: 222; Kohlmann, 2007: 17). The 
public endorsement of the kidnapping and execution of two Algerian diplomats in Bagdad by 
Al Qaeda Iraq in July 2005 had a positive impact on the rapprochement between the Al 
Qaeda affiliate and its North African counterpart. Despite its focus on international jihad, the 
GSPC had not lost sight of its local objective. In 2005, the group launched an attack on a 
military outpost in Mauritania killing 15 military personnel (Harmon, 2010: 16). Assuming 
Al Qaeda’s tactics of attacking foreign targets, the GSPC bombed a bus carrying foreign 
employees of a US owned firm in 2006, killing the driver and injuring 6 employees (Filiu, 
2009:223). Gradually, the GSPC adopted Al Qaeda’s modus operandi in its denunciation of 
the amnesty offered by Bouteflika’s government while targeting the Far Enemy such as 
France and the US and its ability to successfully execute manoeuvres outside the Algerian 
borders in Mauritania and Mali for instance. 
  
A partnership between the GSPC and Al Qaeda grew increasing closer as both sides realised 
its importance and mutual benefit. GSPC saw this partnership as producing global exposure 
and legitimacy in the eyes of the worldwide Salafi-Jihadist movement. For Al Qaeda, it had a 
practical basis as it sought to access the widespread network of GSPC cells in Europe (Le 
Sueur, 2010:155). Hence, on the 11th of September 2006, Al Qaeda celebrated the fifth 
anniversary of its attacks on American soil with the announcement of the integration of 
GSPC into Al Qaeda. Four months after its official merger with Al Qaeda, the GSPC 
officially announced that it would from that time onwards be known as Qaedat al-Jihad fi 
Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This is a brief 
history of how AQIM came about in North Africa.                   
93 
 
5.9 Chapter Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to situate the emergence of terrorism in Algeria from a historical 
perspective. Comprehending the emergence of this phenomenon requires an understanding of 
the factors that contributed towards the incubation of terrorism such as Algeria’s colonial 
legacy and its socio-economic development from post-independence to pre-civil war period. 
To this end, the chapter analysed the Algerian war of independence and the political regimes 
that followed until the 1992 military coup. Then the chapter changed course as it focused on 
the emergence of religious terrorism within the Algerian environment. It achieved this goal 
by examining the formation, leadership and tactics of the two antecedents to AQIM, namely, 
the GIA and the GSPC. Albeit subtly, the chapter attempted to analyse the root causes of the 
Algerian conflict through the greed and grievance thesis as elaborated in chapter three and 
discovered that conflicts arise due to both economic and political grievance. 
 
In the next chapter, the emergence of AQIM in Algeria and its expansion into North Africa 
will be examined. As such, the ideology, tactics and transformation of the group will be 
assessed through the crime-terror paradigm. The discussion initiated in previous chapters is 
distilled and is applied to the next chapter as it evaluates the central tenet of this study, which 



























From the Islamic State of Algeria to the Economic Caliphate of 
the Sahel 
6.0 Introduction 
Having established the historical antecedents of the situation that incubated the birth of 
terrorism in Algeria, this chapter investigates the transformation of the most infamous and 
sophisticated terror group that emerged in the aftermath of the civil war. The emergence of 
AQIM marked the beginning of transnational terrorism in both Algeria and the rest of Africa. 
This chapter, in an attempt to attain the objective of this study, seeks to ascertain an 
understanding of the phenomenon of AQIM. To this end, the chapter attempts to answer the 
question as to whether AQIM is a religious terrorist group that resorts to criminal activities 
for funding or if it has transformed into an organised crime group focused solely on economic 
gains and recourses to terror tactics to achieve this goal. As such, the origin and 
organisational structure of the group is examined. Furthermore, there is a brief assessment of 
the terrorist acts coupled with the profit-generated activities (such as kidnapping for ransom 
(KFR) and drug trafficking) conducted by the group. By the end of this chapter, it is hoped 
that the reader will have a more comprehensive understanding of the type of entity known as 
AQIM.   
6.1 North Africa: Al Qaeda’s Treasured Playground 
Africa had long been the playground of Al Qaeda and its terrorist activities, even before its 
merger with the GSPC. In addition to the continent being the recipient of numerous attacks 
by the group, it had been the host of the group’s former leader, Osama Bin Laden, for many 
years. Before his escape to Afghanistan in 1996 in the aftermath of discovering a plot to have 
him arrested, Bin Laden spent many years in Sudan training future jihadists and planning 
attacks on US interests. It would take another two years, however, before Al Qaeda carried 
out its first major attack on African soil. On the 8th of August 1998, two Al Qaeda operatives 
drove a truck loaded with explosives into the US embassy in the Kenyan capital city of 
Nairobi. The ensuing blast ‘demolished a multi-story secretarial college, severely damaged 
the U.S. embassy, and the co-operative bank building’ resulting in 4500 people injured and 
213 fatalities (Gunaratna, 2002: 160-161). Concomitantly in Dar es Salaam, an Al Qaeda 
member performed another suicide mission by also detonating a truck outside the US 




Prior to the 9/11 events, these two attacks would symbolise the serious threat and devastation 
that Al Qaeda posed to the African continent and the rest of the world. Despite its contacts 
with various jihadist group in North Africa, it was not until 2002 that Al Qaeda would make 
its presence felt in the region. On the 11th of April 2002, precisely seven months after 9/11, 
Tunisian Al Qaeda member Nizar Naouar conducted a truck bomb attack against the Al 
Ghriba synagogue on the Tunisian island of Jerba. Al Qaeda’s first attack on North African 
soil claimed the lives of 21 tourists amongst whom 14 were German nationals (Guardian, 
2002). It can be argued that the Tunisian attack was the inception of Al Qaeda terrorism in 
Northern Africa which would find its culmination in the merger between itself and the GSPC.  
6.2 The Nascence of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
In commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the 11th of September 2006, 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri announced the official merger of the GSPC and Al Qaeda. Three days 
later, in an acknowledgement of the message of Zawahiri, the GSPC released its own 
communiqué affirming its allegiance to Al Qaeda and specifically to Sheikh Bin Laden,  
we are glad to inform our Islamic nation and our Muslim brothers around the 
world about the great news which the mujahedeen have been waiting for… the 
news of the merging of the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat in Algeria 
with Al-Qaeda…We have decided to swear bayat to Shaykh Usama Bin Laden 
and to continue our jihad in Algeria as soldiers under his command, for him to 
use us in the cause of Allah when and where he sees fit…(quoted in 
Kohlmann, 2007: 21).  
 
In the subsequent months after this official amalgamation of the GSPC into Al Qaeda, the 
Algerian jihadists group continued to use its previous name on all its official documents and 
bulletins. After four months of careful consideration and consultations with Bin Laden, the 
GSPC finally changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The hiatus between the 
pledge of allegiance to the actual name change had led scholars to examine the relationship 
between AQIM and Al Qaeda more closely.  
 
In terms of ideology, both terrorist groups subscribe to Salafi-jihadism that possesses an anti-
Western perspective with the aim of establishing an Islamic caliphate ruled by a caliph under 
shari’a. Additionally, both groups have little tolerance for other forms of Islam and view 
violence as a justification or a duty in their quest to attain their goals. In 2014, Abdelmalek 
Droukdel reiterated AQIM’s objectives by renewing the group’s loyalty to Zawahiri when he 
pledged, ‘an allegiance to jihad to liberate Muslim lands and affirm Islamic shari’a law in it 
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and bring back the Caliphate that is based on prophetic principles’ (TRAC, 2014:1). 
However, the fact that both groups espouse a similar ideology is not equivocal to them having 
the same identity or even a close cooperative relationship (Liepman & Chivvis, 2013: 4).  
 
Ab initio, AQIM displayed Al Qaeda’s modus operandi such as ‘high-profile coordinated 
attacks against symbolic targets, active use of the media and internet and investment in 
lengthy preparations and timing’ (Mohamedou, 2011:3). Yet, AQIM had difficulties mutating 
from its GPSC identity into the Al Qaeda one due to its social and political environment. One 
of those problems was the fact that both organisations had a different ‘far enemy’. For Al 
Qaeda it was the US while for AQIM the primary enemy was France. Liepman and Chivvis 
(2013: 4) interestingly highlight that it was not coincidental that Droukdal sought closer 
relations to Al Qaeda during the period when the latter’s propaganda was directed against 
France. Another issue that spotlights the failure of AQIM to totally adopt Al Qaeda’s identity 
relates to the composition of AQIM. In an interview with the New York Times in 2008, 
Droukdal admitted that the majority of members of this organisation were Islamists of 
Algerian nationality (Mekhennet et al., 2008: A1). These issues have led scholars to conclude 
that the GSPC’s name change was merely a marketing strategy that the group utilised to gain 
more exposure in order to enlarge their pools of recruits.  
 
After analysing AQIM media and internet propaganda messages, Sorriano (2011: 294) 
concludes that the GSPC exploited its merger with Al Qaeda to improve its image and elevate 
its profile since ‘its leaders did not intend the merger to mark a drastic change in the group’s 
existing strategies or objectives’. Harmon (2010: 16) echoes this statement when he notes that 
for the GSPC, the merger had more to do with survival than advancing local or global jihad. 
He further argues that,  
besides the differences in name and rhetoric and the introduction of new 
tactics, including suicide bombings, the major changes in the Group’s posture 
included its expansion into the Sahara-Sahel region and its drift into 
contraband and trafficking (Harmon, 2010: 5). 
 
Regardless of the reasons behind the change of name, it appeared that the renaming had 
reinvigorated AQIM to attain its objective with earnest. The adoption of a new name 
propelled the group from a mere insurgency to a more flexible network organisation capable 
of imposing significant damage (Cristiani, 2013: 79). To examine the impact of the evolution 
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of AQIM within its political and social context, this dissertation now turns to analyse its 
operational structure.   
6.2.1 AQIM: Operational Structures 
The argument of scholars who purport that the merger had little impact on the restructuring of 
the previous operating method of the GSPC is supported when one examines the structures 
within which AQIM operates. Simply stated, AQIM had retained the previous structures and 
operations that its predecessor had put in place albeit with minor adjustments. Prior to its 
union with Al Qaeda, the GSPC divided its arena of operations, which included Algeria and 
certain parts of the Sahel, into nine geographical zones with an emir as the leader. In the 
aftermath of its emergence, AQIM set out to restructure these nine zones into four main 
ktibas11 or branches divided into north, south, east and west.  
 
The north/central section, formerly zones 1, 2 and 3 of the GSPC covers the capital Algiers 
and its suburbs, Kabyle and the east coast of Algeria. According to the ECOWAS Peace and 
Security Report (2013:2), this kitaba was the most active of the four (as at 2013) as it 
comprised of the largest number of fighters ranging between 500 -800 men who planned their 
operations from the Aures mountain region. Conversely, the least active is the west katiba, 
previously GSPC’s zone 4 and 8, consisting of the western part of Algeria that extends to 
Morocco and the south-western part of Algeria. Zones 5, 6 and 7 on the Eastern part of 
Algeria have been restructured into the East section that extends from the south of Tunisia, 
eastern part of Algeria to the north of Niger. This katiba also known as Katibat Tariq ibn 
Zayyad was established by Amira Saifi in 2003 but later came under the leadership of Yahia 
Abou Ammar Abid Hammadu (alias Abdel Hamid Abou Zeid) (Ecowas PSR, 2013: 2). This 
branch of AQIM under the guidance of Abou Zeid has evolved into one of the most ‘terrorist’ 
branches. In addition to the killing of two foreign hostages in 2009 and 2010 respectively, the 
commander of the Katibat Tariq ibn Zayyad was also reported to assist and train Boko Haram 
militants in Niger (Tanchum, 2012: 2).  
 
The southern branch also known as Katibat al-mulaththamin whose emir is Khaled Abdul 
Abbas more commonly known to as Mokthar Belmokhtar, comprises of former zone 9 that 
                                                 
11 The term katiba originates from the tradition of Islamic military where the army was divided into katibas 
(representing a battalion of approximately 300 soldiers), sariyya (squadron of less than 100 soldiers); fassila (a 
platoon) and jema’a (a group). Notwithstanding the GSPC and later AQIM, this structure was also adopted by 




encompasses south-western Algeria, northern Mali and Mauritania (Ecowas PSR, 2013: 2). 
Contrasting the katiba of Abou Zeid whose primary operation is terrorist activities, this 
branch focuses on criminal activities such as smuggling of weapons, contraband and stolen 
vehicles (Botha, 2008: 49). This is due to the fact that its leader Belmokhtar is more 
influenced by monetary gain rather than purely terrorist activities. However, it is important to 
recall that Belmokhtar and his militants had been involved in terrorist attacks both during his 
time in the GSPC and in AQIM (Echeverria, 2012: 169). In recent times, due to the military 
pressure on AQIM militants in the central region, the southern katiba had superseded it to 
become the most active of the AQIM branches. Belmokhtar gradually became a pivotal 
player within AQIM as he formed important networks with different Arab and Tuaregs tribes 
in the Sahara region, particularly in Northern Mali (Bencherif, 2013:109).  
 
While the decentralisation model of AQIM (where the leader of each region had his own 
autonomy) contributed positively towards it becoming the most active and feared jihadist 
group in the Sahel region, it also had some disadvantages of instigating a clash between the 
emir of the group and its commanders. One of the instances occurred when AQIM’s emir 
Droukdal feared that Belmokhtar was growing too influential and had him replaced with the 
former head of the information committee Yahia Djouadi (Botha, 2008: 77). Anticipating that 
his life might be at risk, Belmokhtar retreated into Mali where he continued his exploits and 
established alliances. He eventually formed his own jihadi group in 2012 called the Masked 
Brigade which would later change its name into Al Mourabitoun. The ongoing rivalries 
within AQIM combined with external threats from the Algerian and international security 
forces have left AQIM with reduced capacities and propelled the group to adapt to its social 
environment while at the same time remaining faithful to its objectives. The next section of 
this dissertation investigates AQIM in terms of the attacks it conducted from the time it 
emerged on the Algerian scene until the present time. The aim is to enable the reader to 
evaluate the transformation of the jihadist organisation. 
6.3 AQIM and Its Reign of Terror 
 In the immediate aftermath of its merger, AQIM began its terror campaign in 2007 with 
more ardour than its predecessor with seven synchronised bombings aimed at various police 
stations in Algeria, killing 8 persons and injuring over 10. Yet, the first major attack of 
AQIM and the worst ever in over a decade in Algeria occurred on the 11th of April 2007 
when AQIM correlated a carefully planned double suicide attacks in Algiers to commemorate 
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the fifth anniversary of the Ghriba Synagogue bombing that symbolised Al Qaeda’s first 
attack on North African soil. The first blast targeted the office of the prime minister killing 
over 12 and wounding 118 while the other attack on the police station resulted in 11 fatalities 
and over 40 injuries (Le Sueur, 2010: 164). This was the first incident where AQIM 
introduced suicide bombing as a strategy to destabilise the enemies and thus departing from 
the traditional modus operandi of the GSPC or even the GIA. Suicide attacks featured as 
AQIM’s signature from this point onwards and on September 6, there was an assassination 
attempt on the Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika when he was visiting the city of 
Batna. Although the president was unhurt, the explosion resulted in the death of 16 people. 
On 8 December, another suicide attack on the naval barracks in coastal city of Dellys killed 
30 people (Botha, 2008: 58). Thus far, by targeting government offices and military officials 
within Algeria, AQIM had confined itself to a local jihad. However, the next assault would 
characterise the seriousness of AQIM as a source of both local and global terror. 
 
Over a year after its formation, on the 11th of December 2007, AQIM launched a cautiously 
planned double suicide mission in the capital city Algiers targeting the United Nations 
building and the Algerian Constitutional Court Building. Following the tactics of Al Qaeda, 
the two suicide bombers drove two separate trucks laden with about 800kg of explosives into 
the buildings. The first suicide bomber identified as 64-year old Rabbah Bechla drove one 
truck into the United Nations while 32-year old Larbi Charef conducted the second suicide 
attack. The resulting explosion killed over 38 people (17 UN workers) and wounding over 
170 others. AQIM instantly claimed responsibility for the attack on its website by stating that 
the assault was ‘another successful conquest...carried out by the Knights of the Faith with 
their blood in defence of the wounded nation of Islam’ (Botha, 2008: 58).  
 
In the eyes of AQIM, the choice of these two targets had symbolic values as the 
constitutional court was overlooking elections for the apostate government of Algeria and the 
UN exemplified the international enemy of Islam. This assault was the second time a UN 
building was attacked by Al Qaeda affiliates. The first one was the bombing of the UN 
offices in the Cana Hotel in Baghdad in 2003 in which Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) members 
characterised the UN as a tool that the West utilises to dominate Muslims and as such, the 
UN became an open target for jihadist groups (Le Seuer, 2010: 166). As Botha (2008: 63) 
posits ‘the attack on 11 December 2007 signalled AQLIM’s intentions not to limit their 
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diplomatic representatives’. With this, AQIM reinstated the original approach of the GIA of 
targeting foreign nationalities. 
 
Despite the escalation in suicide attacks the following year, the casualties were not equivalent 
to those of the previous year when AQIM was at its zenith within the Algerian context. In 
August 2008, there were over 125 people killed where the most vicious attack happened 
when a truck packed with explosives drove into a police academy resulting in 43 fatalities 
(Le Seuer, 2010: 167).  Nevertheless, AQIM could not match its deadly spate of violence that 
it initiated the previous year, resulting in a drop in the number of fatalities. In 2009, the most 
notable assaults were the execution of British hostage Edwin Dyer and the bombing of a 
convoy of Chinese engineers protected by Algerian forces that killed 24 individuals. In June 
2010, AQIM claimed responsibility for the death of 11 Algerian soldiers while also 
detonating a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at another police checkpoint 
resulting in 10 fatalities (7 police officers and 3 civilians).  
 
In March of the same year, the group launched its first suicide bombing attack in Niger and in 
August, Mauritania was the recipient of its first suicide attack by AQIM. Overall in 2010, 
fatalities caused by the attacks of AQIM amounted to over 80 people and the areas affected 
included Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (Global Security, 2015). The following year 
witnessed a greater focus on kidnapping for ransom than on violent attacks. The most 
infamous attack was the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) by an AQIM 
trained member targeting the French embassy in Mali. Henceforth, violent assaults by AQIM 
declined while the group began focusing on kidnapping for ransom (Australia National 
Security, 2015).    
Figure 2: AQIM Terror Attacks from 2008 -2014 




Filiu (2009: 6) attributes this downward spiral of violence to two factors. Primarily, the 
effective military strategies in dealing with AQIM militants have proven successful in dealing 
with the terror threat. Secondly, the fact that Al Qaeda in Iraq was fighting Sunni nationalist 
insurgencies provided a negative image for the Al Qaeda affiliates around the globe, 
especially AQIM. Additionally, the increase in suicide bombings as a method of jihad and its 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians also dealt a blow to the recruiting image of AQIM. 
Realising the latter mistake, AQIM, in its propaganda and media website, attempted to 
downplay the number of local casualties of its attacks and instead emphasised the number of 
foreigners killed. Some scholars have also associated the Arab springs, especially the Libyan 
uprising as contributing towards the decline in the ranks of AQIM as its members went to 
assist its allies in the overthrow of Qaddafi and his government in 2011.  
 
6.3.1 AQIM under Pressure: From Algeria to Mali 
From 2008 onwards, AQIM was under increasing pressure from successful military 
campaigns by Algerian security forces. This led to a decrease in both number and propensity 
of attacks by the group. It eventually sought refuge in neighbouring Northern Mali where it 
received much needed respite. Not only did Northern Mali shelter AQIM militants from the 
Algerian security forces, it also provided the group with a safe haven to conduct its various 
activities and plan new attacks. Furthermore, the region would become the epicentre of 
AQIM’s theatre of operations for the next few years and according to some scholars 
(Harmon, 2010; Pham, 2011), this contributed towards its transformation from being less 
politically motivated to more economically driven. Contributing factors towards this change 
include a lack of governance and the formation of alliances with local population through 
marriage bonds and forging ties with networks of drug traffickers (Ecowas PSR, 2013: 2). In 
relation to its modus operandi, AQIM changed its focus from explosive attacks aimed at 
causing voluminous casualties to kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking.  It is important 
to note that although kidnapping for ransom had been part of AQIM’s tactics for funding 
since its inception (and during its time as the GSPC), the ratio of kidnapping for ransom to 
terror attacks had almost doubled since 2008/9 period.  
 
However, the 2012 Northern Malian insurgency provided the perfect opportunity for AQIM 
to restore its image as a terror group focused on political objectives of establishing an Islamic 
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state in its area of operation. State failure due to a lack of governance structures in Northern 
Mali compounded with the rebellion of the Tuaregs against the Malian government in the 
north of the country due to accumulated grievances, provided AQIM with a perfect 
opportunity to accomplish the objective for which it was created, that is, extend the Islamic 
caliphate beyond Algeria. Joining forces with the local battalions and Ansar Al Dine, AQIM 
and its followers began controlling sizeable areas while implementing shari’a  and at the 
same time opening training camps. The establishment of a UN mission in Mali had the 
adverse effect of propelling more recruits to join the jihadi factions. Adapting to the new 
environment, AQIM began establishing its own economic system within the area it controlled 
through  
employment- and income-generating activities, including the recruitment of 
combatants and auxiliaries (guides, drivers, informers, paramedical staff); the 
supply of foodstuffs (cereals, sugar, tea, etc.), fuel, tyres, spare parts and 
weapons; and subcontracting hostage taking and hostage keeping (ECOWAS 
PSR, 2013: 3). 
 
Gradually, AQIM and its allies started gaining the trust of the people with increasing 
popularity gained at the expense of the dwindling legitimacy of the government and local 
traditional leaders. Moving away from its exclusively Algerian composition, AQIM began 
recruiting members from all parts of Africa such as Morocco, Tunisia, Mali, Mauritiania and 
Niger amongst others and some even arrived from countries as far as Pakistan and 
Afghanistan in order to wage jihad. Realising that its security forces were not equipped to 
face the insurgents who were advancing upon the capital city of Bamako, the Malian 
government made a desperate appeal to the international community for help as it perceived 
that defeat would have been eminent.  
 
The French government responded to the plea by the government of their former colony by 
preparing for a military intervention in Mali. In January 2013, the French military launched 
operation Serval against the advancing jihadist groups. Supported by the US, the British and 
its allies, the French intervened with airstrikes and ground assaults occasioning the death of 
over 300 jihadists fighters (Chivvis & Liepman, 2013:9). A few weeks later, the foreign 
forces wrestled back the areas occupied by the jihadists such as Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal from 
AQIM and its fighters. In the process, the jihadists dispersed and sought refuge in 
neighbouring countries in the Sahel. While operation Serval could be deemed successful in 
terms of military prospects, it would be obviously ambitious to assume that the operation had 
totally defeated AQIM.  Actually, it is more accurate to state that the French intervention 
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incapacitated the political and social functions of AQIM organisation and consequently led to 
AQIM gravitating more towards becoming an economically motivated entity. Nonetheless, 
2014 and 2015 have witnessed an increase in attacks albeit from AQIM affiliates in Mali as 
attested in the figure below.  
 
Figure 3: AQIM and Affiliate attacks in Mali for period 2014 -2015 
   Source: Adapted from militaryedge.org (2015) 
6.4 AQIM’s Economy of Terrorism 
As previously mentioned above, in the wake of operation Serval, AQIM reduced its terrorist 
attacks and turned its attention to engaging in criminal activities for financial gain. There is 
little doubt that terrorist groups require funds in order to run their operations. Since the 
international community considers terrorist groups illegitimate, the only avenue for these 
groups to raise funds for their survival is through involvement in illegal activities. It is no 
different for AQIM which derives its funds from illegal activities consisting of kidnapping 
for ransom (which is its highest source of income), drug trafficking and illegal smuggling of 
illegal contrabands (Shelley, 2014: 4). To understand the relationship between criminal 
activities and terrorism within AQIM with the view for counter-terrorism measures, it is 
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6.4.1 Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) 
In recent times, kidnapping for ransom has become the primary source of income for AQIM. 
Unlike the GSPC, whose kidnapping of 32 tourists was more of a terrorist act, kidnapping for 
ransom by AQIM tilts more towards a criminal activity for profit nowadays. A study 
conducted by Lacher (2012: 9) concluded that the estimated amount of ransom fees between 
the period 2008 and 2012 were in the region of between $40 and $65 million with the price 
per hostage ranging between $1.5 and $4 million. The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report 
(2013:4), however, puts the annual AQIM earnings through KFR at approximately $163 
million. In terms of conducting negotiations in the wake of a kidnapping, AQIM follows a 
usual pattern that comprises of providing proof of detention followed by a ransom paid by 
those who seek the release of the hostages. The release is often ‘partly open’ in that hostages 
are released and ‘partly closed’ where ransom money is paid in secret by the actors 
(ECOWAS PSR, 2013: 3). Jihadist groups such as AQIM justify KFR as weapon of war 
against the infidels and the apostates and any hostage is treated as a prisoner of war 
(Echeverria, 2012: 176). It is for this reason that the jihadists have no qualms in executing 
their hostages should their demands not be met by government. Two such cases that received 
worldwide media attention was the killing of British hostage Edwin Dyer in 2009 and 
Frenchman Michel Germaneau in 2010. Nonetheless, the profit that AQIM obtained from the 
KFR from 2008 has continued to increase as noted in the figure below     
 
Figure 4: AQIM Annual Income from Kidnapping for Ransom 
Source: Adapted from Brisard (2013) 
 
Since the KFR activities have proven to be a lucrative source of income for AQIM, it is not 
surprising to notice a continuous increase in hostage kidnapping by the group. To this extent, 
as Daniel Benjamin (2011) notices, ‘no group has made a bigger name for itself in the 
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kidnapping-for-ransom business than Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)’. The table 
below illustrates this increase and impact of KFR activities of AQIM.  
 
Table 3: The Timeline of AQIM Kidnapping for Ransom Activities 




February 2003 First foreign hostages taken 
hostage by the GSPC 
comprise of 32 Europeans 





22 February 2008 2 Austrian tourists are 
kidnapped in Tunisia then 
moved to Mali 
Hostages were later 
released  
14 December 2008 Canadian Robert Fowler, UN 
envoy to Niger kidnapped 
alongside his driver  




22 January 2009 Four European tourists (2 
Swiss, 1 German and 1 
British) were kidnapped  
British hostage Edwin 
Dyer executed while other 
3 were released 
9 November 2009 
 
3 Spanish relief workers 
(Alicia Gamez, Roque 
Pascual and Albert Vilalta) 
were kidnapped  
All 3 were later released 
26 November 2009 French National Pierre  
Camatte kidnapped in Ménaka 
in Mali 
Later released 
18 December 2009 
 
two Italians (Sergio Cicala 
and his wife Philomène 
Kaboré) were kidnapped in 
Mauritania then transferred to 
Mali 





19 April 2010 
 
Michel Germaneau, a 78-
year-old French national, and 
his driver were kidnapped in 
the north of Niger. 
Hostage was executed 
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16 September 2010 
 
5 French nationals, 1Togolese 
and 1 Madagascan kidnapped 





7 January 2011  
 
2 French nationals were 
kidnapped by AQIM militants 
in Niger. 
They were killed on 8 
January during a rescue 
attempt. 
24 November 2011 
 
2 French nationals were  
kidnapped from their hotel in 
Mali. 
1 hostage was killed. The 
other, Serge Lazarevic 
(the last French hostage in 
Africa) was later released 
in 2014 
25 November 2011 
 
AQIM militants kidnapped 1 
Swedish national, 1 Dutch 
national and 1 dual British-
South African national from 
Timbuktu, Mali. 
1 German national was 
killed during the 
kidnapping. The Dutch 
national was released. 





26 January 2012 
 
AQIM claimed responsibility 
for kidnapping a German 
national in Kano, Nigeria. 
The hostage was later 
executed 
15 April 2012 a Swiss woman was 
kidnapped in Mali 





As at 23 June 2015 AQIM purports to have last 
two hostages in Mali  
 
 Source: ECOWAS PSR (2013: 3-4); ANS (2015); Weiss (2015). 
 
6.4.2 Drug Trafficking and contraband smuggling 
Although AQIM’s involvement in drug trafficking and contraband smuggling can be traced 
back to the era of the GSPC, the group has since grown more adept to this form of illegal 
activities as it featured as one of its specialities. This success of AQIM within the drugs and 
illegal smuggling arena can be attributed to its former commander of the southern region, 
Mokthar Belmokthar ‘who epitomizes the intersection of crime, corruption, and terror in the 
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vast territory from North Africa to the Sahel’ (Shelley, 2014:235). The increasing 
involvement of AQIM in the drug trafficking field have led to the group forging alliances 
with local terrorist groups such as the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO) and international drug cartels resulting in an increased flow of drugs within the 
Sahel region.  
 
As Lacher (2012: 6) points out, there has been a gradual expansion in the drug flow from 
South America to West Africa. From there, the drugs find their way to Europe through 
different smuggling routes of the Sahel. Upon their arrival on the Western shores of Africa in 
countries like Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Benin and Ghana, the drugs are transported through 
inland routes through Northern Mali to Algeria, Morocco and Libya where they are then 
transported either by plane or by boat to their ultimate destinations. One evidence purporting 
to drug trafficking in the Sahel is the case of the ‘Air Cocaine’, a Boeing 727 that was 
discovered in the town of Tarkint in Mali after it was shot down before take-off. During the 
investigation, it was discovered that the plane carried between 7-10 tons of cocaine from the 
airport in Venezuela and its final destination was Morocco (Lacher, 2012:7).  
 
Figure 5: Cocaine Transit areas in West Africa 
    Source: UNODC (2013:9) 
 
Morocco has emerged as one of the most vulnerable countries for drug smuggling and 
trafficking due to its geographical proximity to Europe. In October 2010, Moroccan 
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authorities disrupted a major drug trafficking syndicate consisting of links between drug 
cartels in Latin America and AQIM. A month later, Malian official arrested six prevalent 
drug traffickers who had links with AQIM (UNODC, 2011: 37). Due to the scarcity of 
research data in drug trafficking, it becomes difficult to assess the full extent to which AQIM 
benefits from the drug trade. Despite this impasse, through the distilling of the information 
that is available, it is possible to assess the impact of drug trafficking within the Sahel region. 
Pham (2011:21) spotlights this problem when he notes that it is difficult to ascertain the 
direct role that AQIM has within the drug trafficking flow. However, he argues that in 
addition to AQIM offering protection to drug smugglers, drug cartels and contraband dealers, 
there is little doubt that the group stands to benefit financially from these illicit trade 
networks in the Sahel. Consequently, as terrorist groups become more fixated on the financial 
benefits of the drug trade, they slowly renegade from their original raison d’être to share 
similarities with drug cartels. Derek Maltz (cited in Hernandez, 2013:39) underscores this 
when he affirms that  
drugs and terrorism coexist across the globe in a marriage of mutual 
convenience. As state-sponsored terrorism has declined, these dangerous 
organizations have looked far and wide for resources and revenue to recruit, to 
corrupt, to train, and to strengthen their regime. Many drug-trafficking groups 
have stepped up to fill that revenue void. 
 
Another form of illegal activities through which AQIM financially benefited is cigarette and 
arms smuggling. In addition to providing protection to drug and illicit contraband traffickers, 
the group also exacts a levy from the smugglers who operate within AQIM’s region 
(ECOWAS PSR, 2013: 3). In the domain of cigarettes smuggling, Belmokhtar has proven to 
be the talisman as he earned the moniker ‘Malboro Man’ due to his financial successes in 
such operations in the Sahel (Guardian, 2013). Shelley (2014:235) extends Belmokhtar’s 
involvement to ‘arms and people smuggling in a web of criminal partnerships’. The money 
obtained through narcotics and other forms of smuggling contributes towards buying 
weapons for the group. One of the reasons that terrorist engage in counterfeit trade is because 
it has a low risk profile. Furthermore, terrorists engage in counterfeit operations in two ways, 
namely, directly or indirectly.  
 
AQIM falls within the first category as it is directly involved in illicit activities rather than 
operating through third parties. Direct involvement means that the group is personally 
engaged in the production, distribution and sale of the illicit goods and the funds obtained are 
redirected towards financing the operation of the group. According to Ronald Noble (quoted 
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in Shelley, 2014: 268), ‘terrorist organizations with direct involvement include groups who 
resemble or behave more like organized criminal groups than traditional terrorist 
organizations’. From the above paragraphs, it appears that AQIM has gradually departed 
from its terror activities to focusing on illicit transaction and kidnapping for ransom. While it 
can be argued that AQIM engagement in these illegal trades is to obtain funds for its 
operations, at the same time, it is also evident that AQIM has, in recent years, predominantly 
focused on kidnapping for ransom and drug trade as its sole activities. This begs the question 
as to whether AQIM is merely a hybrid group that is involved in crime, trafficking, and 
insurgency or if it is still focused on the jihad or the illegal trafficking /kidnapping for ransom 
side (Harmon, 2010: 20). 
6.5 AQIM: Criminal Terrorists or Terrorist Criminals? 
Since its emergence as an Al Qaeda affiliate from the GSPC in 2008, AQIM has not only 
spread its reach in the Sahel but also obtained millions of dollars from its operations in that 
region. In this regard, AQIM can be perceived as a group that is focused more on generating 
profit rather than launching jihad and establishing an Islamic state as was it original 
objective. Meanwhile, this perception is challenged by the 2012 events in Mali which 
demonstrated that AQIM is not solely focused on criminal activities as means of profit but 
can also resort to military action when the opportunity presents itself. The fact that AQIM 
controlled the large territory of Northern Mali (assisted with other jihadists groups) shows 
that the political motivations of the group are still relevant to the group’s functioning. 
Attempts to assess the type of group AQIM has evolved into have separated scholars into two 
groupings.  
 
The first category views AQIM as primarily a terror group involved in criminal activities to 
fund its campaigns. To this end, AQIM still purports to its primary motive of establishing an 
Islamic state through the use of jihad while the funds serves as a means to finance its 
operations and recruit new jihadists into its ranks. As such, the group still retains its original 
motivation that serves as a propellant to its functioning and evolvement. The second category 
illustrates AQIM transforming into an organized crime group that uses terror tactics solely for 
economic gain. In this view, AQIM is a group that appears to act with ideological and 
religious ideals, but is actually only interested in obtaining ransom money and engaging in 
criminal activities for profit (Liang, 2011: 3). In this regard, the group adheres to its original 
ideology only in as far as it is a political façade to attract recruits.  Although, these two 
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categories provide a basis for which to understand the phenomenon of AQIM, they are 
limited as they embody an either-or paradigm. As a means to rectify this shortcoming, it is 
merited to assess AQIM through the lens of the convergence thesis (previously examined in 
chapter three of this study) as it makes for an easier categorization of the group in its current 
state.  
 
Within the crime-terror continuum, Makerenko (2014:135) introduces the convergence thesis 
where a terrorist group and an organized crime organisation converge into one entity where 
their tactics are indistinguishable from each other. Another aspect of the convergence thesis 
posits that some terror groups adopt criminal tactics as a means to finance their operations. In 
this aspect, the convergence occurs through the blending of the crime-terror nexus within the 
same space and time. Within this context, ‘a hybrid entity emerges and simultaneously 
displays ideological and economic motivations by perpetrating acts of politically motivated 
terrorism and engaging in OC for profit maximisation’ (EU, 2012:17). While this may 
resemble the second category, the difference is that the hybrid group can be defined either as 
terrorist or criminal and thus can be easily overlooked by both anti-crime and anti-terrorism 
agencies.  
 
Pham (2011:29) assiduously posits that ‘AQIM has proven itself to be rather resilient, 
transforming itself to adapt to changing conditions in the Maghreb’. From its beginnings as 
the GIA with a Salafist-Jihadist ideology to its merger with Al Qaeda AQIM has transformed 
into one of the most notable terrorist groups operating in North Africa. While the group 
capitalised on the grievance of the population to enter the governance arena (the case of 
Northern Mali), it has also become an infamous player in the domain of kidnapping for 
ransom and drug trafficking. Because of its successful adaptation to its environment and 
context, the Sahel for instance, it has become difficult to distinctly separate the political and 
economic motivation of AQIM. Therefore from the information gathered and the data 
examined, it can be argued that since AQIM displays ideological (Salafist-Jihadists 
propaganda and statements) and economic (kidnapping for ransom, drug trafficking, arms 
dealing) motivations, it falls under the categorisation of being a hybrid entity.  
 
As such, AQIM is ‘comfortably rooted in both ideology and profit, constantly shifting [its] 
strategies and tactics as [it] evolves’ (Ballina, 2011: 130). The evolution of AQIM into a 
hybrid entity can be attributed to its link with Al Qaeda and the steady expansion of its sphere 
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of attack due to its political economy of the terror and crime nexus (Liang, 2011: 5). The 
French military operations may have thwarted AQIM’s sphere of attacks in that many of its 
fighters have been killed and as such cannot effectively launch devastating attacks against 
foreign targets. It is with this in mind that Pham (2011: 25) alludes to the fact that, 
the AQIM of the future may come to consist of only a few hundred hardcore 
terrorists waging international jihad against the West and its allies, while being 
supported by an affiliated criminal organization of several hundred. 
 
This statement proved prescient, as the period following operation Serval has witnessed an 
increase in terror attacks on UN peacekeepers, foreign targets and even civilians. Moreover, it 
is concerning to note that while these attacks were perpetrated not only by AQIM and but by 
groups affiliated to it. From this, it appears that AQIM is supported by splinter groups in 
conducting terror acts under the banner of ideology such as Ansar Al Dine and the newly 
renamed Al Qaeda in West Africa (formerly Al Mourabitoun). Therefore, it is fitting to 
conclude that Al Qaeda is a terrorist group influenced by both political motivations 
(establishing an Islamic state in the Sahel) and economic motivations (through drug 
trafficking and kidnapping for ransom).  
 
AQIM’s religious and political ideology is further extended in the newly formed Al Qaeda in 
West Africa (formerly Al Mourabitoun) which is a cause for concern. Rather than being 
defeated as many scholars purport, it appears that AQIM has once again reinvented itself, but 
this time it took the form of smaller splinter groups. From the available information, it 
appears that the political motivation of AQIM is carried forward by splinter groups that share 
the same ideology. Yet, this leads to another concerning eventuality: has AQIM’s economic 
motivations also being carried forward through splinter groups /drug trafficking groups which 
remains unaware due to the lack of information available? 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
Through its plethora of criminal activities, AQIM has established itself as one of Al Qaeda’s 
wealthiest affiliates. Despite its economic successes, AQIM has responded to its critics who 
claim that it has transformed into an organised crime organization that is profit motivated by 
launching various attacks on security personnel and civilians alike in the Sahel region. This 
chapter has attempted to clarify this argument about the type of organisation into which 
AQIM belongs by assessing, firstly, its political inspiration through the attacks it conducted 
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both inside and outside of Algeria; and secondly, its economic motivations by examining its 
criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking.   
 
It is important to note that although AQIM failed to achieve the goal of the global jihad for 
which it was formed, it remains one of the most dangerous groups in North Africa. The 
resilience of the group is characterised by its adaptation to the various situations and contexts 
that it encounters. When Algerian security forces managed to expel the group into the Sahel, 
it reinvigorated itself within the confines of Northern Mali which it eventually controlled. 
Meanwhile, it reduced its terror attacks while at the same time increasing its criminal 
activities and generating millions of dollars. After the French military defeated AQIM 
fighters in Northern Mali forcing them to find refuge in the Sahel, the group later resurfaced 
but as different splinter groups adhering to the same ideology. For instance, Al Mourabitoun, 
whose leader is none other than the former AQIM commander Belmokhtar, has been 
responsible for numerous attacks in Mali on both civilians and security forces. The difficulty 
in combatting the terrorism of AQIM is due to it being a hybrid group that exhibits both 
criminal and terrorist characteristics. To this end, the next and final chapter seeks to 



















In Search of Solutions: Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.0 Introduction 
Thus far, the preceding chapters have assessed the phenomenon of AQIM by examining its 
ideology, historical origins and transformation. In response to the hypothesis of this study, the 
previous chapter (Chapter 6) revealed that AQIM is a hybrid entity that displays both terrorist 
and criminal motivations which are determined by the context within which the group finds 
itself. Some of the conditions that allow the group to thrive include poor governance, lack of 
security on the border and grievances of the populace due to poverty, discrimination and 
unemployment. The aim of the present chapter is to conclude the study and proffer 
recommendations that aim towards countering the threat of terrorism in general and AQIM in 
particular and contribute towards its demise.  
 
Yet, before undertaking the task stated above, the study examines the existing measures that 
are in place to combat the threat of terrorism in Africa. As such, resolutions passed by the UN 
and the AU are investigated and assessed with regards to their resourcefulness. Furthermore, 
this chapter also evaluates the two counter-terrorism initiatives that were effectuated in North 
Africa, namely, the US-led initiative known as the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP) and the French military intervention in Mali (Operation Serval). 
Subsequently, the successes and failures of these initiatives are elucidated and 
recommendations on how to improve these failures are proposed. The chapter concludes with 
a summary of the study and the prospects of AQIM on the African continent.  
7.1 Evaluating resolutions and Counter Terrorism frameworks 
When assessing the impact of AQIM terrorism in the Sahel region and North Africa, it is 
imperative to situate this undertaking within the broader spectrum of the terrorism 
phenomenon. Terrorist attacks in 2014 have claimed the lives of more than 43, 500 people 
and injured more than 40, 900 signalling a notable increase from previous years. Africa also 
claimed its share in these figures with groups such as Boko Haram and Al Shabaab recording 
an increase in fatalities of 311% and 141% respectively (Miller, 2015: 4). Although AQIM, 
Ansar Al Dine and newly formed Al Qaeda in West Africa do not feature as the top terrorists 
groups causing the most casualties, they nonetheless remain a pertinent threat to the Sahel 
region and beyond. As noted previously within the study, the events of 9/11 did not initiate 
the beginning of religious terrorism but alerted the world towards the dangers of that type of 
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terrorism. After Al Qaeda’s greatest victory over the West, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) with the consent of the world powers began a concerted effort to combat 
terrorism. The result appeared in the form of the formulation of resolutions and counter-
terrorism frameworks that countries were encouraged to adopt at a global, continental and 
regional levels. As such, there came into effect numerous UNSC resolutions on terrorism, AU 
and EU counter-terrorism frameworks inter alia. It is in this milieu that the foregoing 
sections examine and evaluate these resolutions and paradigms with respect to Africa and 
most particularly the Sahel region. 
 
7.1.1 The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Resolutions 
In its role as the UN primary organ in dealing with international peace and security globally, 
the Security Council has played an active role in combatting terrorism. This is evident 
through the formulation and subsequent adoption of resolutions relating to terrorism. The 
focus of these resolutions have varied from concentrating on specific acts of terror such as 
resolution 1189 that deals with the Kenyan and Tanzanian bombings to more globalised 
incidents such as resolution 1373 that was passed in the wake of 9/11. It is important to note 
that these resolutions were formulated in line with Chapter VII of the UN Charter that deals 
with actions that are a threat to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression (UN, 1945: 
Article 39-51).  
 
Adopted on the 28 of September 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, Resolution 1373 was quite 
significant as it imposed certain legal obligations on member states. With respect to Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the resolution emphatically called upon member states to 
re-double efforts collectively as well as individually, to prevent and suppress 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including, by increased 
co-operation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions 
relating to terrorism to which they are parties and called on all Member States, 
inter alia, to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts by 
criminalizing the provision, acquisition and collection of funds for such acts 
(UNSC, 2001a) 
 
The resolution also led to the establishment of the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC) whose aim was to both assemble the UNSC members and to supervise the actual 
implementation of resolution 1373 by member states. To further support the work of the 
CTC, the UNSC later established the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate 
(CTED) through resolution 1535 which included making recommendations to states based on 
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their responses to the council (Ford, 2011:26). With regards to implementing resolution 1373, 
it required the development of novel administrative structures, setting up of advanced 
technical equipment and substantial stages of training. Furthermore, the successful 
implementation of this resolution also necessitated enhanced security reform sector, 
intelligent units and a well-established financial regulatory mechanism. However, many 
states, particularly in Africa, lack the resources to successfully implement resolution 1373 
(Cortright, 2005: 63). Recognising this shortcoming, the UNSC adopted resolution 1377 
allowing the CTC to support these states through financial, technical, regulatory, legislative 
or other assistance programmes with view to facilitate the implementation of resolution 1373 
(UNSC, 2001b).  
 
As a result, on the 8 September 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 60/288 
(The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy) paving the way for the first 
comprehensive global framework for combatting the threat of terrorism. Taking into 
consideration all the aspects of the previous resolutions, this framework contained a fourfold 
approach to combatting terrorism categorised under four pillars, namely, 1) addressing the 
conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, 2) preventing and combating terrorism, 3) 
building state capacity to counter terrorism and 4) defending human rights while combating 
terrorism (UN General Assembly, 2006: 4-9). These pillars meant to serve as concrete 
measures that states can implement individually or collectively while being assisted by the 
Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) that the Secretary General established in 2005.  
 
On the 14th of June 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 68/276 (the fourth 
review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy) highlighting new issues and challenges 
that have emerged more pertinently over the past few years. While terror groups conducting 
attacks still remain a prevalent threat, the document also revealed lone terrorist attacks and 
(with particular importance to this study) the connection between organized crime and 
terrorism as growing concerns. The review suggested that more emphasis needed to be placed 
on pillars 1 and 4 for a long-term success and as such it set the direction for which the UN 
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to follow until the its next review in 2016 – which 
would be its 10th anniversary since its conception (UN General Assembly, 2014). 
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7.1.2 The African Union Counter-Terrorism Framework 
The recent upsurge in bloodletting by terrorist groups in Africa has invoked questions 
surrounding the role of the African Union and its capabilities in dealing with the ever-
growing threat of terrorism. The continuous inability of African states to combat or even 
contain the proliferation of terror groups in their region cast doubt over the intent and 
willingness of the AU to seriously deal with the issue of terrorism. This further overshadows 
the concerting effort of the AU in its formulation and implementation of legal counter-
terrorism frameworks such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention of 1999 
or the Algiers convention, the 2002 AU Plan of Action  on the Prevention and Combatting 
Terrorism and the Protocol in 2004. 
 
In July 1999 in Algiers, the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 
or the Algiers Convention was adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Head of 
States but was only effectuated in December 2002 after 30 states had ratified it (Ford, 2011: 
29). In addition to providing a definition of terrorism, the Algiers convention elucidated on 
the importance of promoting areas of cooperation among member states, the institution of 
state jurisdiction over acts of terror and as well as initiating a system for extradition, inter-
state investigation and mutual legal assistance. The Algiers convention also required that 
member states adhere to a fourfold commitment towards countering terrorism.  
 
Firstly, as Article 2 (c) of the Algiers convention noted, states must ‘implement the actions, 
including enactment of legislation and the establishment as criminal offences of certain acts 
as required in terms of the international instruments’ (OAU, 1999). As such, these states 
should ratify these international instruments and apply them within their domestic statutes. 
An example of an international instrument that states should implement is the International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 1979. The second commitment emphasises the 
importance of establishing and supporting inter-agency cooperation at a national level (OAU, 
1999: Article 4) prior to an inter-state level (Article 5). The third commitment follows from 
the second, as it requires that states improve cross-border policing and surveillance so as 
‘develop and strengthen methods of controlling and monitoring land, sea and air borders and 
customs and immigration check points’ (Article 4 (2c)).  
 
Additionally, this also includes sharing of information amongst member states as Article 5 (5) 
stresses that ‘States Parties shall co-operate among themselves in conducting and exchanging 
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studies and researches on how to combat terrorist acts and to exchange expertise relating to 
control of terrorist acts’. Lastly, the fourth commitment pertains to states not providing any 
type of support to terrorist groups such as ‘providing safe sanctuaries both directly or 
indirectly, financing groups, committing or inciting to commit terrorist acts through 
provisions of weapons or issuing of travel documents and visas’ (Article 4(1)). Although the 
Algiers convention predated the establishment of the African Union, it remained the 
foundation for subsequent counter-terrorism frameworks and as at 2013, only 41 out of 52 
African states had ratified the convention. 
 
After its inauguration in July 2002 from the amalgamation of the OAU and the African 
Economic Community (AEC), the African Union (AU) set out to align itself with the global 
fight against terror, with particular focus on Africa. The Algiers Convention coupled with the 
reality of international terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attacks propelled the aspect of 
counter-terrorism to become a major part within the formation of the AU’s peace and security 
framework (Ford, 2015: 30). In continuing to concretize the commitments and strategies as 
stated in the Algiers Convention, the AU’s Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating 
of Terrorism was adopted in September 2002. In addition to calling on member states to 
ratify and implement the Algiers Convention, this plan sought to adopt practical counter-
terrorism measures to address challenges that included police and border control, legislative 
and judicial measures, financing of terrorism and exchange of information (Moki, 2007:115). 
To this end, the Plan of Action initiated the establishment of the AU’s Peace and Security 
Council whose objective is to ‘harmonize and coordinate continental efforts in the prevention 
and combating of terrorism’ (African Union, 2002: Article 4 ).  
 
Moreover, as part of a practical implementation of its Plan of Action of 2002, the AU 
established within the Peace and Security Council the African Centre for the Study and 
Research of Terrorism (ACSRT or CAERT in French). The objectives of this centre include 
researching all aspects of terrorism, developing counter-terrorism capacity building programs 
and provide advice to member states based on recommendations on a needs basis (African 
Union, 2004: Article 5 (2 a-f)). In its 7th Annual Focal Points Meeting in December 2013, the 
ACSRT presented its plan for the implementation of the Plan of Action for the following four 
years which consisted of four pillars. These included 1) ‘enhance information sharing and 
dissemination through the ACSRT CT-Situation-Room and the CT Early Warning System 
(CTEWS)’; 2) augment the rate of publications while at the same time improving its quality; 
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3) implement national and regional capacity building programmes; and 4) improving the 
relationship and cooperation of the research centre with the regional and international 
partners (AU PSC, 2014: Paragraph 41).  
 
In July 2004, the AU adopted the 2004 Protocol of the Algiers Convention which recognised 
the ‘linkages between terrorism and mercenarism, weapons of mass destruction, drug 
trafficking, corruption, transnational organized crimes, money laundering, and the illicit 
proliferation of small arms’ as increasing prevalent risks associated with terrorism (African 
Union, 2004: Preamble). The purpose of this protocol was to rectify a significant weakness of 
the OAU Convention in that the latter did not have an implementation mechanism per se. To 
this end, the protocol mandated the AU PSC to monitor and facilitate implementation in 
addition to harmonizing and coordinating efforts and also encouraged Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) to play a more active role (Allison, 2015:5). Although the protocol was 
adopted in 2004, it only entered into force on the 26th of February 2014 after 15 countries 
ratified the Protocol on the Algiers convention of 2004. The reason behind the delay was that 
the African Union required 15 countries to ratify the protocol before it could be effectuated 
and it only attained that number a decade later (AU, 2004: Article 10). Thus far, states that 
are in the foreground in the war on terror such as Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Mauritania and 
Chad have not ratified the protocol yet (Allison, 2015: 5; AU, 2014).  
 
In an effort to continue implementing counter-terrorism measures in Africa in accordance 
with  the relevant regional and international mechanisms, the AU has developed the African 
Model Anti-Terrorism Law as a comprehensive legal instrument that member states can 
adopt to ‘strengthen their criminal justice system and effectively prevent and combat 
terrorism’ (AU PSC, 2014: Par. 46). However, according to the AU PSC report 2014, only 
three member states (Ghana, Mauritius and Burkina Faso) have approached the AU for 
assistance in implementing the new model into their national legislation. From these 
preceding paragraphs, it can be argued that there has been progress in terms of formulating 
continental counter-terrorism frameworks from the time of the OAU until its evolution into 
the AU despite the accusations levelled against the continental organisation for its futile 
effort in reducing the threat of terrorism.    
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7.2 Assessing Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Africa 
In its quest to prevent and combat terrorism in Africa, the AU has adopted some of the UN 
priority areas such as counter-terrorism legislation, operational mechanism and capacity 
building. While this approach has a share of its advantages in terms of security related affairs, 
it is also quite limited in the area of development. This can be partly blamed on the emphasis 
on security-related mechanism by the UN at the expense of the development aspects, which 
are more relevant within the African context. As a result, the UN has experienced limited 
success in its implementation of counter-terrorism objectives in Africa. Scholars argue that 
this lack of success is due to the failure on the part of the UN to take into consideration the 
African perspective when implementing these mechanisms in addition to the dearth of 
political will on the part of African leaders. Hence, this has translated into slow progress to 
implement counter-terrorism measures by the AU.  
 
The accusations levelled against the AU for the slow pace of its implementation of the 
Algiers convention and subsequent protocols and counter-terrorism mechanisms can be 
categorised according to two levels. Firstly, the AU continuously faces challenges from the 
international community in such a way that its efforts in the global fights against terror are 
eclipsed by the actions of the US, Britain, France and the UN. Moreover, the AU has received 
little support from these Western powers towards assistance in implementing anti-terrorism 
instruments on the African continent. Instead of collaborating with the AU, these Western 
powers prefer working directly with the member states as exemplified in the US 
establishment of the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) in 2002 to assist Mali, Mauritania, Niger and 
Chad (Moki, 2007: 121).  
 
The second aspect concerns the continental level where the AU faces challenges from its own 
member states regarding the implementation of the 1999 OAU convention. The primary 
difficulty included persuading all the member states to ratify the Algiers convention. After 
much urging and continuous pleading by the AU, only 41 member states have ratified the 
convention until present. In a similar fashion, it took just over a decade for the 2004 Protocol 
to enter into effect and there has been only 15 ratifications. Additionally, according to Ford 
(2011:31), the AU ‘lacks a system for monitoring implementation of measures by states even 
if they do ratify’. The lack of funds, resources and technical knowledge remain the greatest 
challenges that contribute to the failure of the AU to fully implement its counter-terrorism 
strategies (Moki, 2007: 133). This in turn leads to the AU relying on the assistance of the UN 
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and the Western countries which prefer to function or implement their strategies 
independently of the African continental organisation. Having said that, this section now 
turns to assessing two of these strategies that have been implemented in North Africa: the 
Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Operation Serval. 
 
7.2.1 Assessing the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the US administration, concerned with the proliferation 
of religious terrorism in Africa particularly the Horn of Africa and North Africa, launched the 
Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) in 2002 – a counter-terrorism partnership with the Sahelian 
countries of Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Chad (Le Seuer, 2010: 152). As a means to attain its 
primary goal of preventing terrorists from establishing safe havens in the Sahel, the program 
received $7 million in funding (Davis, 2007: 151). Other objectives of the initiative included 
protecting porous borders from illegal activities such as drug trafficking and people 
smuggling, providing training in capacity building, training military and civilian officials in 
the four countries and encouraging information exchange among states. At that time, the 
GSPC, one of the terrorists groups that turned the Sahel into their operation hub with the 
kidnapping of 32 European tourists, was based in Algeria. Thus, although not included in the 
PSI, Algeria became a pivotal partner of the US in its war on terror in the region. The first 
success of the PSI was the capture of GSPC’s Saifi – the mastermind behind the kidnapping 
of the European tourists. However, the PSI failed to capitalise on this initial success and 
effectively combat the GSPC. Inadequate funding, the unwillingness of states to share 
information and the US shouldering all the responsibilities of the initiative contributed 
towards the inability of the PSI to achieve its full potential (Moki, 2007:132).     
 
Realising its mistakes from the PSI initiative, the US administration launched the Trans-
Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2005. Unlike the PSI, the TSCTP 
received much more adequate funding with $100 million per year for five years (Davis, 2007: 
155). The increase in funding resulted in a more ambitious counter-terrorism program that 
saw the partnership extending to nine states as compared to the previous four. The TSCTP 
included Chad, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria and Senegal. 
The core objectives of the TSCTP remained the same of the PSI but extended to include, 
‘strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities; enhancing and institutionalizing 
cooperation among the region’s security forces; promoting democratic governance; 
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discrediting terrorist ideology; and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States’ 
(Reeve & Pelter, 2014:22). Operation Flintlock, the first military exercise where over 3000 
soldiers from the partner states underwent training, signalled the beginning of the TSCTP 
initiative in North Africa and represented the model for future counter-terrorism initiatives 
(Le Seuer, 2010: 216). Operation Flintlock had a threefold objective of ‘coordinating security 
along borders, strengthen patrols in ungoverned territories and prevent establishment of 
terrorist bases’ (Harmon, 2010: 23).  
 
Thus far, TSCTP has been in operation for about a decade during which time it has yielded 
both gains and losses for the US and its partners. The program has been successful in that it 
has improved the US-Africa relations in terms of counter-terrorism and military cooperation. 
This is witnessed in the various joint military exercises that the US conducts every year with 
countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and Mali amongst others. Yet, the TSCTP had not 
succeeded in achieving its original objective of totally eliminating terrorist activities in the 
Sahel. This lack of success is proven by the increase in both terrorist attacks in the Sahel and 
illegal activities across borders. Scholars have thus debated as to whether or not the US had 
exaggerated the situation or the threat warranted by AQIM in order to initiate the large 
deployment and massive funding towards US counter-terrorism measures which have 
resulted in embarrassing situations for the TSCTP (Harmon, 2010: 23). Four military armies 
that the US trained under the PSI have proceeded to overthrow their government. These 
include Chad in 2006, Mauritania in 2008, Niger in 2010 and the most recent being Mali in 
2012. While the latter coup enabled AQIM to capitalise on the situation, the jihadists were 
prevented from overthrowing the government when the French launched operation Serval. 
  
7.2.2 An Assessment of Operation Serval 
On the 11th of January 2013, at the request of Malian transitional government, France 
launched Operation Serval to defend the Malian capital from falling into the control of AQIM 
and its jihadist allies. Having already positioned its equipment and military at different bases 
in the region such as Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, Abidjan in the Ivory Coast and 
N’Djamena in Chad, the French military intervened within hours of the request by the Malian 
transitional government. Within the next months, the operation possessed a sizeable troop of 
about 6 500 military personnel of which 4000 were French, 2000 were from Chad and the 
rest from other countries (Reeve & Pelter, 2014: 10). The operation also received support 
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from allies of France. The support by the US, UK, UAE, Netherlands, Sweden and Canada 
came in the form of strategic transport aircrafts for troops, helicopters and armour while 
Germany, Belgium, Denmark and Spain provided tactical transport aircraft and battlefield 
helicopters (French Ministry of Defence, 2013). The aims of the mission were directly clear: 
helping the Malian Armed Forces to fight the jihadists while protecting civilians and assisting 
Mali in recovering its sovereignty and legitimacy (French Ministry of Defence, 2013). As 
elaborated in the previous chapter, the operation was perceived as successful in that the 
jihadists were defeated and dispersed into the Sahel.  
 
Enthused by the success of Operation Serval, the French administration initiated operation 
Barkhane in 2014. Contrasting Serval which had a specific time frame, Barkhane had an 
open-ended mandate that would see 3 000 French military combatants based indefinitely in 
five states of the Sahel (also referred to as the G5 Sahel) – Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and 
Burkina Faso. According to the French Ministry of Defence (2014), Operation Barkhane had 
two objectives, namely, to support the Sahel-Saharan partners in their fight against terrorist 
groups and to prevent the establishment of sanctuaries for jihadists in the Sahel. It is 
interesting to note that the objectives of Barkhane have a similar nuance to those of the PSI.  
 
In assessing Operation Serval for its eighteen months’ duration reveals both successes and 
limitations. The operation claimed tactical success such as combating jihadist groups, 
eliminating and repelling their fighters. Yet, the operation has also encountered numerous 
strategic limitations. Despite the French and UN military presence in Mali, the country has 
not regained its full sovereignty as there are still insurgent groups fighting in the North of the 
country rendering it ungovernable. The French administration and its allies mistakenly 
perceived the problem in Mali as a terrorist rather than a political problem. In so doing, it 
focused on defeating AQIM and its affiliates at the expense of addressing the prior political 
conflict (between the Tuaregs groups and the government) that contributed to a conducive 
environment for the terrorist groups (Reeve & Pelter, 2014: 26).  
 
After the intervention, porous borders have allowed jihadists to disperse into neighbouring 
countries, thus transferring jihadist terrorism there. Consequently, groups that have splintered 
from AQIM have strengthened and become more ambitious as demonstrated in the increase 
in attacks in Mali, Niger and Mauritania in the aftermath of operation Serval (Mielcarek, 
2013). According to Reeve & Pelter (2014: 27), ransom payments paid to AQIM by 
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governments in order to secure the release of hostages have also undermined the counter-
terrorism efforts by the French military. 
 
7.3 Policy Recommendations: Towards a Viable Solution 
After having examined the existing counter-terrorism framework models of the UN and the 
AU that are in place in Africa, the ensuing sections suggest some recommendations in order 
to curb the rising threat of AQIM and other terrorist groups that are in operation in the Sahel. 
To this extent, it becomes imperative to be reminded of the words of the former UN 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who stated the following: 
Our strategy against terrorism must be comprehensive and should be based on 
five pillars : it must aim at dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or 
supporting it; it must deny terrorists access to funds and materials; it must 
deter states from sponsoring terrorism; it must develop state capacity to defeat 
terrorism; and it must defend human rights (Annan, 2005:26).   
 
A concerted effort towards effectively countering the threat of terrorism needs to contain 
these five pillars in order to provide a holistic approach towards engaging this threat. Over 
the years, the UN has passed counter-terrorism resolutions that have gradually incorporated 
these five pillars. The period after the 9/11 events has witnessed an increase in a counter-
terrorism measures focusing predominantly on the security aspect. Yet, cases such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq have led scholars and policy makers to realise the importance of 
development within the paradigm of counter-terrorism measure. Subsequently, there was a 
shift from an emphasis on security towards a more balanced approach that include the nexus 
of security and development. It is with this in mind that the following recommendations are 
formulated. 
 
7.3.1 Greater Cooperation of States in the Maghreb Region 
From the above, it can be argued that Africa has been open to security assistance from the 
international community as witnessed in the establishment of the TSCTP and even the French 
partnership in the region. Yet, there has been a disparity between the rhetoric and the 
assistance provided as most times counter-terrorism frameworks initiated by the AU fail in 
many states due to a lack of funds. In this regard, it is important for the international 
community to assist and form partnership with the AU prior to attempting to provide funds to 
individual countries in their battle against terrorism. While the US security initiative through 
the TSCTP have proven beneficial to the states involved since its inception in 2005 (Filiu, 
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2009:10), the US has been less active in military actions than their French counterparts as 
signalled through Operation Serval followed by Barkhane. Meanwhile, the French may have 
been successful in expelling the jihadists from Northern Mali but its increased military 
presence have done little to alleviate the belief that the Western nations have a hidden agenda 
in their ‘interventions’ in Africa. In order to dispel this notion that the West is only concerned 
about their own interests, Filiu (2009:10) recommends that these nations keep a low profile 
lest they provide a palpable excuse for jihadi propaganda. Additionally, France and the US 
should assume the role of support to the AU instead of taking the lead role in their operations. 
 
Since AQIM’s theatre of operation in the Sahel stretches over various states in North Africa, 
it is not viable to expect that either the French or the US in cooperation with a few states can 
actively counter the threat of terrorism. In order to effectively counter the threat of AQIM and 
its affiliates, it is imperative for North and West African states to cooperate so as to mount a 
concerted counter-terrorism effort. This should include inter-regional information sharing 
among states and the creation of a joint commitment of forces in the Sahel with the aim of 
undertaking joint transnational operations along the borders. The North African regional 
block – the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA) consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia  – should be made operational once again.  
 
The fact that AQIM has evolved from a group exclusive within the Algerian context to a 
transnational terror group operating in the Sahel, implies that that there need to be increased 
bilateral exchanges between regional blocks such as UMA, ECOWAS and ECCAS to make 
the trans-Saharan cooperation a success. In this regard, Ammour (2012:7) recommends that 
to promote efficient intelligence sharing, ‘stabilization efforts must be structured around 
integrated regional zones grappling with the same problems’. To prevent local resentment, 
these integrated forces should consist of locals as well, for instance, in the case of countering 
the threat in Mali the Tuaregs groups should be incorporated within the armed forces. 
However, it is also important not to create a situation where the locals are armed to the point 
that they can initiate their own armed rebellion. 
 
7.3.2 Towards a More Holistic Approach: A focus on Development 
Although security is important in countering terrorism, it is only a part of the solution. To 
effectively counter the threat of AQIM and its affiliates, there is need for a greater 
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coordinated effort among the states of the region not only in terms of security action but also 
in respect to development. To this end, these states should resolve ‘the current condition of 
political stasis, economic stagnation, social atrophy, and cultural discrimination’ (Pham, 
2011b: 253). A greater political will on the part of all the African leaders is required to 
confront challenges such as ‘bad governance, poverty, local conflicts over resources, 
corruption, youth unemployment and alienated peripheries’ (Crisis Group, 2014:23). It is 
imperative to note that while these latter issues may not create terrorists as such, they 
nonetheless incubate a context of grievances that is conductive towards the recruitment of 
individuals by terrorist groups. As examined in this study, the context of poor governance, 
unemployment and corruption were proven to be primary catalysts that contributed towards 
the outbreak of the Algerian civil war.  
 
One important aspect towards alleviating the threat of AQIM is to promote good governance 
in the region, especially in the context of Mali where intermittent cases of terrorist attacks 
have occurred in recent years. However, it is difficult to practice good governance in a 
situation where there is conflict and a lack of trust. Presently, the conflict in Northern Mali is 
still ongoing as various armed groups continue to violate the cessation of hostility agreement 
that was signed in Algiers on the 19th February (UNSC, 2015). To resolve this issue of poor 
governance, it is imperative for regional blocks to promote a commitment to democratic 
ideals such as advocating for good governance while rejecting military coups, respecting of 
human rights and listening to the voice of the people. Another pertinent challenge to good 
governance is corruption by government officials. Resolving this issue requires that the 
international aid packages are attached with strict anti-corruption strategies consisting of 
‘formation of authoritative, well-resourced civil society oversight mechanisms and simple, 
measurable indicators’ (Crisis Group, 2015: 23). In addition to the international aid donors, it 
is imperative that regional governments should also support and implement anti-corruption 
strategies nationally.  
 
Another way to counter terrorism is to foster environments that are not conducive for terrorist 
recruitment. This can be achieved (at least in part) by establishing opportunities of 
employment and education. A focus on sustainable development with the objective of 
responding to the social and economic structural problem of the society helps to ‘eliminate 
the conditions favourable to terrorists’ (Jebnoun, 2007:19). As Ammour (2012: 6-7) notes, 
expanding economic integration between Maghrebian, Sahelian, and Sub-Saharan partners 
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can result in establishing projects which in turn would increase the accessibility of 
disregarded regions. In responding to the grievances of the populace the government would 
not only garner legitimacy and trust but also receive support which in turn would deal a blow 
to the recruitment strategies of terrorist groups.  
 
There is also a greater need to empower the youth through education, skills training and 
capacity building. To prevent a situation where the young people are unemployed after school 
– a situation in Algeria that led to the October riots of 1988 – the governments of the region 
need to adhere to a long-term commitment of creating economic opportunities for the 
growing youth population (Pham, 2011b: 253). For instance, this could come in the form of 
special policies that equip the youth with skills training in order to help them find 
employment or introduce programmes that are geared towards creating sustainable economic 
development initiatives aimed at the unemployed youth.    
 
7.3.3 Countering Extremist Ideologies 
Poverty and unemployment in themselves are not the efficient causes of terrorism but rather 
factors that facilitate the recruitment of individuals by terrorist groups. Bin Laden and Al 
Zawahiri, who are regarded as the most infamous of all jihadists, were wealthy individuals – 
Bin Laden was the son of a millionaire and Zawahiri was a surgeon. As noted in chapter four 
of this study, the leaders of Salafi-jihadist groups distort the original teachings in order to 
rationalise their causes. Poverty and social inequalities create a milieu that is susceptible for 
young people to be easily exposed to these radical and extremist ideologies. Echoing this 
argument, the AU Peace and Security council (2014) posit that ‘social grievances, unresolved 
conflicts, personal or community identity claims, religion, history, marginalization, exclusion 
and a host of other factors…produce an ideological narrative that creates an enabling 
environment for recruitment and radicalization’. Therefore, in order to counter extremist 
ideologies, two aspects need to be taken into account.  
 
Firstly, there is a need to tackle the issues that foster the milieu that enables recruitment, 
namely, social and economic inequalities. Ways to tackle the latter issues were discussed in 
the previous subsection above. Secondly, a concerted effort by different actors within society 
is required to formulate programmes dealing with counter-radicalisation and counter-
extremist ideologies. To this end, it is important for government to partner with members of 
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civil societies to formulate such measures as to effectively counter extremist ideologies. 
Programmes should be aimed at creating awareness of the extremist ideologies among the 
local communities. In this regard, religious leaders should denounce all forms of extremist 
teachings in particular the distortions of sacred texts used by jihadist groups such as AQIM. 
Islamic religious leaders should further collaborate and establish religious curriculum that 
aims at rectifying the distorted message advocated by the Salafi-Jihadist extremists. One 
example is the letter that Muslim scholars wrote to ISIL leader Al Baghdadi spotlighting his 
error and distortion of the text of the Quran (Ababakar et al., 2014).  
 
Additionally, counter-radicalisation programmes should be introduced in schools where 
children can learn about inter-cultural understanding, tolerance, non-violence and respect for 
all religions. Another place that is vulnerable to violent radicalisation is prison where inmates 
are easily influenced by fellow jihadists. Special programmes should be implemented to 
prevent prison from becoming pool of recruits for jihadist groups such as rehabilitation 
programmes consisting of psychological counselling and religious education. Internet and 
social media is another avenue that jihadist groups exploit in order to disseminate their 
propaganda. This is dangerously evident in the surge of individuals, male and female, that 
flock to join ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Consequently, those who are not able to travel to fight 
with the group are inspired by their ideologies and conduct individual attacks in their own 
countries (often referred to as lone wolf attacks).  
 
While it is important for government to curb this propaganda through censoring and 
monitoring these websites and social media arena, it should be careful not to go as far as 
undermining the democratic ideals of freedom of expression. To adequately counter extremist 
ideologies, it is imperative for the government of the region to work in tandem with their civil 
societies to formulate policies and legislation with the above in mind and implement them. In 
turn, the AU in conjunction with global partners should provide support to regional and local 
governments in their effort to counter extremist ideologies and preventing the exacerbation of 
terrorism. Chelin & Mngomezulu (2015:123) emphasise that countering violent radicalisation 
should be perceived as a collective responsibility and ‘should not be shouldered solely by 




7.3.4 Responding to the crime-terror nexus 
The AU Peace and Security Council Report (2014) acknowledges that the link between 
transnational terrorism and organised crime has become increasing apparent especially in the 
Sahel. The report overtly acknowledges this when it defines the Movement for Unity and 
Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO after its French acronym), an offshoot of AQIM, as a group 
‘financed by narco-trafficking, comprising radical elements and fanatics with a mercantile 
profit maximization mind-set’ (2014: Par 19). This proliferating trend of the crime-terror 
nexus is a threat to peace and security in the continent and the world. In addition to 
possessing an inadequate legal framework to deal with the crime-terror threat, many states 
differ on their stance towards hybrid groups.  
 
While in one state a hybrid group would be classified as a terrorist entity, another state would 
perceive the same group as a criminal organisation. Ammour (2012:2) captures this dilemma 
between the Algeria and the Sahelian states in this regard when he notes that ‘they 
[Algerians] see AQIM as a new type of terrorist organization driven by its extremist 
ideology. Sahelian states, in contrast, stress the criminal nature of the group, with its heavy 
engagement in drug and arms trafficking, as the most dangerous aspect of this regional 
threat’. Hence, the failure to formulate an adequate definition of the threat at hand results in a 
fragmented response to the danger.  
 
Having realised the threat of the crime-terror nexus and the danger it poses, the UN passed 
resolution 2195 on the 14th December 2014. In the latter, the UN warns states of the 
increasing danger of terrorist groups dealing in cross-border criminal activities as a means to 
fund their activities. Although the resolution does not delve into the motivations and 
functioning of hybrid groups such as AQIM, it nonetheless emphasises that states be assisted 
in implementing legal frameworks that can deal with people involved in terrorist and 
organised criminal activities.  
 
One way to combat the crime-terror threat is to establish a joint-task force at national and 
regional level that investigates the convergence of organized crime organisations and terrorist 
entities. Incidentally, this is what the new President of Nigeria (Muhammadu Buhari) is 
trying to do. The responsibility of the task force would be to monitor and evaluate the trends 
and movement of these hybrid groups and provide feedback to the member-states. The 
agreement to establish African Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), which is 
129 
 
designed to address the threat of organized crime on the continent, is a beginning to achieving 
this joint-task force. The objective of AFRIPOL is to ‘promote police coordination at 
strategic, operational and tactical levels bearing in mind the common challenges facing the 
African countries in terms of terrorism and organized transnational crime’ (AU PSR, 2014: 
par 63).  
 
While AFRIPOL is a positive start towards addressing the crime-terror threat, there is a need 
for the newly formed organisation to receive adequate support nationally, regionally and 
internationally. To successfully address the threat of AQIM and its affiliates, AFRIPOL 
needs to foster cooperation in transnational policing by ‘building liaison networks, 
exchanging police personnel, organising foreign training programs, joint operations, 
intelligence sharing operations and capacity building programs’ (Liang, 2011:4).  
 
The private sector, particularly the financial industry, can become pivotal partners in 
combatting the crime-terror nexus as they can help identify and report cases of fraud, money 
laundering and other illegal financial activities. Furthermore, these industries can work with 
the government to identify lacunae in the financial system which criminal/terrorist groups 
exploit and help formulate laws and policies to address these challenges. There should be 
greater cooperation between law enforcement organisations that deal with organized crime 
and counter-terrorism institutions on a local, national, regional and international level. In 
short, as Pham (2011b: 254) cautions, AQIM currently ‘cannot be effectively combated by 
military means alone…an even broader approach will be required, one that does justice to the 
growing nexus between extremism, terrorism, and organized criminality’. 
7.4 Quo Vadis AQIM 
After assessing the present activities of AQIM, there are two possibilities that emerge 
concerning the possibilities of the future of the group. Firstly, AQIM could continue to break 
up into different splinter groups in the Sahel region. Secondly, through a coordinated effort 
from the international, regional and local communities, AQIM could be defeated. Apropos 
the first possibility, it appears that it is already in progress. Several splinter groups from 
AQIM have already joined forces and controlling major parts of the Sahel and West Africa. 
For instance, Al Mourabitoun – a merger of two former AQIM splinter groups Al 
Mulathamun Battalion (The Battalion of Those Who Sign in Blood) and MUJAO – has been 
responsible for the majority of attacks in Mali in the past two years. Its leader, Mokhtar 
130 
 
Belmokhtar, recently pledged allegiance to Al Zawahiri and changed the jihadist group name 
to Al Qaeda in West Africa (Joscelyn, 2015). While some scholars perceive the name change 
as a commitment of Belmokhtar to Al Qaeda Central, it may also signal a move away from 
the shadow of AQIM as he aims to establish his group as the predominant Al Qaeda 
organisation in the Sahel and West Africa. Under the leadership of Belmokhtar, the group has 
become one of the most infamous and dangerous group operating in the Sahel to the extent 
that it was labelled as the most dangerous threat to US interests in the Sahel (US Department 
of State, 2014).  
 
The on-going jihadist feud between ISIL and Al Qaeda central have resulted in ideological 
differences between jihadist groups around the globe and particularly Africa. This is 
pertinently observant in the case of the name change of Boko Haram to the Islamic State in 
West Africa after its leader pledged allegiance to the ISIL’s Al Baghdadi. The ISIL – Al 
Qaeda feud has also affected AQIM as there appears to be an ideological battle of allegiance 
amongst its members. On the 14th of July 2014, AQIM’s judge for the central region Abu 
Abdullah Othman al-Asemi released a tape pledging support to the ISIL leader. Two weeks 
later, the emir of AQIM, Droukdel opening renewed the group’s allegiance to Al Qaeda’s 
leader Al Zawahiri (Maghrebia News, 2014). This aperture within AQIM, resonating with the 
rift amongst jihadists group over the continent, may result in the group splitting in two where 
one division follows Al Zawahiri while the other pledges to Al Baghdadi. A further cause of 
concern is that jihadist groups in Africa may turn against each other due to differing 
ideologies as it the case in Syria between Al Qaeda’s Al Nusra Front and ISIL.  
 
Having said this, the second possibility appears as a distant and unattainable ideal. At present, 
the prospects of eliminating terrorism on the African continent is a monumental task that is 
made more difficult with the proliferation of jihadist groups and increase in lone wolf attacks 
as exemplified in the Tunisian museum attacks on the 18th of March 2015 and the beach 
resort on the 26th of June 2015. With the increase in terror attacks by both individuals and 
groups, it becomes evident that military force alone is not a viable approach to address the 
issue of terrorism, more so with respect to AQIM. Taking cue from the Global Terrorism 
Index 2014, Chelin & Mngomezulu (2015:123) spotlight that initiating a political process and 
policing have been two of the most successful strategies for defeating terrorist groups from 
the 1960s. The two strategies were responsible for defeating over 80 per cent of terrorist 
groups while military engagement accounted for only about 7 per cent.  
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The strategy of initiating a political process may not be a viable option in dealing with AQIM 
due to its ideology and objectives. Military engagement is also unfeasible in ending AQIM as 
exemplified in the French military operation Serval.  However, policing is a more achievable 
method to defeating AQIM, especially regarding the current split occurring within the group. 
This would require that the above-mentioned recommendations be effectuated, with specific 
focus on countering extremist ideologies of the group and addressing the grievances that lead 
these individuals to join the group in the first place. This would also provide AFRIPOL with 
the opportunity to participate in its first mission and achieve a successful result. In short, this 
indicates that there is hope in defeating AQIM but only if the concerting effort on part of 
actors concerned in countering the threat reflects the urgency of the situation.        
7.5 Overall Summary 
This study began by providing an introductory background to the socio-political context that 
precipitated the emergence of AQIM on the Algerian and North African scene. Then, in order 
to situate the reader within the broader perspective of the study, key concepts were delineated 
from existing literature to achieve that aim. These themes included terrorism, organised 
crime, ideology, the crime-terror continuum and their inter-relatedness within the AQIM 
network. As a means to further comprehend the functioning of the group in relation to the 
ideology that drives its members, a brief historical excursion was undertaken in the Salafist-
Jihadist school of thought. In tandem with religious ideology, the context that inspired the 
rise of Militant Islamism was also examined in events such as the Iranian revolution and the 
Afghan jihad against the Soviets.  
 
Moving from a general to a more particular perspective, the study then proceeded to discover 
the origins of AQIM by analysing the root causes of the Algerian civil war. The assessment 
of the Algerian conflict revealed that the combination of the colonial legacy, poor economic 
decisions and increasing grievances of the populace contributed towards the outbreak of the 
civil war. This evaluation correlated with the greed and grievance theoretical framework 
advanced in chapter three of the study as a means to understand the origins of conflict. 
Subsequently the evolution of AQIM was examined through the lens of the convergence 
thesis, also elaborated in chapter three. To this end, the study assessed the number of terror 
attacks and the criminal activities conducted by the group from the time of its emergence 
until present times. Although AQIM has reduced its number of terror attacks in the past 
years, it has by no means transformed into an organised crime network. Hence, the findings 
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of the study reveal that AQIM has transformed into a hybrid organisation that displays both 
economic and ideological motivations. In other words, AQIM behaves both as a terrorist 
group and an organised crime entity.  
 
Taking a cue from this observation, this study proffered some recommendations for states to 
combat the menace of AQIM on the continent. Prior to giving its recommendations, the study 
assessed current counter-terrorism measures that are in place and highlighted their deficiency 
in dealing with the new form of threat that AQIM poses. To effectively counter-AQIM, the 
recommendations that the study suggests include greater cooperation among local and 
regional governments in terms of military and intelligence sharing,  focus on development 
and good governance, alleviation of poverty and countering extremist ideologies in schools 
and prisons inter alia. Finally, it is imperative to remember that AQIM cannot be defeated 
instantaneously but rather it would require patience and effort which would have to be 
translated into a long-term commitment.  
 
Therefore, the recommendations given above should be viewed in this light. As such, their 
success requires greater cooperation not only between the international, regional and local 
governments but also between the government and its citizenry.  It is only when the 
government can gain the trust and legitimacy of the populace through good governance, 
reducing poverty, eliminating discrimination, preventing situation of grievances and 
improving economic opportunities for all that groups such as AQIM can lose their raison 
d’être and thus function only within the confines of history books. Failure to do this would be 
tantamount to trying to extinguish a conflagration of fire using bare hands or trying to kill a 
wild lion using a pocketknife. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon. The only way it can be 
combated is through concerted effort by different stakeholders. It needs a comprehensive 
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